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1. Time Series Momentum 
1.1 Introduction  
Trend following investing, the strategy of buying recent winners and selling (or shorting) 
recent losers, has long been a significant component of the decision making processes of 
many investors, both professional and private. While a wide variety of methodologies 
are used to capture the effect, all rely on the assumption of a continuation in price returns, 
or, put alternatively, that there is a positive relationship between past and future price 
returns. A recent paper (Moskowitz et al. (2012)) terms the effect time series momentum 
and provides a formal definition from an academic perspective. 
This investigation of time series momentum has its origins in an observation made in 
early 2013. Commodity trading advisors (CTAs), generally assumed to run trend 
following investment strategies, received a significant inflow of assets following large 
positive returns in 2008. However, performance since then had been below the long term 
average. In the twenty-nine years from 1980 to 2008, the BarclayHedge CTA Index 
generated an average return of 12.2% per annum and only had three years with a negative 
return, while of the following four years to 2012, three had negative returns. The 
divergence becomes even more striking when compared to the long run performance of 
trend following, illustrated in Figure 1.1. The cumulative return of time series 
momentum in the period from 1950 to 2012, Panel A, shows significant positive excess 
return with few periods of negative or even flat returns1. In contrast, Panel B shows that 
collectively, CTA funds failed to produce any return over the four years between 2009 
and 2012. 
Unsurprisingly, the divergence between long-term and more recent performance led to 
uncertainty over the future prospects of the strategy. In particular, investors focused on 
whether the future performance would more closely resemble the poor performance of 
the previous four years or the long term average. The observation that the poor 
performance corresponded to the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression led 
to another hypothesis, that rather than being atypical, the poor performance was normal 
for the strategy in times of financial crisis and as markets reverted to normal behaviour 
                                                 
1 The results shown here are consistent with other long term assessments of time series momentum, 
including Hurst et al. (2012) and Lempérière et al. (2014). 
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following the crisis, the performance of time series momentum would return to its typical 
long term values.  
Figure 1.1 
Cumulative Performance of Time Series Momentum 
The figure shows the cumulative return of time series momentum based strategies over the long and 
short term. Panel A shows the natural log of the cumulative return of a simulated diversified portfolio 
generated with a time series momentum trading strategy from January 1950 to December 2012. Panel 
B shows the natural log of the cumulative return of two leading trend following CTA indices over the 
four year period from January 2009 to December 2012. 
 
Panel A Panel B
Source: Hutchinson and O'Brien (2015) Source: Newedge, Hedge Fund Research 
 
The investigation highlighted that while the strategy was extensively used in industry, 
time series momentum is underrepresented in academic literature. Much of the available 
work shows that the strategy has generated returns significantly above the risk free rate. 
While evidence that information from past price history could predict future price 
movements is, prima facie, an anomaly to the efficient market hypothesis, the potential 
anomaly has received far less attention in the literature than others.  
1.2 Time Series Momentum 
Trading based on continuations in price movement has a long history in the finance 
industry. Charles Dow emphasises the importance of trend when setting out what was to 
become Dow Theory at the turn of the twentieth century (Bishop (1961)) and aspects of 
the strategy can be traced back even further to candlestick analysis, developed for rice 
trading in 18th century Japan (Caginalp and Laurent (1998)). More recently, surveys have 
consistently shown that technical trading strategies, of which trend following is a core 
component, are not only a significant part of the investment processes of both 
professional and individual investors across financial markets but are often given more 
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weight than fundamental analysis (Lukac et al. (1988a) and Menkhoff and Taylor 
(2007)). The performance of CTAs (Fung and Hsieh (2001)) and currency traders 
(Pojarliev and Levich (2008)) has been shown to be closely related to the return of trend 
following strategies. This wide spread use of trend following techniques is not of itself 
evidence that time series momentum can form the basis of a profitable trading strategy 
but it does provide motivation for detailed study of the phenomenon.  
The literature investigating time series momentum is limited, much of the work has 
focused on simple performance tests, looking at the return generated by time series 
momentum based trading strategies, generally relative to the risk free rate. The 
preponderance of evidence confirms the excess performance of the strategy2.  
Despite this, there is little literature focused on explaining an apparent anomaly to the 
efficient market hypothesis. Academic debate on the hypothesis has focused almost 
exclusively on equity markets (see, for example, Fama (1991) and Malkiel (2003) who 
highlight the key issues from an efficient market hypothesis perspective and Barberis 
and Thaler (2003) who present a behavioural overview). While there have been a number 
of efforts to explain the returns as risk premia (Fung and Hsieh (2001) make a key 
contribution) or through other market mechanisms (see, for example, LeBaron (1999)), 
the literature remains incomplete.  
1.2.1 Commodity Trading Advisors 
The industry sector most closely associated with trend following strategies is managed 
futures where commodity trading advisors (CTAs) are generally assumed to run trend 
following strategies. Testing this assumption, Fung and Hsieh (1997) show trend-
following is the dominant self-described strategy and the same authors show (Fung and 
Hsieh (2001)) that despite the variation in individual CTA returns, trend following is the 
single dominant component. 
CTAs have become a significant part of portfolios of institutional investors. Figure 1.2 
shows the growth in assets under management, which reached 334bn USD by the first 
quarter of 2016. A detailed analysis of the risks and returns to time series momentum 
investing is essential to these investors to fully understand their allocation to CTAs.  
                                                 
2 This will be extensively discussed in the next chapter 
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However, the reverse is also true, analysis of the returns of CTAs can be used to support 
evidence generated from statistical analysis of price data and simulated portfolios. As 
the performance of CTAs includes all transaction costs and represents out of sample tests 
of trading strategies, evidence of positive CTA returns can be used to counter two of the 
most common explanations of anomalous results; profits are not available after properly 
incorporating costs and apparent profits are the result of data mining. 
The other key group associated with trend following is foreign exchange dealers, who 
use trend based indicators as one class in a range of technical analysis techniques 
(Menkhoff and Taylor (2007)). The performance of currency managers is less relevant 
to this study as, by focusing on only one asset class, it provides a smaller research sample 
and trend following is not the dominant style, particularly at horizons beyond one month 
(see, for example, Cheung et al. (2004) and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004)). 
Figure 1.2 
CTA Industry – Assets Under Management: 1980-2016 
The table shows the assets under management in the CTA industry, reported by BarclayHedge. The 
numbers are presented in billions of USD. All figures represent year end, except 2016, which is dated 
to the end of the first quarter. The AUM were 310 million USD in 1980 and first exceeded one billion 
USD in 1984. 
 
Source: BarclayHedge 
 
1.3 Report Structure 
The research is presented in six further chapters. The next chapter reviews the literature, 
to identify the current understanding of time series momentum and the appropriate 
framework for its analysis. The research is presented as three self-contained research 
papers, each making up one of the following three chapters. This is followed by a chapter 
investigating the robustness of assumptions implicit in the research papers. The report 
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finishes with a chapter drawing together the main conclusion of the three papers in a 
unified structure. The content is laid out below. 
Time Series Momentum: Theory & Evidence: The current academic evidence on time 
series momentum is assessed. The chapter starts with a discussion of the efficient market 
hypothesis and arbitrage pricing theory. These form the central framework for analysing 
investment returns in general and time series momentum in this research program. This 
is followed by a survey of the evidence on the performance profiles series momentum 
trading strategies and CTAs. The explanations for the excess return are then reviewed. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of behavioural finance as a key alternative to 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
Is This Time Different? Trend-Following and Financial Crises: This paper explores 
the divergence between typical long run performance and the poor performance 
highlighted from 2009 to 2013, testing whether this is typical of trend-following 
strategies in periods of financial crisis. The return series of diversified and asset class 
specific portfolios, constructed from time series momentum signals, are generated over 
the period from1925 to 2013. Financial crises in this period are identified and differences 
in return characteristics between crisis and normal periods presented. The tests are 
repeated on a set of regional crises to confirm earlier results. Finally, the price structure 
of the futures’ market is analysed in crisis and non-crisis periods to help explain the 
divergent performance of time series momentum.  
Time Series Momentum and Macroeconomic Risk: The paper investigates the 
relationship between time series momentum and economic conditions. It focuses on the 
period 1950, when monthly economic data first becomes available, to 2014. The link 
between performance and, first, the economic cycle and then, economic variables is 
investigated. Both linear and conditional relationships are considered. The returns to 
time series momentum are decomposed into components based on economic factor 
related and idiosyncratic asset returns. Finally, a recently developed measure of 
economic uncertainty is used to investigate the relationship between time series 
momentum and macroeconomic risk.  
Just a One Trick Pony? An Analysis of CTA Risk and Return: The focus of the 
research moves to CTAs and the performance of these funds is analysed based on the 
constituents of the BarclayHedge CTA database. A bias free database is used to measure 
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the performance of CTAs from 1987 to 2015. Using both cluster analysis and self-
classification, the assertion that CTAs are a homogenous group employing time series 
momentum based trading strategies is tested. A variety of alternative risk premia are 
used to categorise the trading strategies of the different groupings and to measure the 
extent the performances can be explained by risk premia. 
Robustness: The work concludes with an investigation of the robustness of three 
assumptions implicit in the previous work and in the literature in general. The validity 
of basing conclusions on synthetic futures prices rather than exchange traded data is 
tested. The transaction cost model used in the papers is verified. Finally, the fee structure 
of CTAs is examined, in particular the assumption of a standard structure comprising of 
a 2% management fee and 20% incentive fee is tested. 
Conclusion: The final chapter unifies the conclusions reached in the previous three 
papers into a single theme. It finishes by highlighting areas requiring further research.  
1.4 Key Contributions 
The research program set out to extend the literature on time series momentum and each 
paper makes a number of contributions, set out below. 
Is This Time Different? Trend Following and Financial Crises 
This is the first peer reviewed paper to generate a performance series for time series 
momentum back to 1925. Further the paper shows the returns, generated from an 
internationally diversified, multi asset class portfolio are statistically significantly above 
the risk free rate over the period even after the deduction of management fees. It provides 
direct evidence on the performance of the strategy during financial crises, demonstrating 
the link between below average performance of time series momentum strategies and 
financial crises. Finally, the paper identifies structural changes in futures markets 
between crisis and non-crisis periods, providing an explanation for the poor performance 
of time series momentum in crisis periods.  
Time Series Momentum and Macroeconomic Risk 
The paper provides evidence that time series momentum portfolio returns exhibit 
statistically significant differences across the business cycle. The performance is shown 
to be higher in economic expansions than recessions, although on average positive in 
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both. Second, it demonstrates that though a linear macroeconomic factor model has little 
explanatory power, a model which allows the coefficients to vary through time, does 
result in several of the macroeconomic factors having a statistically significant 
relationship with time series momentum. The paper decomposes the returns of time 
series momentum portfolios based on economic factor-related or asset-specific portions 
of price returns. It shows that both portions generate statistically significant returns and 
that the returns generated by the economic factor related portfolio account for about 40% 
of total returns. Finally, using a new estimation approach for the measurement of 
economic uncertainty, a negative relationship between the performance of time series 
momentum and economic uncertainty is demonstrated.  
Just a One Trick Pony? An Analysis of CTA Risk and Return  
The paper develops and uses a novel approach to create the largest backfill free CTA 
dataset in the literature. The time period for accurate estimates of historical performance 
of the industry is extended back to 1987 and the statistically significant excess 
performance of CTAs back to that date is demonstrated. This is the first study to unify 
contemporary global asset pricing based risk factors with a CTA database to examine 
risk attribution and performance. Utilising clustering techniques, eight different styles of 
CTA were identified, each with different risk attributes. Analysis of the clusters showed 
that while the time series momentum factor was the dominant strategy in CTAs, a 
number of the clusters did not have any exposure to time series momentum. Finally, 
evidence is presented to show that exposure to alternative risk factors explains a 
relatively small proportion of differences in CTA fund returns, casting doubt on the use 
of low cost alternative beta products to capture the returns of this sector. 
1.5 Notes 
1.5.1 Terminology 
There is some variation across the literature in the terminology used to describe time 
series momentum. The term trend-following is generally used within the finance industry 
to refer to the trading strategy, while both time series momentum (Moskowitz et al. 
(2012) claim to be the first to use this term) and trend-following are used in the academic 
literature. The two terms are used synonymously in this work. The term momentum is 
generally accepted to refer to cross-sectional momentum. This is the market neutral 
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strategy of buying relative winners and shorting relative losers. This strategy is related 
to but distinct from time series momentum. However, the term is occasionally used to 
refer to time series momentum, rare in academic literature but more common in industry. 
In this work momentum always refers to cross-sectional momentum. 
Commodities has a broad and narrow meaning within the literature. In the widest 
definition the term can encompass any futures contract trading on an exchange. 
However, the narrow meaning is preferred here where the term commodity refers to 
future contracts based on physical products (typically agricultural products, metals and 
energy) but excludes futures based on financial products (equities indices, government 
bonds and currencies). 
It is common across the literature to divide the futures universe into four sub-classes, 
equity indices, government bonds, currencies and commodities and analyse these 
separately. Where this work refers to four asset classes or standard asset classes, it refers 
to this specific division. In the few cases where an alternative division arising in the 
literature is discussed, the classes are referred to specifically. 
1.5.2 Formatting 
The content of the three papers, presented in chapters three, four and five, matches 
exactly the published or latest version. However, in order to maintain a consistent 
presentation through-out a number of changes were made in the layout and referencing. 
A single unified bibliography provided with the individual bibliographies removed. The 
numbering of sections, tables and figures is updated to allow consistent referencing. 
Finally, a number of tables and figures were reformatted to better fit the layout of this 
document. An extra appendix, including addition material to the published paper, is 
added to chapter three. 
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Chapter Two 
Time Series Momentum: Theory and Evidence 
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2. Time Series Momentum: Theory & Evidence 
This chapter describes the current literature on time series momentum and issues related 
to its study. The research that forms the basis of this work is presented as three papers, 
each with a literature review specific to its individual research focus. In order to 
minimise repetition, this review will focus on areas not covered in the individual reviews. 
It is divided into five sections, designed to provide a background to and context for the 
research carried out for the thesis. 
Efficient Market Hypothesis: The efficient market hypothesis and the related pricing 
models are discussed first. Collectively, these provides the framework for much of the 
analysis in the following chapters, as well as in the literature in general. In addition, early 
tests of the random walk model are closely linked with tests for time series 
autocorrelation. 
The Performance of Time Series Momentum: This section focuses on reviewing the 
evidence presented in the literature on the presence of time series momentum in financial 
markets and related effects, in particular, whether time series momentum can provide 
the basis for investment strategies generating returns in excess of the risk free rate. In 
addition, by taking a chronological approach to the evidence, it also tracks the evolution 
of the methods used to capture time series momentum.  
Commodity Trading Advisors: The performance of CTAs, generally assumed to run 
time series momentum strategies, is analysed to supplement the evidence presented in 
the previous section, again focusing on performance measured in excess of the risk free 
rate. The biases inherent in extracting aggregate return statistics from databases are 
highlighted.  
The Theory of Time Series Momentum: The explanation of the excess returns is 
considered here, focusing on risk based explanations, including the development of risk 
factors. Efforts to explain the return by exposure to traditional pricing factors is first 
discussed. This is followed by an examination of the development of alternative risk 
premia and the section concludes with a review of efforts to link the performance of 
investment strategies to the economy.  
12 
 
Behavioural Finance: The chapter finishes with a brief review of behavioural finance. 
Although the links between time series momentum and behavioural biases have not been 
explored yet, many of the models proposed by theorists attempt to explain price 
continuations in other contexts, notably cross-sectional momentum in equity markets.  
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In general terms, an efficient market is one in which prices “fully reflect” all available 
information (Fama (1970)). Jensen (1978) provides a more formal definition: 
“A market is efficient with respect to information set ߠ௧, if it is impossible to make 
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set	ߠ௧.”  
The concept has a long history in the study of financial markets. Courtault et al. (2000) 
trace its origins back to Bachalier’s Theorie de la Speculation, published in 1900. 
Bachalier finds security prices on the Paris bourse can be modelled using a random walk 
and, consequently, “the expectation of the speculator is zero”.  
Working (1934) is generally credited with highlighting the random walk model of price 
returns in the academic literature. Kendall and Hill (1953) produce an early rigorous test, 
their analysis, based on the movement of aggregate prices by industry, finds no evidence 
of autocorrelation. Osborne (1959) also finds that price movements on the New York 
Stock exchange are random, although he suggests they are better characterised by a log-
normal distribution. A series of papers, including Samuelson (1965) and Fama and 
Blume (1966), fail to find evidence of violations of the random walk model in market 
data. 
In Efficient Capital Markets, Fama (1970) provides a synthesis of the research up to that 
time. The author defines an efficient market as one “in which prices always fully reflect 
available information” and sets out three forms of the hypothesis; weak, semi-strong and 
strong. The author later associates each form of the hypothesis with an set of tests (Fama 
(1991)), outlined in Table 2.1.  
As it is defined fully from past prices, time series momentum is linked to the weak form 
of the hypothesis. The hypothesis presents a theoretical barrier to trend based strategies 
generating an excess return, while evidence of excess return, absent a risk based 
explanation, provides a challenge to the hypothesis.  
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Table 2.1 
The Forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The table list the three forms of the efficient market hypothesis, along with the relevant information set, 
(Fama (1970)) and the appropriate tests (Fama (1991)). 
 
Form Information Set Test 
   
Weak Past price history Return predictability 
Semi-Strong All publically available information Event studies 
Strong All public and private information Private information 
   
 
The standard pricing model for tests of the efficient market hypothesis, still widely used, 
is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This was developed by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) and has its origins in modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz (1952, 1959)). This pricing model defines the expected return of an asset, 
ܧሺݎሻ, in terms of its relationship to the expected return of its market 
 ܧሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௙ ൅ ߚ൫ܧሺݎ௠ሻ െ ݎ௙൯ (2.1)
Here ܧሺݎ௠ሻ is the expected return of the market, ݎ௙ is the risk free rate and ߚ the exposure 
of the asset to the market risk.  
There was a significant change in emphasis in the research following Efficient Capital 
Markets. The focus moved almost exclusively to equity markets, where a variety of 
anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis were identified. These include value (Basu 
(1977) and Rosenberg et al. (1985)), size (Banz (1981) and Keim (1983)), long-term 
reversal (De Bondt and Thaler (1985)) and cross-sectional momentum (Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993)). There was particular focus on US markets, with others often limited to 
confirming results found there. Rouwenhorst (1998), for example, confirms cross-
sectional momentum as a global phenomenon, following its identification in the US 
equity market (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). 
The use of a single risk factor was also questioned, Black et al. (1972) provide an early 
challenge. Ross (1973, 1976) develops a theoretic framework, Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 
for multifactor asset pricing models, so that  
 
ܧሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௙ ൅෍ߚ௙
ி
௙ୀଵ
. ܧሺܴ ௙ܲሻ (2.2)
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Here ߚ௙ is the securities exposure to risk factor f, ܧሺܴ ௙ܲሻ is the expected risk premium 
associated with factor f and F is the total number of risk factors. Tests for market 
efficiency are a joint test of the hypothesis and the pricing model used (Fama (1970) and 
Schwert (2003)). As a consequence, anomalous empirical evidence can be caused by or 
attributed to an incorrectly specified pricing model.  
Fama and French (1996) make use of this framework to introduce value and size risk 
factors, developing a widely used three factor model 
 ݎ ൌ 	 ݎ௙ ൅ ߚଵ൫ݎ௠ െ ݎ௙൯ ൅ ߚଶܵܯܤ ൅ ߚଷܪܯܮ (2.3)
SMB and HML are the size and value factors respectively, following the notation in the 
original paper, and ߚଵ, ߚଶ	and	ߚଷ are the asset’s exposure to the risk factors. This new 
model successfully explained a number of previously identified anomalies. Efforts to 
improve the model for equity markets continue, Carhart (1997) proposes cross-sectional 
momentum as a fourth risk factor and Chen and Zhang (2010) propose an alternative 
three factor model, based on investment and return on assets. To date none of these has 
gained popularity and the three factor model remains central to the analysis of asset and 
investment returns.  
The link between risk and return in the pricing model is captured by Malkiel (2003) in 
his practical definition of efficient markets as markets that ‘do not allow investors to 
earn above average returns without accepting above average risks’ or, referring back to 
Equation 2.2, a portfolio with no exposure to risk factors (that is, all ߚ ൌ 0ሻ has an 
expected return equal to the risk free rate. This has caused some problems in the study 
of alternative investments. While these generate returns in excess of the risk free rate 
(Capocci and Hübner (2004), Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Schneeweis et al. (2012)), 
traditional pricing factors only partially explain these returns (see, for example, Fung 
and Hsieh (2001) and Schneeweis et al. (2013)). In order to make the returns of 
alternative investments compatible with the efficient market hypothesis it became 
necessary to identify new risk premia. Fung and Hsieh (2001) introduce an option based 
factor to capture the risk in trend following, while more recently, Asness et al. (2013) 
and Koijen et al. (2013) have developed pricing factors for value, momentum and carry 
based on multi-asset class futures contracts. 
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The inter-temporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) provides an alternative 
approach to resolve the problem of the single risk factor in the CAPM. The theoretical 
frame work was developed by Merton (1973) and expands on earlier work by Black et 
al. (1972) which shows it is possible to construct a portfolio with no correlation to the 
market (a zero-beta portfolio) that has a return in excess of the risk free rate, an anomaly 
to the CAPM. The ICAPM is based on investors maximizing lifetime consumption given 
uncertain investment opportunity sets. The model can be expressed as  
 ߙ௜ െ ݎ௙ ൌ ߛ௠൫ߙெ െ ݎ௙൯ ൅ ߛ௜൫ߙ଴ െ ݎ௙൯ (2.4)
An investor is compensated for exposure to the market (ߛ௠) and investment opportunities 
(ߛ௜ሻ.	The returns on the asset, market and zero-beta portfolio are ߙ௜, ߙெ	and 
ߙ଴	respectively. It should be noted that ߛ represents a complex function of market and 
asset characteristics rather than a constant as in the case of APT models. Applied over a 
single period, there is no uncertainty in the investment state variable ሺߛ௜ ൌ 0ሻ and the 
model simplifies to the CAPM. 
Fama (1996) reinterprets the model in a mean-variance efficient framework, based on 
investors hedging different aspects of future consumption-investment trade-offs through 
portfolios mimicking consumption risk, expressing the ICAPM as:  
 
ܧሺݎሻ െ ݎ௙ ൌ ߚ௠൫ܧሺݎெሻ െ ݎ௙൯ ൅෍ߚ௦൫ܧሺݎሻ െ ݎ௙൯
ௌ
௡ୀଵ
 (2.5)
This derivation produce a model in a form equivalent to the multi-factor APT models. 
However, there is a limit to the extent that ICAPM and APT models can be regarded as 
different implementations of the same underlying model. While In and Kim (2007) show 
that the Fama-French value and size factors can provide good proxies for changing 
investment opportunities in the long run, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) show that most 
of the common APT risk factors produce inconsistent (or impossible) results when used 
in the ICAPM framework.  
Before leaving the discussion on efficient markets, it is worth highlighting three of the 
most common counter arguments to evidence of anomalies to the theory; incorrectly 
specified risk models, transaction costs and data mining.  
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In a sweeping dismissal of the theories of behavioural finance (these are discussed in 
detail in Section 2.5) Malkiel (2003) associates anomalies to incorrectly specified risk 
factors. In specific examples, the Fama and French (1996) definition of value and size 
as a risk factor removes a number of anomalies, while Carhart (1997) eliminates the 
problematic momentum effect by adding it to the standard Fama and French (1996) three 
factor model. 
Fama (1991) allows for market frictions, such as transaction and information costs, in a 
practical interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis where ‘prices reflect 
information to the point where marginal benefits of acting on information do not exceed 
the marginal costs’. This allows statistically significant predictive relationships to exist 
in price returns without violating the efficient market hypothesis. Correct interpretation 
of such results can only be achieved by the inclusion of appropriate market friction costs 
in the analysis. 
Data mining, that is finding random features in data that appear statistically significant 
but disappear when tested out of sample, can cause false identification of anomalies. 
Fama (1998) dismisses much of the anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis as 
“chance results” which “tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique”. 
Tomek and Querin (1984) show that it is possible to observe systematic components in 
random data and consequently that ex-post profitable trading rules can be found in such 
data. Schwert (2003) shows a number of anomalies disappear when tested out of sample, 
while specific to this study, Ready (2002) argues that positive evidence for a moving 
average based strategy can be attributed to data mining. A subtle variation, fine-tuning 
(over-fitting) parameters of a trading rule, provides a level of return that is not repeatable 
when applied outside the sample universe (see, for example, Boguth et al. (2011)) and 
suggest gross returns are above rather than below transaction costs. 
2.2 The Performance of Time Series Momentum 
The section reports the results of a survey of the literature for evidence on the presence 
of time series momentum. As the literature that deals explicitly with time series 
momentum does not appear until recently, Moskowitz et al. (2012) claim to have named 
the effect as recently as 2012, the survey cannot be limited by this definition. Instead it 
covers evidence for effects consequent to the phenomenon. In particular this includes 
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evidence for continuation (autocorrelation) in price returns and the performance of 
trading strategies which rely on such continuations.  
Where evidence is presented on trading performance, the focus is on returns in excess of 
the risk free rate, equivalent to a positive Sharpe ratio. The discussion also tracks the 
development of the methodologies used to capture and study time series momentum. It 
follows Park and Irwin (2007) in splitting the literature around a break occurring with 
the publication of Lukac et al. (1988b), which introduced significant improvements in 
methodology, including improved statistical analysis and incorporation of trading 
frictions. The analysis techniques move closer to practitioners’, testing industry standard 
trading rules and basing conclusions on the performance of portfolios created from those 
rules.  
Moskowitz et al. (2012), a key paper in the development of the theory of time series 
momentum, is discussed in detail. This section concludes by looking at a number of 
papers that present analyses of time series momentum over long time horizons.  
2.2.1 Random Walks and Filters 
The earliest evidence regarding return continuations focused on tests of the random walk 
model. Typical of these early papers was small sample size, with conclusions based on 
as little as a single index or a pair of futures. Analysis was based on higher frequency 
data, typically daily or weekly returns, and relationships tested over shorter time horizons 
than later work. A summary of the key early contributions is presented in Table 2.2. 
The earliest investigations examined statistical properties of price series, particularly 
return autocorrelation, for compatibility with the random walk model. Kendall and Hill 
(1953) show that first order price changes were uncorrelated, while Osborne (1959) 
shows price changes of equities on the New York Stock Exchange were log normally 
distributed and the variance was directly related to the period of measurement. Alexander 
(1961) focuses on runs, consecutive price moves in the same direction, and finds their 
distribution consistent with a random walk.  
Alexander (1961) attempted to resolve the conflict between the widespread use of 
technical analysis by practitioners and his finding that prices followed a random walk by 
developing and testing trading rules based on filters. Starting with the assumption that 
market noise obscures price patterns, simple filter rules were developed to exclude small 
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price movements. These were shown to form the basis of profitable trading. As defined 
by Alexander (1961), the rules require that after a market rises (falls) x%, investors go 
long (short) and hold the position until the market falls (rises) x%.  
Table 2.2 
Price Return Continuations 
The table summarises the key academic papers investigating price returns for evidence of continuation. 
 
Paper Focus Markets Conclusions 
    
Kendall and Hill 
(1953) 
Random 
walk 
Equity sector 
indices, spot cotton 
and wheat 
All series fit random walk model 
except cotton 
Osborne (1959) Random 
walk 
Equities, NYSE Distribution of price changes is 
consistent with random walk 
Alexander (1961) Filters DJIA No evidence against random walk 
but filters can produce excess 
returns 
Houthakker (1961) Stop orders Wheat and corn 
futures 
Stop orders improve returns over a 
buy and hold strategy 
Smidt (1965) Filters Soybean futures Some evidence of serial correlation. 
Fama and Blume 
(1966) 
Filters Thirty US equities Prices follow a random walk and 
filters are not profitable after costs 
Stevenson and Bear 
(1970) 
Filters Corn and soybean 
futures 
Trends are present in commodity 
prices 
Taylor (1982) Random 
walk 
Ten commodity 
futures and GBP 
Rejects the random walk hypothesis 
Irwin and Uhrig (1984) Technical 
trading rules 
Eight commodities Trading rules are generally positive, 
reject random walk. 
Sweeney (1986) Filters Ten currencies 
against USD
Significant inefficiencies in 
currency markets 
    
 
In the same year, Houthakker (1961) showed trading rules based on stop-loss orders were 
profitable while Smidt (1965) tests similar rules on soybean futures, concluding that 
there is some evidence of serial correlation in this market. As with Alexander (1961), 
Fama and Blume (1966) find no evidence of serial correlation in stock markets and that 
filter rules can generate positive returns. However, they conclude these profits are not 
robust to transaction costs. This foreshadows the later interpretation of an efficient 
market, which allows for price predictability provided it is not economically significant 
(Fama (1991)). 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) find significant variation from efficiency in corn and soya 
bean futures over a twelve year period. They demonstrate evidence of reversals at a two-
day horizon, serial correlation at a five-day horizon and positive returns for a range of 
filter based trading rules. Taylor (1982) finds evidence for serial correlation across nine 
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commodities based on significant statistical improvements. Irwin and Uhrig (1984) test 
a set of six trend based technical rules, using a wide range of parameters and find that 
87.5% are profitable. Taking a more negative view, Tomek and Querin (1984) show that 
it is possible to develop profitable trading rules ex-post on prices following a random 
walk. In the first extensive study of filters in currency markets after the breakdown of 
the Bretton-Woods system, Sweeney (1986) concludes that the presence of significant 
profits to a filter rule is evidence for inefficiency in the market.  
Cutler et al. (1991) extend the range of markets which provide evidence for time series 
momentum by demonstrating autocorrelation of price returns in the US housing market 
and a variety of collectables, including coins, stamps and old master paintings. 
2.2.2 Technical Trading Rules 
The managed funds industry changed dramatically in the years after 1980. Assets under 
management in public futures funds grew one hundred fold from 1978 to 1984 (Irwin 
and Brorsen (1985)), while at the same time managers embraced computer technology 
and technical trading rules, with 80% of managed future funds relying on computer based 
technical trading strategies (Lukac et al. (1988a)). 
This widespread use of technical trading strategies provided motivation for tests of their 
effectiveness, and explicitly or implicitly, the efficient markets hypothesis. A wide 
variety of different strategies were used in practice, Murphy (1999) provides an 
extensive, if uncritical, review of trading rules from an industry perspective. The 
majority are based on continuation patterns and Lukac et al. (1988b) highlights the 
similarity of these systems. 
The publication of Lukac et al. (1988b) marks a significant change in the nature of the 
analysis (Park and Irwin (2007)). The sample set becomes broader, monthly data 
dominated and time horizons became longer. In addition, studies began to focus on the 
returns of portfolios formed from trading rules rather than individual instruments as the 
basis for conclusions. Research began to focus on trading rules used in the industry and 
the filters developed by Alexander (1961) tend to disappear from the literature.  
Indicators based on time series momentum can be broken into two main categories, 
moving average and channel breakout (see Szakmary et al. (2010) for an example of this 
categorisation). Marshall et al. (2016) demonstrate the high correlation between the 
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return series of portfolios generated from moving average and time series momentum 
rules. The moving average systems rely on comparing two moving averages a long and 
short formation period:  
 ܯܣ௟௢௡௚ ൌ
∑ ݌௧ି௜௡೗௜ୀଵ
݊௟ ,ܯܣ௦௛௢௥௧ ൌ
∑ ݌௧ି௜௡ೞ௜ୀଵ
݊௦ , ݊௟ ൐ ݊௦	 (2.6)
The number of time periods in the long and short formation periods are ݊௟ and ݊௦ 
respectively. Positions are taken according to simple criteria, buy (go long) when 
ܯܣ௦௛௢௥௧ ൐ ܯܣ௟௢௡௚ and sell (go short) when ܯܣ௦௛௢௥௧ ൏ ܯܣ௟௢௡௚. The channel breakout 
indicator is based on a price moving outside a channel, itself defined as a function of 
past price history. Typically the top of the channel is defined by a trailing high and the 
bottom of the channel is defined by a trailing low. 
 ܥܪ௧௢௣ ൌ ܯܣܺሺ݌௧ିଵ, … , ݌௧ି௡ሻ, ܥܪ௕௢௧௧௢௠ ൌ ܯܣܺሺ݌௧ିଵ, … , ݌௧ି௡ሻ,	 (2.7)
Assets are bought (long) when the price moves above ܥܪ௧௢௣ and sold (shorted) when the 
price crosses below ܥܪ௕௢௧௧௢௠. 
The basic models allow significant variation, (see Murphy (1999)) including using 
multiple moving averages, alternative methods of averaging, a range of functions to 
define channels and different look-back periods for opening and closing positions. The 
ability of investigators to vary the parameters, allows critics, not unjustifiably, to cite 
data mining as the cause of successful tests, see Ready (2002) for an example of this line 
of argument. 
Results across all markets and on all dates, tend to show that technical trend indicators 
produce positive excess returns. Lukac et al. (1988b) test twelve trading rules on twelve 
US futures contracts, including currency and interest rate futures, and find the majority 
generate positive returns. Mulvey et al. (2004) show that a portfolio of diverse futures 
contracts created using a moving average rule consistently generates excess return over 
a number of sub-periods and, significantly, that this excess return is not explained by the 
CAPM model.  
Faber (2007) tests a moving average rule on five market indices and government bonds 
and find it outperforms a buy and hold strategy. Szakmary et al. (2010) test both moving 
average and channel rules on twenty-eight commodity futures over a period of forty-
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eight years. Individually, twenty-two and twenty-six of the futures had positive returns 
for the rules respectively. Both rules produce portfolios with statistically significant 
excess returns over both the full period and in each of four sub-periods. 
Harris and Yilmaz (2009) is one of a few papers that increases the complexity of 
methodology used to capture time series momentum. In an echo of Alexander (1961), 
they build filters to extract the low frequency component of price movements of a group 
of nine currencies against the US dollar. They show that both the more complex rules 
and simpler moving average based rules generate excess returns. Allen and Karjalainen 
(1999) use a genetic algorithm to eliminate the effect of data-mining but find they cannot 
generate excess returns out of sample. 
A significant number of studies focus on the currency market, showing positive excess 
return for both channel (Taylor (1994)) and moving average (Okunev and White (2003)) 
rules when applied to a basket of currencies. James (2003b) examines the performance 
of moving average rules and finds positive returns for thirteen out of fourteen currency 
pairs and a combined portfolio with a Sharpe ratio in excess of one. The author 
subsequently shows (James (2003a)) that the findings are robust to the parameters 
chosen, using formation periods of one to five months. Menkhoff et al. (2012b) 
investigate the performance of moving average rules over a thirty-five year period and 
show Sharpe ratios between 0.77 and 0.88 at the portfolio level. 
The evidence is not unanimous. Ready (2002) suggests the success of moving average 
rules depends on data mining, although this conclusion is based on studies of a single 
index. Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) analyse the performance of a moving average rule 
on a basket of six major currencies and show that while the strategy made substantial 
profits from 1975 to 1995, returns in the following ten years were negative but not 
statistically different from zero. This is consistent with the efficient market view that, 
once an anomaly has been identified, it will be arbitraged away (Fama (1970)).  
Cross-sectional momentum is a trading strategy distinct from but correlated to time series 
momentum. Both rely on continuation of price returns, absolute in the case of time series 
momentum and relative for cross-sectional momentum. Moskowitz et al. (2012) 
highlight the similarities between the two measures and, in particular, show that time 
series momentum fully explains the return of cross-sectional momentum. As a 
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consequence, evidence of excess returns for cross-sectional momentum can be 
interpreted as indirect evidence of time series momentum returns. 
In the commodity markets both Erb and Harvey (2006) and Miffre and Rallis (2007) 
show that the strategy produces excess returns. These results are shown to be robust to a 
range of market based risk factors (Erb and Harvey (2006)), formation period and time 
period (Miffre and Rallis (2007)). 
Both Burnside et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al. (2012b) highlight positive excess returns 
to momentum in currency markets. Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006) show a momentum 
portfolio formed from thirty-eight national equity indices over a thirty year period 
produce statistically significant returns. Stevenson (2009) shows a positive return to a 
cross-sectional momentum trading strategy based on eleven international real estate 
indices. 
More generally, Asness et al. (2013) show momentum producing positive Sharpe ratios 
for four asset classes. Fuertes et al. (2010) combine momentum with carry to provide a 
profitable trading strategy.  
2.2.3 Time Series Momentum 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) is a key paper in the development of the understanding of time 
series momentum. The paper develops a rigorous definition of time series momentum, 
which extends beyond trading rules. The methodology developed has been used as a 
standard definition of time series momentum, including Baltas and Kosowski (2013) and 
Marshall et al. (2016). Hong and Satchell (2015) recognise moving average as a means 
of capturing the return to time series momentum as defined by Moskowitz et al. (2012). 
The time series return signal, ܶܵܯ௧, is defined as the sign of the return, r, of an asset 
over a given time horizon, h, so 
 ܶܵܯ௧ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ሺݎ௧,௧ି௛ሻ (2.8)
The paper extensively investigates the performance of a global portfolio and four asset 
class portfolios. Tests were carried out across a wide range of formation and holding 
periods. All formation periods up to two years, globally and for each asset class produce 
statistically significant excess returns. Performance was measured against three risk 
models; the Fama and French (1992) three factor model, the value and momentum 
(cross-sectional) factors developed by Asness et al. (2013) and a model specific to the 
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paper. Focusing on the twelve month formation period, the key results, reproduced in 
Figure 2.3, shows statistically significant excess return across the four asset classes 
(Panel A) and the failure of risk factors to explain the returns of a global portfolio (Panel 
B).  
A twelve month time series momentum trading rule was applied to each of the fifty-eight 
instruments in the data universe individually and excess returns were generated for all 
instruments.  
Figure 2.1 
The Excess Return of Time Series Momentum: 1985-2012 
The figure show the test statistics of the excess return (intercept) of simulated time series momentum 
portfolios reported by Moskowitz et al. (2012). Panel A reports the performance of four asset class 
portfolios; equity indices (EQ), government bonds (BN), currencies (FX) and commodities (CM). Panel 
B shows the test statistics of the excess return of a diversified portfolio over three different risk models; 
a model specified in the paper (MOP), the Fama-French model (F-F), and the risk model (AMP) 
developed in Asness et al. (2013). 
 
Panel A Panel B
Source: Moskowitz et al. (2012)  
 
The introduction of a standard definition of time series momentum compliments other 
recent formalisations of alternative risk factors based on trading strategies; carry (Koijen 
et al. (2013)) value and momentum (Asness et al. (2013)) and facilitates study of the 
phenomenon. 
The paper identifies the presence of serial autocorrelation of returns in futures markets 
at horizons of up to twelve months. This finding opens up new possibilities for 
understanding time series momentum as well as justifying the use of twelve months as 
the standard formation period3. In addition, time series momentum is demonstrated 
across all major asset classes, both in terms of excess returns and the presence of 
                                                 
3 Cutler et al. (1991) provide evidence of autocorrelation in an earlier period, 1960 to 1988, but not in the 
context of times series momentum. 
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autocorrelations in price returns. This indicates the mechanism of time series momentum 
is universal and that investigation of the effect should focus on global rather than market 
or asset specific explanations.  
Finally, the paper highlights the correlation between time series momentum and cross-
sectional momentum, showing that the returns to cross-sectional momentum are fully 
captured by its exposure to time series momentum. 
2.2.4 Long Term Performance 
A number of studies examine the performance of trend following over the long term. 
The early studies are typically based on a US stock index. Neftci (1991) shows that a 
moving average indicator has predictive power for the Dow Jones Industrials over two 
centuries up to 1976. Brock et al. (1992) identify statistically significant returns to both 
moving average and channel rules from 1896 to 1987, with statistically significant results 
in each of four sub-periods. Siegel and Coxe (2002) provide evidence that a moving 
average rule improves timing on the stock market over the period 1885 to 1997. Faber 
(2007) confirms the long term excess return over the period from 1900 to 2005. In 
addition, he shows that the trading rules work out of sample in four additional markets 
(UK, France, Germany and Australia) and are robust to the choice of formation period, 
generating similar results while varying this from six to fourteen months. 
Two later papers test the idea that the findings of Brock et al. (1992) can be attributed to 
data mining with contrasting results. Sullivan et al. (1999) use a bootstrap methodology 
and conclude the results are robust while Ready (2002) uses a genetic algorithm to argue 
they are the result of data mining.  
Two recent studies have attempted to extend the return series of momentum backwards 
in time by analysing the performance of a multi asset class portfolio. Hurst et al. (2012) 
follow an approach similar to Moskowitz et al. (2012) and base their analyses on the 
performance of simulated portfolios created using a time series momentum strategy. The 
portfolio comprises of instruments with exchange traded futures prices, supplemented 
with synthetic prices to extend the sample period backwards. The returns of the portfolio 
are broken down into ten year periods, reproduced in Figure 2.4. A positive Sharpe ratio 
is reported for each decade, the lowest value being 0.53. These results are net of 
transaction costs and the standard fee structure of 2% (management fee) and 20% 
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(incentive fee). The returns after 1983, which are primarily based on exchange traded 
futures data, remain high.  
Lempérière et al. (2014) move the time series back a further century, showing positive 
and statistically significant Sharpe ratios for each fifty year period from 1800. The results 
for the earlier periods should be treated with caution as they are based on spot prices 
rather than future prices. However, results from 1960, based on exchange traded 
contracts and arranged in decades, confirms the result of Hurst et al. (2012). 
Figure 2.2 
Simulated Performance of Time Series Momentum: 1903-2012 
The figure shows the Sharpe ratio of a simulated portfolio of futures generated using a time series of 
momentum strategy reported by Hurst et al. (2012). The portfolio is constructed of futures based on 
equity indices, government bonds, currencies and commodities. The Sharpe ratio is calculated on the 
portfolio return net of trading costs, management fee (2%) and performance fee (20%). 
  
Source:Hurst et al. (2012)  
 
2.3 Commodity Trading Advisors 
Times series momentum is generally believed to be the dominant factor of CTAs (see 
Elton et al. (1987) and Lukac et al. (1988a) for early examples). The assumption is tested 
more rigorously by Fung and Hsieh (2001), who show trend following factors explain a 
significant portion of CTA returns while Baltas and Kosowski (2013) demonstrate the 
high correlation between CTA and trend following returns.  
This provides an alternative approach to assessing the performance of time series 
momentum as CTA returns data provides an indirect measure of the returns to time series 
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momentum. Realized returns have two important characteristics, they are net of 
transaction costs and out of sample. Evidence of positive returns derived from CTA 
performance cannot be dismissed as the results of either under incorporation of 
transaction costs or data mining, two of the common objections to results anomalous to 
the efficient market hypothesis.  
Fund databases are subject to significant biases which, if not correctly accounted for, can 
lead to significant over statement of performance (Brown et al. (1992)). Fung and Hsieh 
(1997, 2000) provide an analysis specific to the CTA industry, highlighting the potential 
problems caused by survivorship bias, back-fill bias (instant history in their terms) and 
selection bias. Fung and Hsieh (2009) highlight issues that can arise from the dynamic 
structure of databases, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) focus on one aspect of this, the 
significant survivorship bias the can result from merging databases. A number of recent 
papers including Bhardwaj et al. (2014), Jorion and Schwarz (2014) and Getmansky et 
al. (2015), develop methods to eliminate these biases. Bhardwaj et al. (2014) further 
show the Sharpe ratio of the aggregate performance of funds in the TASS CTA database 
drops from 0.77 to 0.18 after accounting for biases.  
CTAs do not all operate trend following strategies, operate in limited asset classes or 
operate mixed strategies. While self-classification can help identify trend followers it 
provides latitude for funds operating in the same classification to conduct divergent 
behaviour. Evidence from the mutual fund industry finds that funds within the same self-
classified segment can have quite different return generating processes (Brown and 
Goetzmann (1997)).  
The performance of CTAs is reported net of (often substantial) management fees and the 
return to underlying strategies is significantly higher than that delivered to CTAs 
investors and recorded in the databases. Bhardwaj et al. (2014) estimate that CTAs 
received an annual fee equivalent to 4.3% of assets under management per annum 
between 1994 and 2012, while French (2008) provides a similar value for hedge funds 
in general.  
The performance records of CTAs can be traced back to about 1980, Irwin and Brorsen 
(1985) note that there was only one publicly traded CTA in 1978, and the earliest 
analyses of their performance appears at the end of the decade. Many studies neglect the 
early evidence due to data bias problems (see, for example, Kazemi and Li (2009) and 
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Bhardwaj et al. (2014)), with 1994 being a common start date for analysis. A very early 
study, Elton et al. (1987) estimates negative performance, showing CTAs underperform 
both stocks and bonds. This is one of very few papers reporting a negative Sharpe ratio 
for average performance of CTAs. The same authors later (Elton et al. (1990)) reassess 
their findings on a broader dataset, confirming the original finding of underperformance 
against stock and bond indices, but reporting a positive Sharpe ratio for average 
performance. In contrast, Schneeweis et al. (1991) examine the performance of CTAs 
from 1980 to 1988 and estimates a higher return than either equity or bond indices. Irwin 
et al. (1993) study performance over a similar period (1979 to 1989) and find that while 
CTAs generate positive performance on average, their Sharpe ratio is only marginally 
positive. However, the average fee charged in this period was estimated to be in the range 
of 18% to 20% of assets under management per annum (Irwin et al. (1993)). It should 
be noted that all these papers predate the important work by Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000) 
on the biases inherent in CTA databases. 
Edwards (1998) finds an equal weighted CTA index has an average return of 23.2% 
(Sharpe Ratio 0.98) from 1982 to 1996. Gregoriou et al. (2005) shows that all categories 
in the BarclayHedge CTA database have positive Sharpe ratios and statistically 
significant excess returns over a variety of standard risk models, although the models 
explain less than 2% of price movement. Kazemi and Li (2009) examine the CISDM 
database from 1994 to 2004 and conform the excess returns of the aggregate 
performance. Arnold (2012) provides a long run analysis of CTA performance, from 
1993 to 2010, again providing strong evidence of an aggregate return above the risk free 
rate. Schneeweis et al. (2013) examine the performance of CTAs based on a variety of 
indices and report positive performance.  
 
Bhardwaj et al. (2014) argues for a more negative view of the value of CTAs as 
investment vehicles. After allowing for biases, they estimate the CTAs in the Lipper-
TASS database returned a statistically insignificant 1.8% above the risk free rate per 
annum between 1994 and 2012. However, when fees are added back in, the gross return 
is significantly above the risk free rate.  
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Taken as a whole, the evidence, summarized in Figure 2.3, supports the contention that 
that CTAs on aggregate and, by implication, time series momentum trading strategies, 
generate a return in excess of the risk free rate.  
Figure 2.3 
The Performance of Commodity Trading Advisors 
The figures shows the Sharpe ratios of aggregate CTA performance derived from the literature. Where 
the Sharpe ratio is not presented directly, it is derived from the available data in the paper, using the 
average yield of three month US treasury bills as the risk free rate. When multiple values are reported, 
preference is given to the value associated with equal weighting and/or systematic CTAs. 
 
 
2.4 Theories of Time Series Momentum 
The preponderance of evidence presented in the previous two sections indicates time 
series momentum strategies produce returns in excess of the risk free rate. This section 
examines the literature for explanations of these returns.  
2.4.1 Traditional Pricing Factors 
The standard approach to explaining a return in excess of the risk free rate within the 
efficient markets paradigm is to associate it with exposure to risk factor(s), using 
arbitrage pricing theory (see, for example, Fung and Hsieh (2002) and Kat and Miffre 
(2008)). This can be expressed as 
 
ݎ௧ െ ݎ௙,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௙
ி
௙ୀଵ
. ሺ ௙݂,௧ െ ݎ௙,௧ሻ (2.7)
where ݎ௧ is the return at time, t, ݎ௙,௧ is the risk free rate at time t, ௙݂,௧ is the return of risk 
factor f at time t, ߚ௙ is the exposure to risk factor f and ߙ is the excess return. Under the 
efficient market hypothesis ߙ ൌ 0 and this equation becomes equivalent to Equation 2.2. 
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The interpretation of a statistically significant ߙ is subjective, interpreted by different 
authors as a risk premium (Asness et al. (2013)), evidence of missing pricing factors 
(Malkiel (2003)) or a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis (Moskowitz et al. 
(2012)). This discussion does not make a distinction but, for the purposes of this section, 
regards evidence of an excess return from a mechanically derived portfolio as a potential 
risk factor. 
Factors which have been used to analyse the return of long only investments, typically 
stock and bond portfolios, are referred to here as traditional risk factors. It is convenient 
to split these factors into asset class factors and style factors along the lines of Sharpe 
(1992). Asset class factors consist of long positions in a basket of assets representing a 
market or subsection of a market. Style factors are more nebulous but can be considered 
to represent the spread between the return of two asset class factors. Sharpe (1992) 
identifies twelve asset class factors for analysing the performance of mutual funds, 
repeated in Table 2.3. Most analyses use a subset of these.  
Table 2.3 
Asset Class Factors
The table lists the asset classes suggested in Sharpe (1992) to understand the returns of equity and bond 
mutual funds in the United States. 
 
Debt  Equity  
  
Treasury Bills Large Capitalization Value US Equities 
Intermediate Term US Government Bonds Large Capitalization Growth US Equities 
Long Term US Government Bonds Medium Capitalization US Equities 
Corporate Bonds Small Capitalization US Equities 
Mortgage Back Securities  European Equities 
Non-US Government Debt Japanese Equities
  
 
Edwards and Liew (1999) find no correlation between the return of CTAs and five asset 
classes. Fung and Hsieh (2001) show eight different sets of asset factors fail to explain 
the return of trend-following funds. The same authors later use a three asset model (small 
capitalization equities, high yield bonds and emerging markets) to explain the returns of 
sixteen hedge fund classes (Fung and Hsieh (2002)). They show that while the model 
can explain a portion of the returns of most classes, the majority still have statistically 
significant excess returns. In addition, the three factors fail to explain the return of 
managed futures, reporting the lowest coefficient of determination for that class.  
30 
 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) and Amenc et al. (2010) highlight the difficulty in 
replicating alternative investment returns through factor exposures in linear and non-
linear frameworks respectively. Schneeweis et al. (2012) show that traditional factors 
have some power to explain the returns of hedge funds in general, they do not 
(Schneeweis et al. (2013)) explain the return of managed futures.  
The second set of factors used are based on investment style. These are size and value 
spreads for equity markets (Fama and French (1992)) and term and credit spreads for 
bond markets (Fama and French (1993))4. More recently, equity momentum, originally 
proposed as a risk factor by Carhart (1997), has been used as such by Fama and French 
(2012). When applied to alternative investments, style factors have some success in 
explaining a portion of the returns of some categories but fail to capture any of the risk 
of CTAs. Liang (2003) shows that while value and size help explain the return of hedge 
fund indices, they have little explanatory power for CTA returns. Burnside et al. (2006) 
similarly show little explanatory power in traditional factors for the returns to currency 
strategies. Schneeweis et al. (2013) confirm the findings of Liang (2003) while also 
including the equity momentum factor in their analyses. 
2.4.2 Alternative Risk Premia 
The limited success of traditional factors in explaining alternative investment returns has 
led to the development of factors specifically for alternative strategies. These factors are 
derived from the returns of portfolios generated from simple mechanical trading rules. 
These methods are generally analogous to the methods used to create traditional factors 
but applied to the universe of instruments traded by alternative managers.  
Fung and Hsieh (2001) developed an early set of risk factors specifically to capture the 
risk associated with trend-following strategies, defining five risk factors, each based on 
a specific asset class (the four standard classes and short term interest rates). In each case 
the return series was defined as the return of a portfolio of a look-back straddles for a 
basket of assets. This model has had success in explaining the returns of individual trend 
following CTAs, generating an average adjusted r-squared of around 20%. Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) combine three of their option factors with four traditional measures to 
develop a seven factor model for bench marking hedge fund performance. This model 
                                                 
4 The credit factors have an earlier interpretation as economic factors and will be discussed in this context 
below.  
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continues to be extensively used, see Avramov et al. (2011), Schneeweis et al. (2012) 
and Baltas and Kosowski (2013) for recent examples. 
While these factors have successfully explained a portion of the return of CTAs, there 
has been some recent criticism of their use as performance benchmarks. Bhardwaj et al. 
(2014) highlight the negative premium associated with the factors, which may result in 
over-estimation of excess return or manager skill. 
Carry, also known as basis or roll, is the expected return of a future contract if the 
underlying spot price does not change (Koijen et al. (2013)). For financial assets 
(equities indices, bonds and currencies) this measure can be calculated mechanically as 
a function of income and funding cost. It can only be measured from traded data for 
commodities where the futures price is a complex function of various factors including 
inventory, cost of storage and supply risks. The literature on carry focuses on foreign 
currency and commodity markets. 
In the currency markets, a carry strategy is implemented by buying high yielding and 
selling low yielding currencies. Bilson (1980) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) provide 
early evidence of positive returns for the strategy. More recently, Burnside et al. (2011) 
and Menkhoff et al. (2012a) provide evidence of a risk premium associated with the 
carry trade.  
Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) both show that carry 
explains a significant proportion of the total return of commodities. In addition, Erb and 
Harvey (2006) find a long-short portfolio of commodities, based on a carry rule, 
produces a significant excess return. More recently, Gorton et al. (2013) show a linear 
relationship between carry and future return while Erb and Harvey (2016) confirm their 
earlier finding of the importance of carry to commodity returns.  
 In equity markets, dividend yield is the equivalent of carry. It has long been known that 
dividend yield has some predictive power, see Ball (1978), Basu (1983) and Fama and 
French (1988) for early evidence. More recently, Dangl and Halling (2012) confirm this, 
presenting evidence of time varying predictability.  
Koijen et al. (2013) unify the research on carry, measuring it in four asset classes. They 
provide a standard definition and present evidence documenting the prevalence of carry 
as an alternative risk premia across all four classes.  
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Duarte et al. (2007) provide an early example of using carry as a risk factor. More 
recently it has been used to analyse the returns of cross-sectional momentum strategies 
in currency markets (Burnside et al. (2011)) and the performance of CTAs (Bhardwaj et 
al. (2014)). Moskowitz et al. (2012) suggest that carry is a significant cause of the time 
series correlation found in futures markets. 
The use of value and momentum as risk factors can be traced back to the literature on 
equity momentum where they play a significant role in the development of asset pricing 
models, see Fama and French (2012) for a recent overview in international equity 
markets.  
Cross-sectional momentum, discussed above as supporting evidence for time series 
momentum, has been shown to produce excess return (or risk premia) for portfolios of 
commodities (Miffre and Rallis (2007)), currencies (Burnside et al. (2006)) and 
international equity indices (Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006)).  
Value has a long history as both an investment style (described in Graham and Dodd 
(1934)) and a risk factor (Fama and French (1996)) in equity markets, it has not had 
featured significantly outside this area, possibly a consequence of the difficulty in 
finding a consistent measure across asset classes.  
Asness et al. (2013) provide comprehensive definitions of both value and momentum 
factors for the four standard asset classes. Momentum is defined across all asset classes 
using past twelve months relative price movement, the standard measure from the equity 
literature (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Fama and French (1996)). 
Value, unlike other risk premia, has asset class specific definitions. The definition for 
equity indices is consistent with that used for individual equities, based on the aggregate 
book to price ratio. The value factors for bonds and commodities is defined in a similar 
fashion to long term reversal in equity markets (De Bondt and Thaler (1985)), while 
currency value is derived from changes in purchasing price parity. 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) use value and momentum risk factors, as defined in Asness et 
al. (2013), to explain a third of the return of time series momentum, although the cross-
sectional momentum factor is dominant. Bhardwaj et al. (2014) show that while 
momentum risk premia in commodities and currencies have significant explanatory 
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power on the returns of CTAs, value and momentum factors based on equity indices 
have no significant impact. 
Hedging pressure has a long history in investigations of the performance of commodities 
and offer a potential risk factor for this market. Keynes (1930) divides participants into 
speculators and hedgers, with hedgers paying a premium to speculators. He postulated 
that hedgers were dominated by producers so, under the theory of normal backwardation, 
the premium would flow to long holders. Bessembinder (1992) and De Roon et al. (2000) 
both demonstrate a link between hedging pressure and returns. Moskowitz et al. (2012) 
apply the disequilibrium directly to time series momentum, suggesting that speculators 
implementing trend-following strategies, receive a premium from hedgers for providing 
liquidity. Basu and Miffre (2013) create a hedging pressure factor based on a long short 
portfolio and show it has a significant positive expected return. This risk factor has not 
as yet been extended to other financial markets.  
2.4.3 Macroeconomic Risk  
2.4.3.1 Macroeconomic Variables 
A number of papers investigate the link between investment returns and economic 
factors, in effect using economic variables as risk factors within the arbitrage pricing 
theory framework. The factors used in the key papers are shown in Table 2.4, 
highlighting a significant overlap. 
An early work (Chen et al. (1986)) shows that a set of eight economic variables have 
significant explanatory powers on returns of a US equity index. Fama and French (1989) 
use a subset of these to explain the return of the bond market. Less directly, Chen (1991) 
uses economic variables to predict economic growth and consequently the return of the 
stock market.  
A number of papers test the use of economic risk factors to explain the returns to cross-
sectional momentum. While it is generally agreed linear models do not provide good 
explanatory power (see, for example, Griffin et al. (2003)), other conclusions differ. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) argue that the majority of cross-sectional momentum 
profitability comes from the portion of equity returns explained by macroeconomic 
factors and has a time varying expected return. In contrast, Griffin et al. (2003) fail to 
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find any evidence of macroeconomic factors explaining momentum across sixteen 
countries, repeating the conditional tests of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002).  
Table 2.4 
Economic Variables and Investment Returns 
The table lists the economic variables cited by papers investigating the relationship between the 
macroeconomy investment returns. The exact details of factor definitions can vary between papers. 
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Chen et al. (1986) • •  • • • • •  •  
Fama and French (1989) • • •         
Chen (1991) • • •   •  •    
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) • • •   •      
Bali et al. (2014) • • • •  •  • •  • 
            
 
2.4.3.2 Volatility and Uncertainty 
An alternative approach links the performance of assets and trading strategies to the risk 
(volatility) in economic conditions rather than the conditions themselves, in effect 
economic risk is defined as a risk factor. 
Both Melvin and Taylor (2009) and Menkhoff et al. (2012a) develop measures of 
currency volatility and use innovations in their measures to explain the returns to carry 
based trading strategies. Lustig et al. (2011) provides evidence of a link between 
currency market returns and equity market volatility. 
Grobys et al. (2016) use currency return dispersion as a proxy for global economic risk 
and demonstrate a relationship between momentum pay-off and this risk factor. The 
option factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001) implicitly link time series momentum with 
market volatility. Daniel and Moskowitz (2014) show a relationship between momentum 
returns and market volatility for multiple asset classes. Higher moments have also been 
cited as risk factors, in particular crash risk. Brunnermeier et al. (2008) provides 
evidence crash risk is a priced risk in the returns of the carry trade.  
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Two recent papers provide methods to create measures of general economic risk. 
Kritzman and Yuanzhen (2010) develop a generic methodology to measure financial 
turbulence and use it to show turbulence effects the performance of portfolios of 
currencies, based on a carry rule. The same authors (Kritzman et al. (2012)) later show 
that market specific versions of their measure can explain return variations in a number 
of dynamic strategies.  
Bali et al. (2014) build an index of macroeconomic risk (uncertainty) as a function of 
eight underlying economic variables. They demonstrate that the measure has a 
statistically significant relationship with the performance of hedge funds and that the 
sensitivity of hedge funds to economic uncertainty is important in explaining the cross-
sectional dispersion of these returns.  
2.5 Behavioural Finance 
Behavioural finance is the most popular alternative market paradigm to efficiency. It 
posits the existence of non-rational participants in financial markets and that their 
irrational actions force market prices away from efficient levels. This is in contrast to the 
standard view which sees economic agents as rational, able to incorporate new 
information instantly and make consistent decisions. A consequence of efficient markets 
is that all prices are effectively fundamental prices (Barberis and Thaler (2003)).  
This discussion does not attempt to provide a full overview of the field of study but rather 
to highlight behavioural mechanisms that could be used to explain time series 
momentum. The bulk of both theory and empirical work in behavioural finance focuses 
on equity markets, in particular those in the US.  
The anomalies identified can be divided into two categories; irrational (sub-optimal) 
behaviour and price predictability. Evidence for irrational behaviour includes evidence 
that the volume of trading is higher than expected, equity volatility is greater than 
justified by changes in earnings (Shiller (1980)) and evidence that the equity risk 
premium is too high (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). The evidence for predictable prices, 
previously discussed in Section 2.1, includes cross-sectional momentum (Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993)), long-term reversal (De Bondt and Thaler (1985)) and value (Basu 
(1977), but can be traced back to Graham and Dodd (1934)). Fama (1991) indicates that 
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in total up to 40% of the variation in price returns can be explained at long horizons, 
although he indicates this is compatible with the efficient market hypothesis. 
The discussion of behavioural finance below is uncritical but the topic remains 
controversial, with significantly less support in the literature than the efficient market 
hypothesis. The majority of the anomalies listed above have been explained within the 
framework of the efficient market hypothesis, at least to the satisfaction of its 
proponents. The explanations include mis-specified risk factors (Malkiel (2003)), 
improper incorporation of costs (Fama (1991)) or simply chance results (Fama (1998)).  
Behavioural finance has its origin in the field of behavioural psychology. Simon (1955) 
argues that individuals, due to limited cognitive ability, are not able to make fully rational 
choices, required by both classical economics and the efficient market hypothesis. 
Instead they use heuristics to simplify the decision making process and reach 
satisfactory, rather than optimal, outcomes. As series of experiments in the following 
decades, Bem (1972) provides a summary, confirms that individuals do not act as fully 
rational agents. The cognitive errors fall into two general categories; those based on 
belief and those based on preference (Barberis and Thaler (2003)).  
A series of papers by Kahnman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973); 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974)) investigates errors based on belief. They focus on 
two heuristics, availability and representativeness. The presence of these biases in 
individuals’ decision making processes is experimentally demonstrated and shown to 
lead to overconfidence in the accuracy of predictions, extrapolation (or over-emphasis) 
of recent data, reliance on available data and failure to incorporate both base rate (a 
priore) probability and sample size. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) conclude that when 
faced with uncertainty, errors in decision making are both ‘systematic and predictable’. 
In addition to misinterpreting data, individuals also exhibit overconfidence in their own 
ability to make decisions. Overconfidence is increased by self-attribution bias, the 
tendency of individuals to attribute events that confirm their actions to skill, while 
negative events are put down to chance (Bem (1965)). Griffin and Tversky (1992) 
demonstrate that experts are more likely to display overconfidence. Odean (1998b) links 
overconfidence to a number of sub-optimal behaviours observed in equity markets, 
including over-trading. 
37 
 
A second set of biases make individuals slow to update their belief with new information. 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to prefer evidence that supports prior views (Gilovich 
et al. (2002)). Belief perseverance posits that individuals hold to their beliefs longer than 
is warranted by the evidence5. Lord et al. (1979) show that not only do individuals seek 
out information to support their views but interpret information in line with prior beliefs.  
The second category of cognitive biases centres on preferences; where individuals 
exhibit sub-optimal or inconsistent preferences. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
introduce prospect theory, arguing that outcomes are judged from gains and losses, rather 
than final position and that individuals have asymmetric utility curves. Thaler and 
Johnson (1990) show that preferences are path dependent. More recently, Marchiori and 
Warglien (2008) show regret avoidance is a significant factor in decision making. Odean 
(1998a) uses this bias to explain the disposition effect, investors’ preference for selling 
winners rather than losers.  
Shefrin and Statman (2000) develop behavioural portfolio theory. They argue that 
individuals build portfolios based on factors which do not match the mean variance 
approach favoured by modern portfolio theory methods. They further show that, under 
this theory, the efficient frontier is different from the mean variance efficient frontier. In 
behavioural portfolio theory, investors do not have symmetric utility curves, but look at 
investments from a safety first perspective, not wanting to fall below a certain level of 
wealth.  
The literature does not extensively deal with time series momentum, however there are 
behavioural explanations for price continuations in the analysis of cross-sectional 
momentum in equity markets. This section concludes with a discussion of this literature 
as it provide theories of price continuation (auto-correlation) potentially applicable to 
time series momentum.  
The excess returns due to the strategy is demonstrated by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
for US equities and later shown to be a global phenomenon by Rouwenhorst (1998). 
Fama (1998) recognizes it as a “puzzle” in need of further investigation. The 
                                                 
5 It’s worth noting Barberis and Thaler’s (2003) example of belief perseverance, if only to highlight the 
distance between the two sides, that is “if people start out believing the EMH, they may continue to believe 
it long after compelling evidence to the contrary has emerged.” 
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investigations, key papers are listed in Table 2.5, produce a variety of explanations, both 
compatible with and contrary to the efficient market hypothesis. 
Table 2.5 
Explanations of Cross-sectional Momentum 
The table lists selected explanations, both rational and behavioural, of cross-sectional momentum found 
in academic literature.  
 
Paper Cause Mechanism 
  
Carhart (1997) Risk Momentum is a risk factor and so compatible with the 
efficient market hypothesis 
Barberis et al. (1998) Conservatism Investors underreact to news, leading to its gradual 
incorporation into market prices 
Daniel et al. (1998) Self-attribution Asymmetric incorporation of public news on private 
information leads to positive feedback trading 
Hong and Stein (1999) Noise traders The interaction between noise traders and news 
watchers creates under reaction to news. 
Grinblatt and Han (2002) Disposition 
effect 
The unwillingness of investors to sell losing stocks 
causes under reaction to news. 
Lesmond et al. (2004) Trading costs The costs of implementing the strategy are greater than 
the gross profits.
   
 
Carhart (1997) defines momentum as a risk factor, effectively extending the Fama and 
French (1996) three factor model to four factors. Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue for a 
risk based explanation, based on time variation of risk in cross-sectional return. Lesmond 
et al. (2004) argue that while the data suggests a profitable trading strategy, this 
disappears in the presence of trading costs, although Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) 
suggest that 5bn USD need to be invested in the strategy before the returns to momentum 
disappear. 
Barberis et al. (1998) focus on conservatism and representativeness to model investor 
sentiment. Conservatism allows investors to under-react to a news item as they are slow 
to update prior beliefs, while representativeness means investors over react to a series of 
positive (or negative) news events. In both cases price continuation is predicted in the 
short term, while the overreaction model suggests longer term reversals.  
Daniel et al. (1998) build a model of investors’ overconfidence in private information 
and self-attribution bias, which shows these behavioural biases lead to short-lag auto 
correlation in the return of financial assets. Their work shows that the effects of 
overconfidence include negative long lag correlations (long term reversal) and public 
event return predictability, while biased self-attribution leads to short-lag auto-
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correlation (momentum). The evidence of a link between market declines, falls in 
confidence and poor returns to momentum (Cooper et al. (2004)) is compatible with this 
model. 
Hong and Stein (1999) propose a model based on the interaction of heterogeneous 
market participants. Unlike other theories, it does not rely on a specific bias, but on 
bounded rationality. Interaction between news watchers and momentum traders results i 
under-reaction to news, resulting in momentum as the price of the asset moves towards 
its fundamental value. In a theoretical model, Goldstein et al. (2014) show that splitting 
a market between hedgers and speculators creates opportunities for excess returns 
through a similar mechanism.  
Finally, Grinblatt and Han (2002) use the disposition effect (prospect theory) to develop 
a market model to explain cross-sectional momentum. The unwillingness of investors to 
close losing positions results in an under-reaction to news, which in turn causes a 
divergence between the market price and fundamental value of an equity. The 
elimination of this divergence leads to positive auto correlation in returns. 
In a rare application of behavioural theories to futures markets, Hurst et al. (2013) 
develop a model to explain time series momentum. The model, which combines under-
reaction followed by delayed over-reaction, reflects earlier work on cross-sectional 
momentum in equity markets (Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999)). The 
model is derived from a decomposition of the market’s response to information that 
changes the fundamental value of an asset.  
Under the efficient market hypothesis, news should be fully incorporated into asset 
prices immediately; that is when the market become aware of news prices should move 
directly to new fundamental values. In the Hurst et al. (2013) model, shown in Figure 
2.4, the market first under-reacts to news, moving slowly towards the fundamental value 
and the over-reacts, driving the price above the fundamental value. Together these two 
phases constitute the trend in an asset price with behavioural biases proposed as the 
source of both under and over-reaction.  
In the third and final stage, the price reverts to its fundamental value as distortions due 
to behavioural biases diminish. This leads to the widely observed long term reversal (see, 
for example, Shen et al. (2007) and Moskowitz et al. (2012)). While this is not directly 
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related to a discussion of time series momentum, it does allow a single behavioural 
model to explain two apparently unrelated market phenomena.  
Behavioural finance is less parsimonious is explaining the causes of the under- and over 
reaction, providing multiple mechanisms to explain both. Asymmetric utility curves 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) cause investors to close winning positions too soon 
(Odean (1998a)) slowing market responses. Both anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974)) and belief perseverance (Lord et al. (1979)) result in investors being slow to 
update their valuations, referring to an arbitrary past value or prior belief respectively. 
Under confirmation bias (Gilovich et al. (2002)) investors underweight information 
contrary to prior beliefs, delaying changes to their position. 
Figure 2.4 
Stylised Model of a Price Trend 
The figure shows the life cycle of a trend based on the model of Hurst et al. (2013). New information 
changes the fundamental value of an asset. The market first under-reacts to this, then over-reacts, before 
finally reverting to the new fundamental value. 
 
 
Under-reaction results in a series of price movements in the same direction. Behavioural 
finance provides a variety of mechanisms that predict overreaction as a consequence of 
serially correlated price changes. These generally consist of behavioural effects that bias 
investors to trade in the direction of the trend. Availability (Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973)) and representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) both lead investors to 
assume a recent price changes will continue. The effects are amplified by sample size 
neglect (Gilovich et al. (1985)) which leads investors to over-extrapolate recent price 
returns. Regret avoidance (Marchiori and Warglien (2008)) encourages investors to 
follow an established trend to avoid missing further profits. Finally, due to herding 
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(Welch (2000)) and feedback trading (Hong and Stein (1999)) investors tend to follow 
recent successful trades of other investors.  
It should be noted that market mechanisms other than behavioural biases can cause or 
contribute to these effects. The presence of non-profit maximising market participants, 
typically central banks (see, for example, Saacke (2002) and Bhanot and Kadapakkam 
(2006)), can result in markets diverging from efficient behaviour. A number of studies 
show that market inefficiencies also slow reaction to new information (see, for example, 
Mitchell et al. (2007), Duffie (2010) and Buss and Dumas (2015)).  
While developing the model, Hurst et al. (2013) do not specifically test for behavioural 
biases beyond demonstrating the presence of both time series momentum and reversals 
in markets. This highlights a key issue in the development of behavioural finance. Many 
phenomena, including both under-reaction and over-reaction, have multiple behavioural 
explanations. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to empirically test for an 
individual bias. This problem and the consequent ambiguity in results is emphasised by 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) who highlight the fact that their empirical results in a study on 
time series momentum are compatible with a variety of both behavioural and rational 
market models. In consequence, while the behavioural biases cited here have been shown 
to exist in individuals to the satisfactions of behavioural psychologists, their effect on 
financial markets and consequent impact on asset prices, if any, has yet to be 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of many. 
2.6 Current State 
Before concluding, the current state of the literature relevant to time series momentum 
is summarised below. 
A significant majority of the evidence suggests that time series momentum is a feature 
of financial markets and can form the basis of trading strategies that generate returns in 
excess of the risk free rate. The effect is found across all asset classes and consistently 
through time. 
Evidence from the performance of CTAs supports this, at least when looking at the 
returns gross of fees. This conclusion relies on the reasonable assumption, with some 
supporting evidence, that time series momentum is the dominant trading strategy of 
CTAs. 
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There is little direct discussion of the excess return of time series momentum as an 
anomaly to the efficient market hypothesis, however standard pricing factors have little 
power to explain this returns.  
A number of risk factors have been developed to capture the returns to alternative 
investment strategies. These have been shown to explain a portion of the return to both 
time series momentum and CTA funds but a statistically significant excess return 
remains in both cases.  
An alternative stream of literature links investment returns to macro-economic factors, 
including measures of the level of risk in markets. Some explanatory relationships have 
been identified, but the investigations have not yet focused on time series momentum. 
Behavioural finance theories suggest mechanisms to generate price continuations but 
these have been mainly applied to cross-sectional momentum and their application to 
time series momentum has not yet been explored.  
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Chapter Three 
Is This Time Different? Trend-Following and 
Financial Crises 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract6 
Following large positive returns in 2008, CTAs received increased attention and 
allocations from institutional investors. Subsequent performance has been below long 
term average. This has occurred in a period following the largest financial crisis since 
the Great Depression. In this article, using almost a century of data, the authors 
investigate what typically happens to the core strategy pursued by these funds post 
global financial crises. They also examine the time series behaviour of the markets 
traded by CTAs during these crisis periods. Their results show that in an extended period 
following financial crises, trend-following average returns are less than half those 
earned in no-crisis periods. Evidence from regional crises shows a similar pattern. They 
also find that futures markets do not display the strong time series predictability 
prevalent in no-crisis periods, resulting in relatively weak returns for trend-following 
strategies in the four years immediately following the start of a financial crisis.  
                                                 
6 This paper has been published in The Journal of Alternative Investments, Vol. 17, No. 2. The research 
reported in this paper has been presented at the following conferences; FMA Europe, Maastricht, FMA 
International, Nashville and QuantInvest, London, all 2014. Lead author, John O’Brien, co-author, Mark 
Hutchinson. 
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3. Is This Time Different? Trend-Following and Financial 
Crises 
Following strong performance in 2008 the aggregate performance of trend-following 
Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) funds has been relatively weak. From January 2009 
to June 2013, the annualized return of the Newedge Trend Index was -0.8%, versus 8.0% 
over the prior five year period, while assets under management of CTAs grew from $206 
billion to $331 billion.7 8 This has occurred during a period of slow recovery in the US 
and prolonged crisis in the Eurozone.  
Understandably, investors in CTAs are now beginning to question their performance. 
Have markets changed post the 2008 financial crisis? Will these types of strategies ever 
work again? In this article, using almost a century of data on trend-following, we attempt 
to provide some guidance on these issues by empirically investigating the following 
research questions. Is what has happened to the performance of trend-following 
subsequent to the US subprime and Eurozone crises typical of what happens post a 
financial crisis? If yes, then what happens to price patterns in the futures markets traded 
by these funds to cause such poor performance during these turbulent periods? 
Our results indicate that subsequent to a global financial crisis trend-following 
performance tends to be weak for four years on average. Comparing the performance of 
crisis and no-crisis periods, the average return in the first twenty-four months following 
the start of a crisis is one-third of the return earned in no-crisis periods, while the 
performance in the forty-eight after a crisis start is half that of no-crisis periods. 
Providing additional supporting evidence we find a similar effect when we examine 
portfolios formed of local assets during regional financial crises. 
Looking at the changing time series dynamics of futures markets we find a breakdown 
in futures market return predictability during the crisis periods. In no-crisis periods, 
futures market returns exhibit strong correlations at lags of up to twelve months, whereas 
during crisis periods correlations are significantly reduced, and, in a number of cases, 
                                                 
7 Source: BarclayHedge.  
8 For the systematic sub-category, AUM has grown from $163 billion to $261 billion. 
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turn negative. This lack of time series return predictability reduces the opportunity for 
trend-following to generate returns. 
The literature on trend-following is typically focused on the performance of different 
variations of these strategies for particular markets in specific periods (see, for example, 
Erb and Harvey (2006), Miffre and Rallis (2007) and Fuertes et al. (2010) for 
commodities and Okunev and White (2003) and Menkhoff et al. (2012b) for currencies). 
Schneeweis et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review. The evidence of these studies 
is generally positive on the performance of trend-following with positive Sharpe ratios 
and little correlation with traditional asset classes. We provide further evidence on the 
long term performance of trend-following strategies through an analysis of the 
performance of a multiple asset class portfolio. 
Related literature focuses on identifying the risks faced by CTAs. In a highly cited study, 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) use a portfolio of options to capture the non-linear payoff from 
CTAs. More recent research focuses on both the longer term performance of these 
strategies (Hurst et al. (2012)), identifying why futures markets trend (Moskowitz et al. 
(2012)), and also examining the interaction between trend-following and value (Asness 
et al. (2013)). Our research identifies and analysis a further performance risk for 
investors: the poor performance of trend-following subsequent to a financial crisis. 
Our finding on the differing performance of trend-following strategies in crisis and no-
crisis periods is consistent with predictions from behavioural finance and evidence on 
cross-sectional momentum in different economic states. Behavioural models link 
momentum to investor overconfidence (Daniel et al. (1998)) and decreasing risk 
aversion (Hong and Stein (1999)), with both models leading to overreaction and return 
predictability in asset prices. Cooper et al. (2004) highlight how overconfidence should 
fall and risk aversion should increase following market declines. These effects lower the 
likelihood of overreactions, and consequently return predictability, in periods following 
a financial crisis under the models proposed by both Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999). Cooper et al. (2004) find evidence to support both these predictions for 
cross-sectional momentum, finding the state (direction) of the market is critically 
important to the profitability of cross-sectional momentum strategies. 
Finally, there is an emerging literature examining the performance of dynamic trading 
strategies during periods of financial crisis (see, for example, Brunnermeier et al. (2008), 
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Melvin and Taylor (2009) and Menkhoff et al. (2012a)) and the potential crash risk to 
these strategies (Daniel and Moskowitz (2014)). We extend this literature on strategy 
risk by providing direct evidence of the performance characteristics of trend-following 
subsequent to financial crises. 
In summary our paper makes three key contributions. First, we provide evidence on the 
long term performance of trend-following using a diversified multi-country multi-asset 
class portfolio using data beginning in the 1920s. Second, we are the first paper to 
provide direct evidence on the performance of trend-following during financial crises, 
analysing both global and regional crises. Third, we examine the underlying markets to 
identify the cause of the differing performance across crisis and no-crisis periods. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: 1) we describe the dataset we use to 
create our trend-following portfolios and our sample of global and regional crises; 2) we 
describe the methodology we use to create our trend-following portfolios; 3) we provide 
results on the performance of trend-following during global financial crises; 4) we 
provides results on the performance of trend-following for regional financial crises; 5) 
we conclude with a discussion of our key findings. 
3.1 Data and Sample 
In this section we describe how we classify our sample into crisis and no-crisis periods 
and the data sources used in the analysis. 
3.1.1 Sample Period 
We consider both global and regional crises. As described below, we create a global 
portfolio to analyse the performance characteristics of trend-following during global 
crises and a series of regional portfolios to provide additional evidence from more 
localised crises. Accordingly we have two samples: one to cover the global portfolio and 
the second to cover regional portfolios. 
Identifying a list of global and regional financial crises is problematic. For simplicity we 
use the list of crisis identified in two of the most highly cited studies of financial crises 
(Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). Table 3.1 describes 
the list of global financial crisis examined. These are the Great Depression in1929, the 
1973 Oil Crisis, the Third World Debt crisis of 1981, the Crash of October 1987, the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000, and the sub-prime/euro crisis beginning in 
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2007.910 The start date for each crisis is considered to be the month following the equity 
market high preceding the crisis. 
The regional crisis countries/regions (with year of inception in parenthesis) are Spain 
(1977); Norway (1987); Nordic (1989); Japan (1990); Mexico (1994); Asia (1997); 
Colombia (1997) and Argentina (2000). The list comprises crises identified by 
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). All crises except 
Mexico are noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), while Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) 
do not consider Spain, Norway, Nordic, Colombia and Argentina. 
Table 3.1 
Global Financial Crises: Dataset 
 
Crisis  Start Date Data Source 
   
Great Depression  Oct-1929 GFD
Oil Crisis  Oct-1973  GFD 
Third World Debt  Aug-1981  Exchange/MSCI/GFD 
Black Monday  Oct-1987 Exchange/MSCI 
Dotcom Bubble  Mar-2000  Exchange 
Sub Prime/Euro  Jul-2007  Exchange 
 
Note: Exchange: exchange traded futures contract. MSCI: Forward derived from MSCI data. GFD: Forward 
derived from Global Financial Data.  
3.1.2 Futures Returns 
The data set for the global analysis consists of twenty-one commodities, thirteen 
government bonds, twenty equity indices, and currency crosses derived from nine 
underlying rates (see Table 3.2 column 1 for the full list) covering a sample period from 
January 1921 to June 2013.11 The data consists of a combination of exchange traded 
futures data and forward prices derived from historical data. The appendix provides a 
more detailed description of the data sources, which generally consists of 
DataStream/MSCI for the more recent prices (from 1980) and Global Financial Data for 
the older price histories. 
                                                 
9 Two other additional crises were considered for inclusion in the study. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) 
describe a currency crisis in the fifties and sixties in their list of financial crises. However, an examination 
of the details of this period shows it is a series of individual regional crises stretching over a decade and a 
half, and consequently unsuitable for inclusion in this study. A second possible candidate for inclusion is 
the period around 1990, with the collapse of the Japanese economy, an oil price spike and the first Iraq 
war. However, as it was not included in Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) as 
a global crisis, it is not included.  
10 We refer to crises using the start date, as defined by the equity market high. 
11 We exclude the period from January 1940 to December 1949 from our sample due to concerns about 
data accuracy around World War II. 
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The data for the regional crises is also sourced from DataStream/MSCI and Global 
Financial Data. All the return series in the regional analysis are forwards calculated from 
the underlying price series.12 Table 3.3 column 5 lists the source for each of the 
underlying instruments. Risk free rates come from Global Financial Data while yields 
are calculated from total return indices for both equity indices and bonds. 
The analyses in this article are based on continuous cumulative excess return series for 
each of the instruments. There are two methods used to create these series. Where a 
futures contract trades on an exchange the return series of the individual futures contracts 
are combined to produce a continuous excess return series. Where futures contracts are 
not available, forward prices are created by combining the underlying spot price, yield 
and risk free rate. These two approaches are discussed below. 
3.1.2.1 Continuous Returns from Futures Contracts 
Continuous return series are created from futures where daily price and volume data is 
available. We calculate the daily excess return of the most liquid contract. This is 
generally the front month or the next-nearest to delivery month. We select the most liquid 
contract as follows. At time, t, the average volume over the previous three trading days 
is measured for each of the live delivery dates. We select the contract with the highest 
volume to be recorded as the excess return for that day. To replicate the practicalities of 
rolling contracts, once we select a further delivery month we do not allow the excess 
return of nearer delivery months to be selected again. 
3.1.2.2 Continuous Return Forward Prices 
Where exchange traded futures are not available, excess return series are created from 
the underlying spot price, risk free rate and yield. The excess return from buying a 
forward at the start of a month and holding it to month end, ݁ݎଵ, is given by: 
 
݁ݎଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎଵሻ ቆ1 ൅ ݍ1 ൅ ݎ௙ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (3.1)
where ݎଵ is the spot price return for the month, ݎ௙ is the one month risk free rate, and ݍ 
is the annualized yield. In order to ensure the comparability of synthetic forwards and 
actual exchange traded futures, a number of tests were carried out where exchange traded 
                                                 
12 Exchange futures data is available for Japan but we use a consistent methodology across all countries 
for the regional analysis. 
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futures returns were replaced by synthetic forward returns. The series were typically 
almost perfectly correlated and in all cases results were close to identical.  
3.1.3 Global Portfolio Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 columns 4 and 5 present summary statistics of the continuous return series 
used in our global sample. Typically excess returns are positive with the exception of 
some commodities with a negative roll yield (see Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst (2006)).  
Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
The table summarizes the key attributes of the instruments used in the study. Two start dates are 
included; the first is the start date for derived forward contracts and the second is the start date for 
exchange-traded future contracts. The performance of the instrument is summarizes by two measures; 
mean annual return and annual volatility. This is shown first for the full sample and then for the two 
year period after the start of a financial crisis. Currencies are quoted as local units per USD. 
 
    Full Sample  Crisis Period 
 Start 
Date 
Derived 
Start 
Date 
Exchange 
Annualized 
Mean 
Return (%) 
Annualized 
Volatility 
(%) 
Annualized 
Mean 
Return (%) 
Annualized 
Volatility  
(%) 
           
Commodity Futures           
COCOA  Jan-80 -8.14  29.67  -1.42  35.60  
COFFEE  Jan-80 -6.80  37.53  -11.88  35.71  
COPPER  Oct-88 5.82  26.21  -8.94  30.90  
CORN  Jan-80 -5.13  25.32  -12.99  30.03  
COTTON Jan-80 -3.62 26.36 -17.36  27.24
GAS OIL  Sep-03 13.39  30.88  -8.20  44.36  
GOLD  Jan-80 3.25  17.98  0.45  20.96  
LEAN HOGS  Jan-80 -2.93  25.10  -17.13  23.37  
LIGHT CRUDE OIL  Mar-83 6.42  34.72  2.30  39.35  
LIVE CATTLE  Jan-80 1.71  14.30  -0.81  14.71  
NATURAL GAS  Apr-90 -12.09  58.26  -30.25  73.89  
NY HEATING OIL  Jan-80 6.55  32.66  2.77  32.76  
PALLADIUM  Jan-80 7.95  33.38  0.77  46.71  
PLATINUM  Jan-80 0.04  25.04  -5.88  32.03  
RBOB GASOLINE Oct-05 7.60 34.77 -14.85  49.34
SILVER  Jan-80 -5.66  31.48  -9.53  30.87  
SOYABEAN MEAL  Jan-80 4.23  26.33  10.91  29.72  
SOYABEAN OIL  Jan-80 -2.91  26.27  -13.02  29.96  
SOYABEANS  Jan-80 -0.47  23.64  -3.97  27.69  
SUGAR  Jan-80 -5.87  39.34  5.01  45.11  
WHEAT  Jan-80 -7.66  25.14  -13.18  26.78  
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
The table summarizes the key attributes of the instruments used in the study. Two start dates are 
included; the first is the start date for derived forward contracts and the second is the start date for 
exchange-traded future contracts. The performance of the instrument is summarizes by two measures; 
mean annual return and annual volatility. This is shown first for the full sample and then for the two 
year period after the start of a financial crisis. Currencies are quoted as local units per USD. 
 
    Full Sample  Crisis Period 
 Start 
Date 
Derived 
Start 
Date 
Exchange 
Annualized 
Mean 
Return (%) 
Annualized 
Volatility 
(%) 
Annualized 
Mean 
Return (%) 
Annualized 
Volatility  
(%) 
           
Bond Futures           
Australia-10Y Jan-20 Jun-85 0.44  6.83  -1.70  10.03  
Australia-3Y  May-88 4.34  9.81  -0.53  9.61  
Canada-10Y Jan-50 Sep-89 1.22 6.26 3.57  9.49
US-5Y Jan-20 May-88 0.89  4.54  3.48  5.88  
US-2Y  Jun-90 1.72  1.74  3.85  1.97  
US-10Y Jan-20 May-82 1.21  6.10  3.99  7.95  
US-30Y Jan-20 Jan-80 1.12  9.13  3.88  11.64  
Germany-5Y  Oct-91 3.01  3.25  2.47  3.73  
Germany-30Y  Sep-05 5.28  12.48  4.30  10.97  
Germany-2Y  Mar-97 0.99  1.38  1.00  1.82  
Germany-10Y Jan-50 Nov-90 2.18  5.08  3.87  5.63  
Japan-10Y Jan-20 Dec-86 1.99  5.09  1.62  5.92  
UK-10Y Jan-20 Nov-82 0.07 7.84 3.40  10.39
           
Equity Index Futures           
SPI 200 - Australia Feb-20 May-00 4.38  15.89  -15.85  26.12  
S&P TSX60- Canada Jan-70 Nov-11 2.72  16.60  -10.70  21.93  
Dow Jones-US  Oct-97 7.30  17.10  -11.03  23.64  
NASDAQ 100 - US  Apr-96 6.28  28.50  -31.60  37.87  
AEX - Netherlands Jan-70 Jun-88 4.71  19.11  -8.80  23.46  
CAC 40 France Jan-70 Jun-92 2.91  20.46  -9.38  24.01  
DAX - Germany Jan-50 Apr-96 5.64  18.63  -8.66  22.48  
MDAX -Germany  Mar-05 9.29  22.99  -29.06  33.09  
HANG SENG - Hong Kong Jan-70 Apr-97 10.70  33.67  -23.31  39.25  
S&P Midcap- US  Feb-92 2.37  15.76  -13.65  18.01  
NIKKIE 225 - Japan Jan-50 Mar-99 6.01  20.39  -14.03  20.62  
S&P 500 – US Jan-20 Oct-90 4.89  19.12  -14.52  22.61  
KOSPI 200 - Korea Jan-65 Mar-05 9.04  27.69  2.56  27.97  
FTSE 100- UK Feb-20 Oct-88 4.28  16.80  -10.14  27.57  
IBES 35 - Spain Jan-70 Oct-97 0.80  21.02  -13.14  21.02  
MIB – Italy Oct-50 Nov-90 1.46  22.06  -23.00  23.72  
Russell 2000 - US Apr-07 2.23 23.93 -20.31  28.49
OMXS 30 - Sweden Jan-70 Feb-92 6.43  22.19  1.70  25.90  
SMI - Switzerland Jan-70 Sep-99 5.11  16.64  -7.38  19.07  
SMI Midcap - Switzerland  Sep-05 2.13  19.00  -27.11  26.40  
           
Currency Forwards           
AUD/USD Jan-73  -1.54  11.72  2.36  14.66  
CAD/USD Jan-73  -0.51  6.63  0.90  8.21  
CHF/USD Jan-73  -0.66  12.55  2.14  12.98  
EUR/USD (DEM/USD) Jan-73  0.28  11.20  5.78  12.13  
GBP/USD Jan-73 -0.69 10.34 6.56  10.94
JPY/USD Jan-73  -0.02  11.42  5.90  12.49  
NOK/USD Jan-73  -1.38  10.79  3.66  10.79  
NZD/USD Jan-73  -1.80  12.64  6.94  15.95  
SEK/USD Jan-73  0.10  11.31  8.35  12.65  
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The different asset classes also have quite different volatilities with equity indices and 
commodities having much higher volatility than fixed income and currencies. Within 
asset classes fixed income has the largest cross-sectional differences in relative volatility 
with shorter term bond futures having significantly lower volatility than longer-term 
equivalents. 
In Table 3.2, columns 6 and 7, we present summary statistics for the different continuous 
return series during financial crisis periods, defined as the two years after the start of the 
crisis. Contrasting these with the full sample statistics it is noteworthy that equity returns 
are negative across all equity indices and countries (except Sweden and Korea), bond 
returns are reasonably similar, commodity returns are mostly negative and all currencies 
suffer depreciation versus the U.S. dollar. 
3.1.4 Regional Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for the regional crisis forward contracts. With the 
exception of Spain, we consider the crises start date as the prior local equity market high. 
As stock markets globally, including Spain, were in a bear market since the 1973 Oil 
Crisis, and the crisis is listed as occurring in 1977 by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), we 
use January 1977 as the start date for Spain. Within the regional crisis a mixture of 
instruments is available. Equity index data is available for all crises, whereas government 
bond data is unavailable for Norway, Finland, Indonesia, Philippines, Colombia and 
Argentina. Currencies are included only for Spain, Norway, Nordic, Japan and Colombia 
as the other regions had currencies pegged to the dollar. 
3.2 Methodology 
In this section we describe how the methodology used to create the trend-following 
global and regional portfolios and to empirically test for changing behaviour of the 
underlying markets in crisis and no-crisis periods. 
3.2.1 Trend-Following Portfolios  
In order to investigate the performance of trading strategies, we analyse the return series 
of portfolios generated from momentum signals. These portfolios are created from 
diversified ranges of both instruments and momentum strategies. Each momentum signal 
is defined in terms of its look back period, k, such that if the cumulative excess return 
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over the last k months is positive the momentum signal is +1, and if it is negative the 
signal is -1. The momentum signal for time t is  
 
ܯ௧,௞௜ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ൭෍log൫1 ൅ ݎ௧ି௞௜ ൯
௞
ଵ
൱ (3.2)
Here, ܯ௧,௞௜  is the momentum of instrument i at time t formed with a look-back period of 
k months, and ݎ௧ି௞௜ is the excess return of instrument i at time t-k.13 
Table 3.3 
Regional Crises: Summary Statistics 
The table lists the key features of the data sample used in analysing country crises. The crises are listed 
with start date and countries involved. The instruments used and their data source are then listed, with 
GDF representing Global Financial Data and D/M being MSCI via DataStream. The final columns 
summarize the performance of these instruments in term of annual return and annual volatility. The full 
sample period is an eight year span starting one year before the crisis. The crisis period represents a 
two-year period from the crisis start date. Short term interest rates sourced from GFD. Currencies are 
quoted as local units per USD. 
 
Region Start Country Instrument Data Full Sample Crisis Periods 
    Source Mean Vol. Mean Vol. 
         
Spain Jan-77 Spain Equity  D/M 4.12 39.48 5.95 67.71 
   Bond GFD -12.67 16.92 -6.71 19.17 
   Currency GFD -5.01 9.77 -2.98 12.89
Norway Oct-87 Norway Equity D/M 4.84 12.05 -2.81 18.16 
   Currency D/M -2.35 26.80 -0.48 33.46 
Nordic May-89 Sweden Equity D/M -4.67 10.62 -0.65 9.62
   Bond D/M 3.72 25.28 -2.63 28.09 
   Currency D/M 0.32 10.07 -0.14 10.19 
  Finland Equity D/M -1.35 12.64 -1.51 8.88
   Currency D/M -3.35 28.07 -9.16 24.90 
Japan Feb-90 Japan Equity  D/M -2.86 13.28 -1.77 10.36 
   Bond D/M -7.83 23.33 -7.77 29.46
   Currency D/M 2.34 7.43 -0.01 8.34 
Mexico Mar-94 Mexico Equity  D/M -1.27 11.59 -1.86 10.89 
   Bond GFD -2.61 28.25 -2.94 31.69
Asia Mar-97 Hong Kong Equity  D/M -2.48 22.03 6.14 37.34 
   Bond GFD -6.49 31.09 -3.21 47.19 
  Indonesia Equity D/M 3.63 7.72 -0.09 13.01
  Korea Equity  GFD -16.63 44.73 -8.18 68.91 
   Bond GFD -2.24 44.36 3.76 64.69 
  Malaysia Equity D/M 4.59 8.42 1.88 13.31
   Bond GFD -7.67 37.77 -4.80 61.74 
  Philippines Equity D/M 4.04 5.82 0.14 6.84 
  Thailand Equity  D/M -21.28 32.27 -5.41 45.03 
   Bond GFD -15.88 50.70 -2.31 77.16 
Colombia Dec-97 Colombia Equity  D/M 9.83 17.52 3.32 27.55 
   Currency GFD 1.06 34.41 -11.44 44.29 
Argentina Apr-00 Argentina Equity D/M 3.91 9.29 0.47 10.54 
         
                                                 
13 Using price return rather than excess return to calculate momentum produces almost identical results. 
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In order to take a diversified measure of momentum, we use the range of values of k 
from 1 to 12, so the diversified momentum measure for each instrument is14 
 
ܯ௧௜ ൌ 1ܭ .෍ܯ௧,௞
௜
௄
ଵ
 (3.3)
ܯ௧௜ is the momentum of instrument i at time t and K is the number of different look back 
periods. Each instrument is given a weight proportional to the diversified momentum 
signal, between +/- 1 and inversely proportional to its volatility, so the size of the position 
is, 
 ݓ௧௜ ൌ ܯ௧௜. ்ܸߪ௧௜  (3.4)
The weight, ݓ௧௜	, is the holding in instrument i at time t and ߪ௧௜ is the corresponding 
volatility. The position is scaled by a target volatility, VT. The choice of this is arbitrary 
but it is set at 40% (consistent with Moskowitz et al. (2012)) which allows the resulting 
portfolio return series to have a volatility level equivalent to those reported in the 
literature and market indices, facilitating comparison. Each position is then held for a 
period of one month so that the return series for an instrument is  
 ݉௧௜ ൌ ݁ݎ௧௜. ݓ௧௜ (3.5)
Here ݉௧௜  is the excess return of instrument i, in time period t. 
The final stage of the process combines the return series of the individual instruments 
into a single return series representing the return of a diversified momentum strategy. A 
two-step process is used to generate the return series. First, the average return across 
assets in an asset class is calculated and the mean return of the asset classes is calculated. 
This has the effect of splitting risk equally among the four asset classes and then equally 
among assets within each class. 
The excess return and momentum series are analysed as calendar month returns. When 
monthly return series are created from daily series, these are calculated as calendar 
month returns. For the regional crises, returns are examined from the perspective of a 
                                                 
14 This method produces identical return series to the Moskowitz et al. (2012) methodology, although, 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) produce return series for each momentum strategy and then average these.  
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U.S. investor, with the currency exposure of the underlying investment assumed to be 
hedged and profit or loss converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the month1516. 
3.2.2 Ex-ante Volatility 
As volatility of the instruments in the universe varies from 2% to 50% (see Table 3.2) 
an ex-ante estimate of volatility is required to scale returns to allow for comparison of 
results across different assets. This is necessary for both portfolio construction and 
regression analysis. As in Moskowitz et al. (2012), we use an exponentially weighted 
squared daily returns model to estimate volatility. This model is similar to a univariate 
GARCH model. The annualized volatility for each instrument is calculated as: 
 
ߪ௧ ൌ ඩ261෍ሺ1 െ ߜሻߜ௜ሺݎ௧ିଵି௜ െ ݎ௧ഥሻଶ
ஶ
௜ୀ଴
 (3.6) 
The parameter ߜ is chosen so that the centre of mass of the weights is 60 days, so data 
from the last sixty days carries equal weight to all data up to then. The same model is 
used for all instruments.17 
3.2.3 Transaction Costs and Fees 
In order to allow comparison with actual fund results, transaction costs and fees are 
included in the calculation of portfolio performance.18 
We use the cost estimate model described by Hurst et al. (2012), outlined in Table 3.4, 
defining costs as a proportion of the nominal value traded. The transaction costs are a 
function of asset class and time period. The costs of trading different assets within the 
same class are assumed to be similar. The starting point for Hurst et al. (2012) is the cost 
model of a large investment management firm which is used to produce cost estimates 
for the most recent period (2002 - 2012). Based on Jones (2002), who shows that the 
level of costs remained constant from 1930 to 1980 and have fallen by about 80% 
subsequently, Hurst et al. (2012) derive estimates for earlier periods. 
                                                 
15 We do not include transaction costs for the currency hedging, but these are likely to have a negligible 
effect on returns. 
16 Our results are robust to this assumption. Analysing returns in local currency leads to almost identical 
conclusions on performance. 
17 In the case where only monthly data is available, δ is chosen to give a center of mass of three months. 
18 Transaction costs are included in all the results shown. Management fees are only included where 
specified. 
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Table 3.4 
One-way Transaction Costs as a Percentage of Notional Traded, by Asset Class 
 
 1900-1992 1993-2002 2003-2013 
    
Equities  0.36% 0.12% 0.06% 
Bonds  0.06% 0.02% 0.01% 
Commodities  0.60% 0.20% 0.10% 
Currencies  0.18% 0.06% 0.03% 
    
Adapted from Hurst et al. (2012) 
 
In general, these estimates are consistent with other literature. Significant falls in trading 
costs, in line with Jones (2002), are recorded by Aitken et al. (2004), Burnside et al. 
(2006) and Subrahmanyam (2007). Similarly, estimates of current futures trading costs 
in the literature tend to be in line with these estimates (see for example Locke and 
Venkatesh (1997), Burnside et al. (2006) and Szakmary et al. (2010)).  
Management and incentive fees are applied where indicated. These are set at typical 
values (Hurst et al. (2012)) of 2% and 20% respectively. Incentive fees are calculated 
monthly and include a high watermark.  
3.2.4 Time Series Behaviour of Markets 
In order to examine why trend-following performance might vary across different time 
periods it is necessary to identify differences in the time series characteristics of the 
underlying futures markets between these periods.  
Moskowitz et al. (2012) provide evidence on the time series predictability of futures 
markets, from 1965 to 2009, using regression analysis. Taking a similar approach to 
examine predictability, for each futures contract, i, we regress the excess return, ݁ݎ௧௜, on 
its lagged excess return, ݁ݎ௧ି௟௜ . The univariate regressions are carried out with a lag, l, 
where l ranges from 1 to 24 months. All the observations for each lag are stacked to 
allow a pooled panel regression. Given the wide range of volatilities in the universe, 
observations are normalised using the lagged ex-ante volatility, ߪ௧ିଵ௜ . The regression 
equation then becomes: 
 ݁ݎ௧௜
ߪ௧ିଵ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ
݁ݎ௧ି௟ିଵ௜
ߪ௧ି௟ିଵ௜
൅ ߝ௧௜ (3.7)
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In comparing the regressions from crisis and no-crisis periods we focus on reporting the 
regression ߚs as, unlike the t statistics, the ߚs are insensitive to changes in sample size. 
Due to limited data size we are unable to draw statistically significance conclusions on 
the differences between individual ߚs in the crisis and no-crisis periods, however we are 
able to test for statistically significant differences in the cumulative ߚs.  
In the following section, we present a number of analyses comparing market 
characteristics in crisis and no-crisis periods. Unfortunately, Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) do not provide guidance on the length or end 
date of each crisis. Rather than attempting to define when each individual crisis ends, we 
focus our analyses instead on two fixed time periods, twenty-four months and forty-eight 
months, post the prior equity market high as our “crisis periods”. Data outside of these 
time intervals is consider “no-crisis periods”. While we acknowledge that our sample of 
crises is heterogeneous and does not last for a fixed period of time, it is a reasonable 
assumption that the majority of the data within these fixed time intervals can be 
considered crisis period data and so an analysis of that data will produce results 
representative of a market crisis. 
3.3 Results 
We begin by focusing on the performance of the global portfolio and the time series 
behaviour of futures returns during financial crises before moving on to provide some 
evidence from the regional crisis periods.  
3.3.1 Global Financial Crises 
3.3.1.1 Portfolio Performance 
Before examining the performance of the trend-following portfolio in crisis periods, we 
review the performance of the portfolio across the full sample period. Figure 3.1 graphs 
the cumulative returns for the global portfolio from 1925 to 201319. The average return 
net of fees is 12.1% with volatility of 11%.  
  
                                                 
19 Including pre-1925 returns leads to larger performance differences between crisis and no-crisis periods. 
However, we exclude these portfolio returns as they are formed using volatility estimated generated using 
relatively short time series of asset returns. 
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Figure 3.1 
Log Cumulative Return of Trend-Following Portfolio (January 1925 to June 2013) 
The chart shows the log cumulative return of a diversified portfolio trend-following from 1925 to 2013. 
The results are shown net of transaction costs and fees (2% management fees and 20% performance 
fee). The decade around World War II, from January 1940 to December 1949, is omitted from the 
analysis due to concerns about data accuracy. 
 
 
To ensure that the portfolio is capturing the characteristics of trend-following CTAs, we 
plot the returns of the portfolio against the returns of the Newedge Index of trend-
following CTAs over the period 2000 to 2013 (Figure 3.2). The two series are highly 
correlated with a coefficient of 0.76. 
Looking at performance in crisis and no-crisis periods, Table 3.5, Panel A, displays 
results for the full sample period from 1925 to 2013. Performance is reported for the 
global portfolio (net and gross of fees) and by asset class. This information is displayed 
graphically in Figure 3.3. 
Column two reports the performance for each portfolio over the full period. The Sharpe 
ratio for the global portfolio is an impressive 1.1. Looking at individual asset classes the 
performance of Equity Indices and Government Bonds is better than the other two, 
Currencies and Commodities.  
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Figure 3.2 
Comparison of Generic Trend-Following Performance with Newedge Trend 
Index, (January 2000 to June 2013) 
The monthly performance of the generic trend-following portfolio generated in the research is plotted 
against the corresponding Newedge trend-following index performance. Generic Portfolio returns are 
net of trading costs, management fee (2%) and incentive fee (20%) and include a cash return. 
 
Source: www.newedge.com 
 
The performance comparison for the twenty-four month crisis period is reported in 
columns three to five. Column three reports crisis period performance, column four 
reports performance excluding the crisis period and column five reports the difference 
between column four and three. Columns six to eight report the same results, this time 
for a crisis period defined as lasting forty-eight months. 
The results are very consistent. Comparing the performance of the first two years of 
trend-following subsequent to a crisis, the returns are far lower than in the no-crisis 
sample. At the full portfolio, level the average return in the first twenty-four months of 
a crisis is 4%, versus 13.6% in the no-crisis months. The return in the four year period 
from the start of a crisis averages 6%, versus 14.9% in the no-crisis sample. The results 
for equity index, government bonds and currency sub-portfolios are consistent with the 
global portfolio results over both the twenty-four month and forty-eight month crisis 
periods. The Sharpe ratio for the no-crisis period exceeds that for crisis period in each 
case and the excess ranges from 0.19 to 0.77. Only Commodities generate returns of a 
similar magnitude in crisis and no-crisis periods. The results for commodities are 
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consistent with prior evidence on the lack of synchrony between the cycle of 
commodities and other asset classes (see, for example, Erb and Harvey (2006) and 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006)). 
Table 3.5 
The Performance of Trend-Following during Financial Crises 
The table shows the performance of trend-following strategies, at a diversified portfolio level and asset 
class level, from 1925-2013. All returns include trading costs. The performance is represented by the 
average excess return, volatility and Sharpe ratio. The first column represents the full sample period. 
Columns 2 & 3 break the performance into crisis and non-crisis periods assuming that a crisis last two 
years from the start date. Column 4 highlights the difference between the two. Columns 5-7 repeat the 
analysis in columns 2-4, but assume a crisis lasts four years. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (January 1925 to June 2013) 
   Two Years  Four Years 
 All  Crisis No-crisis Diff.  Crisis No-crisis Diff. 
          
FULL: Fees    
Return (%) 12.14  4.04 13.63 9.59  5.97 14.90 8.93 
Volatility (%) 11.04  11.16 10.98 -0.18  10.92 11.03 0.11 
Sharpe Ratio 1.10  0.36 1.24 0.88 0.55 1.35 0.80
                
FULL                
Return (%) 18.49  8.77 20.29 11.52 10.59 22.06 11.47
Volatility (%) 12.35  12.19 12.33 0.14  11.79 12.49 0.70 
Sharpe Ratio 1.50  0.72 1.65 0.93  0.90 1.77 0.87 
     
EQUITY                
Return (%) 5.13  3.47 5.44 1.97  3.68 5.76 2.08 
Volatility (%) 4.78  4.91 4.75 -0.16  4.86 4.73 -0.13 
Sharpe Ratio 1.07  0.71 1.14 0.43  0.76 1.22 0.46 
                
BOND                
Return (%) 5.15  1.65 5.75 4.10  2.46 6.30 3.84 
Volatility (%) 5.27  5.12 5.28 0.16  5.13 5.30 0.17 
Sharpe Ratio 0.98  0.32 1.09 0.77  0.48 1.19 0.71 
                
CURRENCY                
Return (%) 1.28  -0.02 1.71 1.73  0.99 1.60 0.61 
Volatility (%) 3.28  3.57 3.17 -0.4  3.30 3.26 -0.04 
Sharpe Ratio 0.39  -0.01 0.54 0.55  0.30 0.49 0.19 
                
COMMODITY                
Return (%) 1.68  3.15 1.20 -1.95  2.74 0.60 -2.14 
Volatility (%) 2.86  3.65 2.54 -1.11  3.27 2.36 -0.91 
Sharpe Ratio 0.59  0.86 0.47 -0.39  0.84 0.26 -0.58 
          
 
As a robustness check we repeat the analysis focusing on the period from 1980 to 2013, 
where exchange traded futures data is available. These results are reported in Table 3.5, 
Panel B.  
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Table 3.5 cont’d 
The Performance of Trend-Following during Financial Crises 
The table shows the performance of trend-following strategies, at a diversified portfolio level and asset 
class level, from 1980-2013. All returns include trading costs. The performance is represented by the 
average excess return, volatility and Sharpe ratio. The first column represents the full sample period. 
Columns 2 & 3 break the performance into crisis and non-crisis periods assuming that a crisis last two 
years from the start date. Column 4 highlights the difference between the two. Columns 5-7 repeat the 
analysis in columns 2-4, but assume a crisis lasts four years. 
 
Panel B: Recent Sample (January 1980 to June 2013)
   Two Years  Four Years 
 All  Crisis No-crisis Diff.  Crisis No-crisis Diff. 
          
FULL: Fees          
Return (%) 6.54  2.62 7.84 5.22  4.91 8.04 3.13 
Volatility (%) 9.25  9.97 8.99 -0.98  9.45 9.06 -0.39 
Sharpe Ratio 0.71  0.26 0.87 0.61  0.52 0.89 0.37 
              
FULL              
Return (%) 11.22  6.73 12.71 5.98  9.21 13.08 3.87 
Volatility (%) 10.12  10.74 9.90 -0.84  10.25 10.01 -0.24 
Sharpe Ratio 1.11  0.63 1.28 0.65  0.90 1.31 0.41 
     
EQUITY              
Return (%) 4.34  2.74 4.90 2.16  3.07 5.52 2.45 
Volatility (%) 4.68  4.30 4.78 0.48 4.51 4.81 0.30
Sharpe Ratio 0.93  0.64 1.02 0.38  0.68 1.15 0.47 
              
BOND     
Return (%) 3.81  0.69 4.79 4.10  2.12 5.37 3.25 
Volatility (%) 5.53  5.23 5.60 0.37  5.23 5.77 0.54 
Sharpe Ratio 0.69  0.13 0.86 0.73  0.41 0.93 0.52 
              
CURRENCY              
Return (%) 1.18  0.26 1.45 1.19  1.20 1.17 -0.03 
Volatility (%) 3.2  3.40 3.13 -0.27  3.28 3.13 -0.15 
Sharpe Ratio 0.37  0.08 0.46 0.38  0.37 0.37 0.00 
              
COMMODITY              
Return (%) 1.66  3.15 1.20 -1.95  2.74 0.60 -2.14 
Volatility (%) 2.86  3.65 2.54 -1.11  3.27 2.36 -0.91 
Sharpe Ratio 0.58  0.86 0.47 -0.39  0.84 0.26 -0.58 
          
 
The results are remarkably consistent with Panel A. For a two year crisis period the full 
portfolio net of fees generates returns almost one third of those earned in no-crisis 
periods. The only exception is Currencies where four years into the crisis the 
performance differential is zero for the crisis and no-crisis returns.  
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Figure 3.3 
The Performance of Trend-Following during Financial Crises (Jan. 1925 to June 2013) 
The chart shows the average annual performance of trend-following strategies, at a diversified portfolio 
level and asset class level, from 1925-2013. All returns include trading costs. Panel A assumes a twenty-
four month crisis whereas Panel B assumes a forty-eight month crisis period 
 
Panel A: Crisis Period Twenty-Four Months 
 
Panel B: Crisis Period Forty-Eight Months 
3.3.1.2 Time Series Effects 
Next, we examine the predictability of these markets to establish whether there is a 
difference in the time series behaviour of futures markets between crisis and no-crisis 
periods.  
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Full: Fees Full Equity Bond Currency Commodity
Me
an
 An
nu
al 
Re
tur
n (
%)
All Crisis No Crisis
0
5
10
15
20
25
Full: Fees Full Equity Bond Currency Commodity
Me
an
 An
nu
al 
Re
tur
n (
%)
All Crisis No Crisis
62 
 
Figure 3.4 reports results of these tests for the full sample. Consistent with Moskowitz 
et al. (2012), there is strong return continuation for the first twelve months, with limited 
evidence of subsequent reversals.  
Figure 3.4 
Time Series Correlation of Asset Prices, All Classes 
Monthly excess returns of each instrument are regressed on lagged excess returns over a range of time 
horizons. The sample consists of data from 1921 to 2013 and the regression model is ݁ݎ݅ݐ ߪݐെ1݅⁄ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚ1݁ݎݐെ݈െ1݅ ߪݐെ݈െ1݅⁄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ. The top two graphs report the t-statistic and ߚ1 for lags from one month to twenty-four months. The sample is then split between crisis and no-crisis periods. Crisis periods are 
assumed to last two years from the start date and the ߚ1reported for these.   
  
  
 
When we next divide the sample into crisis and no-crisis periods, the different dynamics 
become very apparent. Within crisis periods the return continuation disappears. 
Reversals occur in months five, six and eight and the beta of continuation months is 
smaller. With significantly weaker relationship between return months the opportunities 
for profitable trend-following are diminished. Excluding crisis periods, the pattern of 
strong continuations becomes very evident. Unlike crisis periods, the no-crisis periods 
provide plenty of profitable opportunities for trend-followers.20 
                                                 
20 Repeating the analysis using the longer crisis period definition provides very similar results. 
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To examine time series characteristics of the different asset classes we repeat the analysis 
for each. Figure 3.5 reports betas for crisis and no-crisis periods by asset class. Equity 
indices, government bonds and currencies have strong return continuation out to twelve 
months in no-crisis periods, whereas there are reversals in at least two of the first six 
months evident in the crisis periods. The only exception is commodities, which have 
strong return continuations for the first five months into the crisis, before reversing. This 
explains why the crisis returns are higher than no-crises returns for commodities, as seen 
in Table 3.5.  
An alternative view of the regressions is presented in Figure 3.6. Here, the cumulative 
sum of the regression coefficients (Betas) is shown, along with its 95% confidence 
interval, for crisis and no-crisis periods. This is shown for the full universe of assets and 
also by asset class. 
The degradation in autocorrelation as markets move to crisis periods is evident. After 
twelve months, the cumulative beta for the no-crisis period is significantly (95% 
confidence level) above the crisis period for the full portfolio, equity indices and 
currencies, while the difference for government bonds is also evident but falls short of 
statistical significance. The commodity market is, as expected, the exception, with 
similar crisis and no-crisis results. 
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Figure 3.5 
Time Series Correlation by Asset Class: Regression Beta 
Monthly excess returns of each instrument are regressed on lagged excess returns over a range of time 
horizons. The sample consists of data from 1921 to 2013 and the regression model is ݁ݎ݅ݐ ߪݐെ1݅⁄ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚ1݁ݎݐെ݈െ1݅ ߪݐെ݈െ1݅⁄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ. The sample is divided by asset class and then between crisis and no-crisis 
market periods, with crises periods are assumed to last two years from the start date. The ߚ1for each lag from one month to twenty-four months is reported for each asset class for crisis and no-crisis 
periods. 
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Figure 3.6 
Time Series Correlation: Cumulative Beta with Confidence Interval 
The cumulative regression coefficients from a series of lagged regressions, along with their 95% 
confidence interval are plotted. Monthly excess returns are regressed on lagged excess returns over a 
range of time horizons. The sample consists of data from 1921 to 2013 and the regression model is 
݁ݎ݅ݐ ߪݐെ1݅⁄ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚ1݁ݎݐെ݈െ1݅ ߪݐെ݈െ1݅⁄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ. Each graph splits the sample between crisis and no-crisis periods. A crisis period is assumed to last two years from the start date.
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3.3.2 Regional Financial Crises Performance 
Given there are only six global crisis we also provide additional evidence using a range 
of regional crises. Summary results for the regional crises are reported in Figure 3.7. 
Panel A displays the cumulative returns of an equally weighted portfolio made up of the 
eight individual financial crisis portfolios, all aligned with the prior equity market high 
at month 0. Performance is relatively weak for the first two to three years into the crisis.  
Figure 3.7 
Performance of a Trend-Following Portfolio following a Regional Financial Crisis 
The chart shows the mean combined performance of the eight regional crises, each of which are aligned 
on the local stock market high. The table summarizes the performance by year. For each year, the mean 
return and mean volatility of the eight crises are shown. These are accompanied by the best and worst 
individual performance and the highest and lowest individual volatility.  
 
Panel A: Cumulative Returns 
 
Panel B: Summary Performance Statistics
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
       
Average Return (%) -1.25 2.87 4.41 6.03 7.89 9.07 
Best (%) 11.48 8.10 17.02 27.24 17.77 22.81 
Worst (%) -14.71 -8.39 -3.48 -6.94 -2.45 -5.23 
       
Average Volatility (%) 11.80 7.60 4.75 8.84 8.13 7.02 
Highest (%) 17.81 17.45 8.15 14.43 15.11 11.74 
Lowest (%) 5.02 3.01 3.19 4.19 4.35 2.69 
       
 
Looking next at the summary performance statistics of the individual crisis reported in 
Panel B, it is evident that there is significant cross-sectional deviation across crises 
performance. For example, in year one, when the average return across crises is -1.3%, 
the range of crisis returns was from -14.7% to +11.5% Again in year two, the average 
crises return is 2.9% with a range of outcomes, from -8.4% to 8.1%. In years four to six 
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average returns gradually increase up to 9%, but in each year the range remains wide and 
at least one of the crisis portfolios generates negative returns. 
3.3.3 A Comparison of Crises 
The heterogeneous nature of the global crises makes it difficult to compare individual 
crises. A number of features however can be highlighted. Figure 3.8, Panel A, graphs the 
cumulative returns for the trend-following portfolio for each crisis period. The crises can 
be loosely classified into two groups, those that develop quite rapidly (1929, 1987 and 
2000) and those that develop more gradually (1974, 1981 and 2007). The first group tend 
to start with a period of very poor trend-following performance, generally due to losses 
in the equity index sub-portfolio, as the equity indices reverse quite sharply. The crises 
that develop more slowly allow time for the trend-following signals to adjust to the new 
market direction before the crisis fully develops, resulting in short run profitability.  
The poor performance during market crises is generally due to extended periods in which 
cumulative returns move sideways rather than experiencing significant drawdowns. 
These periods are characteristic of all the crises we examined. The longest period each 
crisis undergoes without generating an excess return is presented in Figure 3.8, Panel B. 
This ranges from 18 months (2000) to 54 months (1987) and averages three years. It is 
notable that this extended period of weak performance begins at different intervals in the 
crises. 
It is only possible to comment on regional crises at an aggregate level due to the scale of 
heterogeneity in the individual results. The general pattern, a period of poor performance 
followed by an improvement in performance, is consistent with the return series of the 
global portfolios. Here the aggregate excess returns are close to zero in the first two years 
with performance beginning to improve through years three and four.  
Taken together the results reported in this section of the paper provide clear evidence on 
the effect of financial crises both on trend-following performance and the underlying 
markets traded by these funds. The performance of these types of strategies is much 
weaker in crisis periods, where performance can be as little as one-third of that in normal 
market conditions. This result is supported by our evidence for regional crises, though 
the effect seems to be more short lived. In our analysis of the underlying markets, our 
empirical evidence indicates a breakdown in the time series predictability, pervasive in 
normal market conditions, on which trend-following relies.  
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Figure 3.8 
Comparison of Trend-Following performance after Global Financial Crises 
Panel A shows the cumulative return of each global crisis and the mean combined performance of the 
six global crises, each of which is aligned on the pre-crisis stock market high. Panel B displays the 
length of the maximum period that the trend-following portfolio generates zero cumulative excess 
returns for each crisis.  
 
Panel A: Cumulative returns of trend-following portfolio following global financial crisis. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this article has taken an extensive look at the long term performance of 
trend-following strategies, how those strategies perform during regional and global 
financial crises periods and what happens to the underlying markets traded by funds 
pursuing these strategies. 
Our analysis of the long term performance of trend-following strategies using a 
diversified global multiple asset class portfolio from 1925 to 2013, suggests that these 
strategies have produced consistently high returns through time. Despite the below 
average recent performance of trend-following funds, this should give investors in funds 
employing these types of strategies some comfort. 
Looking next at the performance of these strategies during financial crises the evidence 
is consistent. These strategies typically underperform for an extended period, on average 
four years, following a crisis. Performance outside these crisis periods is more than 
double the crisis returns. 
Repeating the analysis focusing on regional crises, the results are consistent with the 
global performance. Although individual crises differ significantly, the pattern of a 
period of poor performance followed by reversion to long term norms is repeated, 
although here performance begins to pick up during the third year after the crisis. 
We find significant differences in the time series dynamics of the underlying markets 
between crisis and no-crisis periods. In futures markets there are strong autocorrelation 
in time series returns of instrument at lags of one to twelve months which drive trend-
following returns. By dividing the data between crisis and no-crisis periods, we find that 
this relationship is significantly diminished during periods of financial crisis. This has 
the consequence of significantly reducing the returns of the trend-following strategy. 
Our research leads to a key question which remains unanswered - What happens to cause 
this break down in the time series behaviour of futures markets following a financial 
crisis?  
Existing behavioural finance theories provide some predictions that our results support. 
For example Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) link serial correlation in 
asset returns to increases in overconfidence and decreased risk aversion of investors. 
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Precisely the opposite conditions occur in a financial crisis, with investor confidence 
falling and risk aversion increasing. Under both models, opportunities for generating 
trend-following returns should decrease in these periods.  
Also, as noted by Daniel et al. (2002), governments have an increased tendency to 
intervene in financial markets during crises, resulting in discontinuities in price patterns. 
The Federal Reserve’s support of Bear Sterns in March 2008 (Melvin and Taylor (2009)) 
and the intervention by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in Hang Seng futures in 
1998 (Bhanot and Kadapakkam (2006)) both caused sharp reversals in their respective 
markets. The frequency, effect and consequences of these interventions for trend-
following require further research. 
Finally, hedging pressure has long been recognised as having a role in the price setting 
mechanism of commodity markets. (De Roon et al. 2000) demonstrates that hedging 
pressure has a significant effect on the futures risk premia, so changing dynamics in 
hedging pressure during crisis may cause changes in market characteristics. More 
explicitly, Moskowitz et al. (2012) link the returns of trend-following with the cost of 
hedging, as speculators (trend-followers) capture a premium from hedgers. It is possible 
that, as hedgers benefit from positions in a crisis, the premia normally paid by hedgers 
to speculators are reversed. 
It should be stressed that while the above points suggest mechanisms by which market 
states may differ from crisis to no-crisis periods, we do not present evidence that these 
changes occur, or if they do, that they are the cause the time series effects that we have 
identified in our analysis. Significant further research is needed to fully understand their 
effects on the markets and on the return characteristics of time series momentum. 
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3.A Appendix: Data Sources 
3.A.1 Equity Indices 
The universe of equity indices has twenty components. Fourteen of these consist of data 
from developed markets, with future prices available from Datastream starting at various 
dates from January 1980 and derived forward prices generated from data from Global 
Financial Data prior to that. In each case Global Financial Data provides a total return 
index, which allows the yield to be calculated. This group consists of Australia (SPI 
200), Canada (TSX 60), Netherlands (AEX), France (CAC 40), Germany (DAX), Hong 
Kong (Hang Seng), Korea (KOSPI 200), Japan (Nikkei 225), United States (S&P 500), 
United Kingdom (FTSE 100), Spain (IBEX 35), Italy (MIB), Sweden (OMX 30) and 
Switzerland (SMI). 
The six additional indices are the three mid cap indices (Germany, Switzerland and 
United States) and three alternative indices for the U.S. (Dow Jones, Russell 2000 and 
NASDAQ 100). We only include exchange traded future contract data for these indices. 
3.A.2 Bond Indices 
A total of thirteen government bond indices from six countries are used. Australia (3 and 
10 year), Canada (10 year), United States (2, 5, 10 and 30 year), Germany (2, 5, 10 and 
30 year), Japan (10 year) and United Kingdom (10 year). Exchange data for these is from 
Datastream, starting on a variety of dates from January 1980. The data for eight of these 
is extended backwards using total return indices and short term yields from Global 
Financial Data. As the Australian bond futures are quoted as (100-interest rate), these 
returns were normalized to facilitate the combination of synthetic and market-price 
series.  
3.A.3 Currencies 
The universe of currency forwards consists of ten currencies. Forwards are created for 
all currency pairs from spot data and short term interest rates. The spot rates are sources 
from Datastream/MSCI from 1980 and, prior to that, from Global Financial Data. 
Although data is available back to 1920, currencies are only considered for inclusion and 
statistics provided from the end of the Bretton-Woods fixed rate system in 1971. The 
Euro and German Mark are spliced into one time series. The currencies included are 
Australian Dollar, Canada Dollar, Euro (German Mark), Norwegian Krone, New 
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Zealand Dollar, Sweden Krona, Swiss Franc, United Kingdom Pound and United States 
Dollar. 
3.A.4 Commodities 
There are twenty-one commodities traded: Copper, Gold and Silver (COMEX), Light 
Crude Oil, Natural Gas, NY Heating Oil, Palladium, Platinum and RBOB Gasoline 
(NYMEX), Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton, Gas Oil and Sugar (ICE), Corn, Soya Bean Oil, Soya 
Bean Meal, Soya Beans and Wheat (CME) and Lean Hogs and Live Cattle (CBOT). The 
commodity data is entirely based on prices of exchange traded futures, provided by 
DataStream. As cost of carry data is unavailable, it is not possible to accurately estimate 
forward prices prior to the availability of exchange traded futures. 
3.A.5 Risk Free Rates 
Short term interest rates are sourced from Global Financial Data. The one month 
interbank rate (LIBOR or equivalent) is the preferred rate. When this is not available, 
the closest available interbank rate was used, and finally the central bank base rate. 
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3.B Appendix: Supplementary Analysis 
3.B.1 Test Statistics 
This section extends statistical analysis presented earlier in the chapter. The test statistics 
for the differences of mean returns in crisis and no-crisis periods are presented in Table 
3.6. The test statistics of the slope coefficient of the regressions of lagged returns are 
presented in Figures 3.9 & 3.10. The values presented in these figures for crisis and no-
crisis periods are not directly comparable due to different sample sizes. 
Table 3.6 
The Performance of Trend-Following during Financial Crises 
The table shows the performance of trend-following strategies, at a diversified portfolio level and asset 
class level, from 1925-2013. All returns include trading costs. The performance is represented by the 
average excess return, volatility and Sharpe ratio. The test statistics of the return difference between 
crisis and no-crisis periods are presented in brackets. The first column represents the full sample period. 
Columns 2 & 3 break the performance into crisis and non-crisis periods assuming that a crisis last two 
years from the start date. Column 4 highlights the difference between the two. Columns 5-7 repeat the 
analysis in columns 2-4, but assume a crisis lasts four years.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample (January 1925 to June 2013) 
   Two Years  Four Years 
 All  Crisis No-crisis Diff.  Crisis No-crisis Diff. 
    
FULL: Fees          
Return (%) 12.14  4.04 13.63 9.59  5.97 14.90 8.93 
Volatility (%) 11.04  11.16 10.98 -0.18 10.92 11.03 0.11
Sharpe Ratio 1.10  0.36 1.24 0.88  0.55 1.35 0.80 
       (2.78)       (3.31)  
FULL     
Return (%) 18.49  8.77 20.29 11.52  10.59 22.06 11.47 
Volatility (%) 12.35  12.19 12.33 0.14  11.79 12.49 0.70 
Sharpe Ratio 1.50  0.72 1.65 0.93 0.90 1.77 0.87
       (2.98)       (3.81)  
EQUITY                
Return (%) 5.13  3.47 5.44 1.97 3.68 5.76 2.08
Volatility (%) 4.78  4.91 4.75 -0.16  4.86 4.73 -0.13 
Sharpe Ratio 1.07  0.71 1.14 0.43  0.76 1.22 0.46 
       (1.32)       (1.78)  
BOND                
Return (%) 5.15  1.65 5.75 4.10  2.46 6.30 3.84 
Volatility (%) 5.27  5.12 5.28 0.16  5.13 5.30 0.17 
Sharpe Ratio 0.98  0.32 1.09 0.77  0.48 1.19 0.71 
       (2.49)       (2.99)  
CURRENCY                
Return (%) 1.28  -0.02 1.71 1.73  0.99 1.60 0.61 
Volatility (%) 3.28  3.57 3.17 -0.4  3.30 3.26 -0.04 
Sharpe Ratio 0.39  -0.01 0.54 0.55  0.30 0.49 0.19 
       (1.42)       (0.59)  
COMMODITY                
Return (%) 1.68  3.15 1.20 -1.95  2.74 0.60 -2.14 
Volatility (%) 2.86  3.65 2.54 -1.11  3.27 2.36 -0.91 
Sharpe Ratio 0.59  0.86 0.47 -0.39  0.84 0.26 -0.58 
     (-1.77)    (-2.07) 
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Table 3.6 cont’d 
The Performance of Trend-Following during Financial Crises 
The table shows the performance of trend-following strategies, at a diversified portfolio level and asset 
class level, from 1980-2013. All returns include trading costs. The performance is represented by the 
average excess return, volatility and Sharpe ratio. The test statistics of the return difference between 
crisis and no-crisis periods are presented in brackets. The first column represents the full sample period. 
Columns 2 & 3 break the performance into crisis and non-crisis periods assuming that a crisis last two 
years from the start date. Column 4 highlights the difference between the two. Columns 5-7 repeat the 
analysis in columns 2-4, but assume a crisis lasts four years. 
 
Panel B: Recent Sample (January 1980 to June 2013)
   Two Years  Four Years 
 All  Crisis No-crisis Diff.  Crisis No-crisis Diff. 
          
FULL: Fees          
Return (%) 6.54  2.62 7.84 5.22  4.91 8.04 3.13 
Volatility (%) 9.25  9.97 8.99 -0.98  9.45 9.06 -0.39 
Sharpe Ratio 0.71  0.26 0.87 0.61  0.52 0.89 0.37 
       (1.49)     (0.96)  
FULL              
Return (%) 11.22  6.73 12.71 5.98  9.21 13.08 3.87 
Volatility (%) 10.12  10.74 9.90 -0.84  10.25 10.01 -0.24 
Sharpe Ratio 1.11  0.63 1.28 0.65  0.90 1.31 0.41 
       (1.56)     (1.08)  
EQUITY              
Return (%) 4.34  2.74 4.90 2.16  3.07 5.52 2.45 
Volatility (%) 4.68  4.30 4.78 0.48  4.51 4.81 0.30 
Sharpe Ratio 0.93  0.64 1.02 0.38  0.68 1.15 0.47 
       (0.83)     (1.50)  
BOND              
Return (%) 3.81  0.69 4.79 4.10 2.12 5.37 3.25
Volatility (%) 5.53  5.23 5.60 0.37  5.23 5.77 0.54 
Sharpe Ratio 0.69  0.13 0.86 0.73  0.41 0.93 0.52 
    (1.98)  (1.69)
CURRENCY              
Return (%) 1.18  0.26 1.45 1.19  1.20 1.17 -0.03 
Volatility (%) 3.2  3.40 3.13 -0.27  3.28 3.13 -0.15 
Sharpe Ratio 0.37  0.08 0.46 0.38  0.37 0.37 0.00 
       (0.98)     (-0.03)  
COMMODITY              
Return (%) 1.66  3.15 1.20 -1.95  2.74 0.60 -2.14 
Volatility (%) 2.86  3.65 2.54 -1.11  3.27 2.36 -0.91 
Sharpe Ratio 0.58  0.86 0.47 -0.39  0.84 0.26 -0.58 
     (-1.77)    (-2.07) 
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Figure 3.9 
Time Series Correlation of Asset Prices, All Classes 
Monthly excess returns of each instrument are regressed on lagged excess returns over a range of time 
horizons. The sample consists of data from 1921 to 2013 and the regression model is ݁ݎ݅ݐ ߪݐെ1݅⁄ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚ1݁ݎݐെ݈െ1݅ ߪݐെ݈െ1݅⁄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ. The top two graphs report the t-statistic and ߚ1 for lags from one to twenty-
four months. The sample is then split between crisis and no-crisis periods. The values of ߚ1 and its test statistic are reported for the two periods. Crisis periods are assumed to last two years from the start 
date. 
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Figure 3.10 
Time Series Correlation by Asset Class: Test Statistic 
Monthly excess returns of each instrument are regressed on lagged excess returns over a range of time 
horizons. The sample consists of data from 1921 to 2013 and the regression model is ݁ݎ݅ݐ ߪݐെ1݅⁄ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚ1݁ݎݐെ݈െ1݅ ߪݐെ݈െ1݅⁄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ. The sample is divided by asset class and then between crisis and no-crisis market periods, with crises periods are assumed to last two years from the start date. The test-statistic 
for ߚ1for each lag from one to twenty-four months is reported for each asset class for crisis and no-crisis periods. 
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3.B.2 The Commodity Anomaly and the Inter-temporal Asset Pricing Model 
An examination of the results presented in Table 3.6 shows that for the diversified, equity 
index, government bond and currency portfolios the performance is better in no-crisis 
periods than crisis periods. These results are consistent over different definitions of crises 
and across different sample periods. The performance of the commodities portfolio 
stands out, being higher in periods of crisis21. It is also the only portfolio that shows a 
noticeable difference in volatility between crisis and no-crises periods, being about 50% 
higher in crisis periods, while the difference is less than 10% for all other asset classes. 
The anomaly reflects previous evidence that suggests the performance characteristics of 
commodity investments differ from other asset classes, (see, for example, Erb and 
Harvey (2006), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and, more recently, Schneeweis et al. 
(2008)).  
The asynchrony between the cycles of commodities and other assets is compatible with 
the inter-temporal asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973). The model focuses 
on investors maximising lifetime consumption given variable investment opportunities. 
The ICAPM produced by Merton is a theoretical framework, subsequently a number of 
authors have provided interpretations of the model which allow for tractable and intuitive 
analysis of its implications for financial markets. These interpretations can provide 
mechanisms to explain the asynchrony. In general, the different the mechanisms, a 
selection are discussed in detail below, rely on changes in the relative preference of 
investors between consumption and investment. These changes, by associating 
commodities with consumption and financial assets with investment, allow the prices of 
these two asset classes to diverge when there is a change in economic state.  
An early interpretation, the consumption capital asset pricing model (Breeden (1979)) 
defines an asset’s exposure to consumption rather than market returns as the source of 
returns above the risk free rate. Using this model is can be shown that there is an inverse 
relationship between consumption and expected investment returns. 
Hall (1988) analyses the ICAPM to demonstrate an inter-temporal substitution between 
saving (financial assets) and consumption (commodities). Investors respond to a change 
in economic state by substitution financial assets for consumption, resulting in diverging 
                                                 
21 A similar pattern is identified in the analyses of time series momentum across varying economic states 
(Section 4.4) and economic uncertainty (Section 4.7). 
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return series. The relative attractiveness of financial assets to investors are represented 
by a changing discount rate by Grossman and Shiller (1981) and later Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004). Analysis by Maio (2005) focuses on risk aversion and demonstrates 
that the model implies a counter cyclical risk aversion.  
Fama (1996) uses a different approach to produce similar results when he reinterprets 
the ICAPM in a mean-variance efficient framework. Investors divide their wealth 
between current consumption and investment. A change in state of the economy alters 
the relative utility of the financial and consumption assets to investors, resulting in 
different return characteristic. 
It should emphasised that while the ICAPM in its various interpretations provides 
reasons to expect differences between the return structure of commodities and financial 
assets around changes market states, it is not possible to extend the model to predict the 
details of the differences in the performance of time series momentum demonstrated 
here. Although the ICAPM can be regarded as a superior model of reality to the CAPM, 
its complexities, along with the underlying assumptions, make it difficult to interpret 
(Fama (1996)). Neither the time varying risk of Maio (2005) or the discount rate model 
of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) improve on the three factor Fama-French model in 
explaining equity returns while, in a more limited scenario, Jagannathan (1985) 
highlights the difficulty of extending the model to understand the of price commodities. 
Despite this, the evidence of negative correlation between the performance profiles of a 
commodity portfolio and the financial portfolios in a crisis is important. It indicates that 
commodities can reduce the overall exposure of a multi-asset-class time series 
momentum portfolio to economic risk and as such argues for a higher relative weight for 
commodities in such a portfolio.  
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Chapter Four 
Time Series Momentum and Macroeconomic 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract22 
 
 
The time series momentum strategy has been shown to deliver consistent profitability 
over a long time horizon. Funds pursuing these strategies are now a component of many 
institutional portfolios, due to the expectation of positive returns in equity bear markets. 
However, the return drivers of the strategy and its performance in other economic 
conditions are less well understood. The authors find evidence that the returns to the 
strategy are connected to the business cycle. Returns are positive in both recessions and 
expansions, but profitability is especially high in expansions. About 40% of returns are 
due to time varying factor-related risk exposure, consistent with rational asset pricing 
theories having a role in explaining the profitability of the strategy.  
                                                 
22 This paper is currently in revision for resubmission to the Financial Analysts’ Journal. The research 
reported in this paper has been presented at the following conferences; FMA Europe, Venice, FMA 
International, Orlando, and as part of the Financial Seminar Series at Queen’s University, Belfast, all 2015 
and INFINITI 2017 in Valencia. Lead author, John O’Brien, co-author, Mark Hutchinson. 
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4. Time Series Momentum and Macroeconomic Risk 
4.1 Introduction 
Subsequent to strong performance in the 2008 financial crisis Commodity Trading 
Advisors (CTAs) pursuing time series momentum strategies have experienced large 
inflows and are now a feature of many institutional investor portfolios.23 For many 
investors the intuition behind including CTAs in their portfolio is primarily the 
expectation of high performance during equity bear markets.24 
Though choosing a strategy due to an expectation of positive performance during these 
periods is reasonable, it disregards the drivers of profitability of the strategy and may 
convey the idea that high returns are exclusive to equity bear markets. Unlike traditional 
asset classes or other hedge fund strategies, there is scant academic evidence to date on 
the interaction between the returns of time series momentum and the business cycle. 
While the academic literature does show that the strategy has historically generated 
consistently positive returns, and that at least a portion of time series momentum returns 
are due to behavioural factors, it is a common sentiment amongst investors that 
performance is equity market period specific. 
In our paper, to help investors understand the drivers of profitability, we explicitly test 
the connection between time series momentum strategies and the business cycle. We 
arrive at four key findings. First, time series momentum portfolio returns exhibit 
statistically significant differences across the business cycle. While positive in both, 
typically the performance of the portfolio is higher in economic expansions than 
recessions. Second, we show that though a linear macroeconomic factor model has little 
explanatory power, a model which allows the coefficients to vary through time, does 
result in several of the macroeconomic factors having a statistically significant 
relationship with time series momentum. Third, we show that when time series 
momentum portfolios are formed on either the factor-related or asset-specific portions 
of financial futures returns they generate statistically significant excess returns in both 
cases, with about 40 percent of returns coming from the factor-related portion. Finally, 
                                                 
23 According to data from Barclay hedge as of the 3rd Quarter of 2014 CTA assets under management 
(AUM) was $312.6 billion. 
24 See, for example, “Global worries forecast to boost flow of assets”, Financial Times, June 9th 2012. 
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using a new estimation approach, we find that time series momentum generates higher 
returns in periods when economic uncertainty is lower.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, these results show that there is a role for rational asset 
pricing in explaining at least a portion of the returns to time series momentum; the 
strategy is related to macroeconomic risk factors which have previously been shown to 
be important in explaining the returns of both traditional and hedge fund portfolios; and 
perhaps most importantly, our evidence points to how practitioners can expect 
performance to vary across different future macroeconomic environments. In the next 
section we review the related literature and discuss how our results link to and extend 
this literature.  
4.2 Literature Review 
The literature on time series momentum is typically focused on the performance of 
different variations of these strategies for particular markets in specific periods (see for 
example Erb and Harvey (2006), Miffre and Rallis (2007) and Fuertes et al. (2010) for 
commodities, and Okunev and White (2003) and Menkhoff et al. (2012b) for currencies). 
The evidence of these studies is generally positive on the performance of time series 
momentum with positive Sharpe ratios and little correlation with traditional asset classes. 
Our paper compliments Moskowitz et al. (2012) who introduce multi asset class time 
series momentum to the literature. In a comprehensive study Moskowitz et al. (2012) 
investigate how time series momentum relates to market movements, sentiment, and the 
positions of speculators; finding evidence supporting a behavioural explanation for time 
series momentum profitability. Our study builds upon Moskowitz et al. (2012) in that 
we focus on macroeconomic factors which have been shown to be important for hedge 
funds and traditional portfolios, employ methodologies which directly incorporate time 
variation in factor exposures, and provide evidence that rational asset pricing may also 
be important in explaining returns. 
Recent evidence linking time series momentum and the broader macroeconomy 
(Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014)) shows that following each of the six largest financial 
crises in the last hundred years, there was an extended period where time series 
momentum performance was below average. Though Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014) 
suggest several explanations why the performance of the strategy might differ in 
different economic conditions, unlike our study, they provide no empirical evidence 
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connecting the strategy to the business cycle. The present paper also addresses a gap in 
Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014) by identifying the link between the business cycle and 
their finding that time series momentum tends to perform below average following 
periods of financial crisis. Using a new methodology, we document that uncertainty 
around changes in macroeconomic factors is the transmission mechanism linking the 
below average returns following large global financial crises and the business cycle. 
By finding a link between the macroeconomy and time series momentum in a time 
varying framework we build upon several related papers on time series and cross-
sectional momentum.25 The cross-sectional momentum literature finds a strong 
relationship between macroeconomic factors and returns (Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002)). While, to date, no one has considered this specification for time series 
momentum, related literature has demonstrated the lack of explanatory power for a range 
of traditional factors in a linear framework (Menkhoff et al. (2012b) and Moskowitz et 
al. (2012)).26 We find that the relationship between returns and macroeconomic factors 
is only revealed in a model which explicitly allows for time varying exposure to risk 
factors. However, our conditional model results show that a significant portion of time 
series momentum returns are not explained by the macroeconomic factors.  
Within the cross-sectional momentum literature Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that 
profitability is due to differences in cross-sectional expected returns. Illustrating this, 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) demonstrate that when the returns of the underlying 
equities into are divided into macroeconomic factor-related and asset-specific 
components, the majority of cross-sectional momentum profitability comes from the 
portion of equity returns explained by macroeconomic factors. Contrary to this, in the 
first study to consider the returns of time series momentum from this perspective, we 
find that the returns to our portfolios are attributable to both the asset-specific and factor-
related components of financial futures. 
                                                 
25 As noted by Moskowitz et al. (2012) cross-sectional momentum and time series momentum are related 
but different strategies. The key difference being that cross-sectional momentum trading decisions are 
based upon the historical return of a security relative to other securities, whereas time series momentum 
is based upon the historical return of a security, considered independent of other securities. See Goyal and 
Jegadeesh (2015) for a decomposition of both strategies. 
26 We acknowledge that the broad range of drivers of returns investigated by Moskowitz et al. (2012) do 
relate to time variation in strategy performance. 
83 
 
More recently, the hedge fund literature has linked the performance of a range of hedge 
fund strategies to economic uncertainty. Bali et al. (2014) find that the sensitivity of 
hedge funds to uncertainty about the economy is important in explaining the cross-
sectional deviation in their performance. In the first study to apply this methodological 
approach to time series momentum, our evidence suggests that time series momentum 
returns tend to be higher when economic uncertainty is lower than average. 
4.3 Data and Methods 
In this section we describe the selection of the sample period and the data used in the 
analysis. The dataset consists of individual exchange traded futures contracts, synthetic 
forward contracts and a range of macroeconomic variables. 
4.3.1 Futures Data 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the 
returns of the time series momentum investment strategy. As consistent monthly 
macroeconomic data only becomes available from the late 1940s, we specify January 
1950 as the starting point for the analyses.27 The sample period runs to the end of 
September, 2014. We split the sample into two sub-periods, January 1950 to December 
1979 and January 1980 to September 2014, based around the peak of the great inflation. 
The first period is characterized by high inflation and increasing interest rates, whereas 
from 1980 inflation fell quickly and remained in a range of 2% to 5% for most of that 
period.28 In this second sub-period interest rates fell steadily, from a high of 15.5% in 
1981 to a low of 1.7% in 2012.29 Dividing the sample into these two sub-periods allows 
us to assess performance in different long term interest rate cycles. 
The futures data set consists of twenty one commodities, thirteen government bonds, 
twenty one equity indices and currency crosses derived from nine underlying rates 
covering the period from January 1949 to September 2014. The data consists of a 
combination of exchange traded futures data and forward prices derived from historical 
data. The momentum signals and portfolio returns are based on continuous return series. 
Using only exchange traded futures contracts would limit the time frame of the study to 
post-1980. In order to extend the study period backwards we follow the methodology 
                                                 
27 We also use data for the twelve months prior to January 1950 to generate trading signals for the initial 
time series momentum portfolios.  
28 Annual change in US CPI, source Federal Reserve Economic Database. 
29 US Treasury 10 Year yield, source Federal Reserve Economic Database. 
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used in other long term studies of time series momentum (see, for example, Hurst et al. 
(2012)) and combine exchange traded prices with synthetic forwards created from the 
underlying instruments. Exchange traded futures’ prices are available from Datastream 
from 1980 to the present. Prior to this period, we obtain continuous return series for 
commodity futures from Commodity Systems Inc. and MSCI currency data from 
Datastream. All older data is sourced from Global Financial Data. Table 4.1 shows a full 
list of the futures used in the study and data sources are discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix 4.A. 
Where a futures contract trades on an exchange, the return series of the individual futures 
contracts are combined to produce a continuous excess return series. Where futures 
contracts are not available, forward prices are created by combining the underlying spot 
price, yield and risk free rate. These two approaches are discussed below. 
4.3.1.1 Continuous Returns from Futures Contracts 
Continuous return series are created from futures where daily price and volume data is 
available. We calculate the daily excess return of the most liquid contract. This is 
generally the front month or the next-nearest to delivery month. We select the most liquid 
contract as follows. At time, t, the average volume over the previous three trading days 
is measured for each of the live delivery dates. We select the contract with the highest 
volume to be recorded as the excess return for that day. To replicate the practicalities of 
rolling contracts, once we select a further delivery month, we do not allow the excess 
return of nearer delivery months to be selected again. 
4.3.1.2 Continuous Return Forward Prices 
Where exchange traded futures are not available, excess return series are created from 
the underlying spot price, risk free rate and yield. The excess return from buying a 
forward at the start of a month and holding it to month end, ݁ݎଵ, is given by: 
 
݁ݎଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎଵሻ ቆ1 ൅ ݍ1 ൅ ݎ௙ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 
 
(4.1)
where ݎଵ is the spot price return for the month, ݎ௙ is the one month risk free rate, and ݍ 
is the annualized yield. In order to confirm the validity of using synthetic forwards, a 
number of tests were carried out where exchange traded futures returns were replaced by 
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synthetic forward returns. The series were typically almost perfectly correlated and in all 
cases results were close to identical.  
Table 4.1 
Future Contracts 
The table provides a list of the underlying futures contracts used to create the time series momentum 
portfolios used in this study. Each future is listed with its average annual excess return, volatility and 
the date the return series becomes available. The futures are divided into four classes; Commodities, 
Government Bonds, Equity Indices and currencies. All data series end in September 2014.  
 
 Start 
 Date 
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Vol. 
 Start 
Date 
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Vol. 
        
Commodity Futures  Equity Index Futures    
COCOA Jan-66 -0.48 28.56 SPI 200-Australia Jan-50 3.78 17.01 
COFFEE Sep-72 -1.47 37.87 S&P TSX60-Canada Jan-70 3.19 16.42 
COPPER Jan-66 4.23 27.51 Dow Jones-US Oct-77 4.12 15.28 
CORN Aug-50 -3.24 22.26 NASDAQ 100-US Apr-96 8.18 27.29 
COTTON Apr-67 -0.83 25.39 AEX-Netherlands Jan-70 5.02 18.91 
GAS OIL Sep-03 9.78 28.87 CAC 40-France Jan-70 3.36 20.26 
GOLD Feb-75 3.97 19.97 DAX-Germany Jan-50 5.82 18.50 
LEAN HOGS Mar-66 2.94 26.05 MDAX-Germany Mar-05 11.14 21.36 
LIGHT CRUDE  Mar-83 6.14 33.96 HANG SENG-Hong Kong Jan-70 10.53 33.29
LIVE CATTLE Dec-64 4.31 16.91 S&P Midcap-US Feb-92 8.19 16.78 
NATURAL GAS Apr-90 -10.76 56.64 NIKKIE 225-Japan Jan-50 6.08 20.30 
NY HEATING OIL Jan-80 6.12 31.97 S&P 500–US Jan-50 5.48 14.52 
PALLADIUM Feb-77 5.75 35.08 KOSPI 200-Korea Jan-65 8.86 27.38 
PLATINUM Feb-64 2.99 26.91 FTSE 100-UK Jan-50 5.05 17.90 
RBOB GASOLINE Oct-05 6.20 32.28 IBEX 35-Spain Jan-70 1.68 20.85 
SILVER Jul-73 -0.51 31.00 MIB-Italy Jan-50 2.11 21.95 
SOYABEAN MEAL Sep-51 3.57 28.69 Russell 2000-US Aug-07 6.09 21.91 
SOYABEAN OIL Aug-50 6.84 27.79 OMXS 30-Sweden Jan-70 6.77 21.93 
SOYABEANS Aug-50 3.31 24.02 SMI-Switzerland Jan-70 5.39 16.45 
SUGAR Jan-66 -2.99 40.52 SMI Midcap-Switzerland Sep-05 6.17 17.47 
WHEAT Aug-50 -4.09 23.14     
        
Bond Futures    Currency Forwards    
Australia-10Y Jan-50 0.50 6.73 AUD/USD Aug-71 -1.69 11.51 
Australia-3Y May-88 4.03 9.47 CAD/USD Aug-71 -0.39 6.54 
Canada-10Y Jan-50 1.29 6.22 CHF/USD Aug-71 -0.80 12.23 
US-5Y Jan-50 0.82 4.98 EUR/USD* Aug-71 0.11 10.91
US-2Y Jun-90 1.62 1.68 GBP/USD Aug-71 -0.77 10.15 
US-10Y Jan-50 1.21 6.75 JPY/USD Aug-71 -0.14 11.18 
US-30Y Jan-50 0.78 9.77 NOK/USD Aug-71 -1.36 10.58 
Germany-5Y Oct-91 2.97 3.22 NZD/USD Aug-71 -1.97 12.41 
Germany-30Y Sep-05 5.34 11.88 SEK/USD Aug-71 0.05 11.03 
Germany-2Y Mar-97 0.92 1.32     
Germany-10Y Jan-50 2.33 5.05     
Japan-10Y Jan-50 2.67 6.15     
UK-10Y Jan-50 1.21 8.27     
        
* DEM/USD prior to the introduction of the Euro in Jan 1999
4.3.2 Economic Data 
Recent evidence has documented a strong link between macroeconomic risk and hedge 
fund strategies (Bali et al. (2014)). Due to the power of these factors for hedge funds we 
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specify the economic factors presented in Bali et al. (2014) for all analyses.30 Consistent 
with Bali et al. (2014) we use the Federal Reserve Economic Database, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the online data libraries of Robert Shiller and Kenneth French for 
economic data. A more detailed description of the sources can be found in Appendix 
4.A. Information is available for all eight factors from January 1950 to September 2014. 
We also examine the performance of time series momentum portfolios in periods of 
economic expansion and recession, based on definitions from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and GDP data from the Federal Reserve. 
4.3.3 Time Series Momentum Portfolio 
The analyses of time series momentum in this paper are based on time series representing 
the performance of the strategy across four distinct asset class sub-portfolios and a 
diversified portfolio combining the four sub-portfolios.  
The portfolios and their associated return series are created from the excess returns of 
the instruments in the data universe. Where possible, excess returns are taken directly 
from futures contracts trading on public exchanges, with the return of the most active 
contract, defined as a function of trade volume, used as the excess return. Where futures 
exchange data is not available for earlier periods, synthetic forward prices are created by 
combining the underlying spot price, yield and risk free rate.  
In creating the time series of time series momentum portfolios we use a twelve month 
formation (look-back) period and a one month holding period.31 These are the most 
common definitions used in the literature (see, for example, Hurst et al. (2012), 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) and Baltas and Kosowski (2013)). The first step is to assign 
each instrument a momentum signal, defined as  
 
ܯ௧,௞௜ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ൭෍log൫1 ൅ ݎ௧ି௞௜ ൯
௞
ଵ
൱ 
 
(4.2)
Where, ܯ௧,௞௜  is the momentum of instrument i at time t formed with a look back period 
of k months and ݎ௧ି௞௜  is the excess return of instrument i at time t - k. 
                                                 
30 For robustness we also conducted all analyses using Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Chen et al. 
(1986) factors. The results (unreported) for all analyses, with the exception of economic uncertainty, were 
stronger with these alternative specifications. 
31 Repeating the analyses using a range of different parameters, including the momentum signal defined 
in Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014), produces very similar results. 
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The instruments are divided into four asset classes, Equity Indices, Government Bonds, 
Foreign Exchange and Commodities and a time series momentum portfolio is created 
for each class. Each instrument is given a weight proportional to its momentum signal 
and inversely proportional to its volatility, so the size of the position is 
 ݓ௧௜ ൌ 1௖ܰ ܯ௧
௜. ௢ܸߪ௧௜ 
(4.3) 
Where ݓ௧௜	is the weight of instrument i held in the portfolio at time t and ߪ௧௜ is the 
corresponding volatility. ௖ܰ is the number of instruments in the asset class. This adjusts 
the weights so that each sub-portfolio is allocated the same level of risk irrespective of 
the number of assets in the class.32 The position is scaled by Vo, the choice of this is 
arbitrary, but is set at 40% so the resulting return series have volatility levels in a range 
from 10% to 15%, equivalent to those reported in the literature, allowing easier 
comparison (Moskowitz et al. (2012)). The portfolio is rebalanced monthly33 so the 
return series for each sub-portfolio is  
 
ݎ௧௖ ൌ෍൫ݎ௧௜. ݓ௧௜൯
ே೎
௜ୀଵ
 
 
(4.4)
Where ݎ௧௖ is the excess return of sub-portfolio c in time period t. The time series for the 
diversified portfolio is the sum of the return series of the four sub-portfolios.34  
4.3.3.1 Ex-ante Volatility 
We replicate the methodology of Moskowitz et al. (2012) to create the ex-ante volatility 
estimates. This method uses an exponentially weighted squared daily returns model to 
estimate volatility, a model similar to a univariate GARCH model. The annualized 
volatility for each instrument is calculated as: 
 
ߪ௧ ൌ ඩ261෍ሺ1 െ ߜሻߜ௜ሺݎ௧ିଵି௜ െ ݎ௧ഥሻଶ
ஶ
௜ୀ଴
 (4.5)
                                                 
32 Risk levels are not exactly matched as we do not include correlation between assets.  
33 The portfolio construction does not allow for intra-month changes in volatility.  
34 In periods where there are fewer than four portfolios, returns are scaled so the diversified portfolio has 
constant target volatility throughout the entire sample period. 
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The parameter ߜ is chosen so that the center of mass of the weights is 60 days, so data 
from the last sixty days carries equal weight to all data up to then. The same model is 
used for all instruments. 
Transaction costs are included in the performance measures in this paper, using the cost 
model described by Hurst et al. (2012), where costs are a function of asset class and time. 
All returns presented are in excess of the risk free rate. In general results are presented 
for three time periods: the entire sample period, January 1950 to September 2014; and 
two sub-periods, January 1950 to December 1979 and January 1980 to September 
2014.35  
The cumulative excess return of the diversified portfolio is shown in Figure 5.1 and the 
summary performance statistics for the diversified portfolio and the four asset class sub-
portfolios are presented in Table 4.2.  
Figure 4.1 
Performance of the Diversified Time Series Momentum Portfolio 
The figure shows the natural logarithm of the cumulative excess return series of a diversified time series 
momentum portfolio from January 1950 to September 2014. Excess returns are presented net of 
transaction costs and gross of fees. 
 
 
 
The most striking feature is the consistent excess returns generated by the time series 
momentum strategy in the long run. The diversified portfolio and all sub-portfolios are 
positive over the full period and both sub-periods. Over the full sample the diversified 
                                                 
35 FX results do not begin until August 1972, so results reported for this asset class in the earlier sub-period 
are based on a relatively short sample period. 
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portfolio generates a mean annualized excess return of 15.75% with a volatility of 
12.55% which translates into a Sharpe ratio of 1.25. 
Table 4.2 
Performance of Time Series Momentum Portfolios 
The table reports the average annualised excess return and volatility of five time series momentum 
portfolios, comprising of a diversified portfolio and four asset class sub-portfolios; equity indices 
(Equity), government bonds (Bonds), currencies (FX) and commodities (Commodity). The results are 
presented from January 1950 to September 2014 and over two sub-periods, January 1950 to December 
1979 and January 1980 to September 2014. The FX and Commodity time series begin in August 1972 
and August 1951, respectively. All other series begin in January 1950. Excess returns are presented net 
of transaction costs and gross of fees. 
 
  Diversified Equity Bonds FX Commodity 
       
1950-2014 Return (%) 15.75 5.18 5.29 1.81 2.04
 Vol. (%) 12.55 5.41 6.39 4.45 4.17 
       
1950-1979 Return (%) 16.60 5.03 5.46 2.46 1.55
 Vol. (%) 13.01 4.97 6.26 5.91 5.00 
       
1980-2014 Return 15.03 5.30 5.15 1.67 2.45
 Vol. (%) 12.14 5.77 6.50 4.08 3.34 
       
 
The pattern of strong positive returns is consistent with studies of time series momentum 
strategies by Moskowitz et al. (2012) for the period 1985 to 2009 and Hurst et al. (2012) 
who examine an extended period from 1903 to 2012. It is also notable that there is little 
difference in performance for the diversified portfolio or the Bond sub-portfolio between 
the two sub-periods, despite the dramatically different interest rate regimes. 
4.4 Time Series Momentum across the Economic Cycle 
To examine the performance of time series momentum across the economic cycle, we 
initially measure and compare the performance of time series momentum in different 
economic states. The states are defined as a function of an economic or interest rate 
spread variable. Each month’s return is assigned to one of the two possible states. The 
average performance of the strategy in each state is calculated as the annualized mean of 
the pooled excess returns for that state. 
The variation in performance of time series momentum under different economic and 
interest rate spread states is analysed here, first for the business cycle using two different 
definitions of recession, and then by using interest rate spreads (term and default) to 
define the state.  
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4.4.1 Economic States 
The variation in performance of time series momentum under different economic 
conditions is tested by splitting the return of the time series momentum return series 
according to the contemporaneous economic state. The economy is allowed to be in one 
of two states, expanding or contracting. Two definitions of economic state are used. The 
first uses NBER recession definitions to define the state of the economy as contracting, 
with all other periods defined as expanding. The second uses the sign of the change in 
GDP to define the economic state; a positive change corresponded with an expansion 
and a negative change with a recession.36 The results are displayed in Table 4.3. 
Using either definition, the economy expands in approximately 85% of months and 
contracts in 15% of months, a pattern repeated in both sub-periods. Irrespective of the 
definition the results of the analysis are consistent. The diversified, equity, bond and FX 
portfolios generate higher returns in periods of expansion than recession. This is seen 
over both the full sample and, in general, across the sub-periods.37 Over the full period 
the average performance in expansions exceeds that in recessions by a statistically 
significant 8.5% (NBER) and 7.6% (GDP).  
Consistent with the results of Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014) the commodity portfolio 
provides an exception to this pattern, performing better in recessions than expansions, 
returning 3.58% in recessions against 1.86% in expansions (NBER definition). This 
result highlights the diversification benefits of commodities in a time series momentum 
portfolio. 
4.4.2 Spread States 
In order to further explore the relationship between economic conditions and the 
performance of times series momentum we define economic conditions using two key 
interest rate spreads. These proxy for short term (term spread) and long term (default 
spread) peaks and troughs in the business cycles (Fama and French (1989)). The term 
spread is defined as the difference between the 10 year and three month US treasury rate 
                                                 
36 There is overlap between four of the ten NBER recessions analysed here and four of the five post-1950 
global financial crises twenty four month periods examined in Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014), though the 
NBER recessions are much shorter (average peak to trough length of 11.1 months). 
37 In the first sub-period bond time series momentum returns are marginally greater in expansion periods 
using the NBER measure (5.60% compared to 5.05%), while they are marginally smaller using the GDP 
measure (5.51% against 5.57%). 
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and the default spread is the difference between the BAA and AAA rated US corporate 
bonds. 
Table 4.3 
The Performance of the Time Series Momentum through the Economic Cycle 
The table presents the average annualised excess return of the time series momentum strategies in 
periods of economic expansion (Exp.) and recession (Rec.). Panel A presents the results based on the 
NBER definition of economic cycles, while Panel B presents results based on changes in GDP. The 
first row of each panel (% Time) displays the proportion of the sample period that the economy was in 
expansion or recession. Results are presented for a diversified portfolio and four asset-specific sub-
portfolios; equity indices, government bonds, FX and commodities. The results are presented from 
January 1950 to September 2014 and over two sub-periods, January 1950 to December 1979 and 
January 1980 to September 2014. The FX and commodity time series begin in August 1972 and August 
1951, respectively. All other series begin in January 1950. Excess returns are presented net of 
transaction costs and gross of fees. Statistically significant differences, calculated using a one tailed 
test, are indicated at confidence levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
 
  1950-1979 1980-2014 1950-2014 
  Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
 
Panel A: NBER Economic Cycles 
 
% Time  84.72 15.28  86.57 13.43  85.71 14.29  
Equity  5.53 2.31  5.84 2.17  5.70 2.24 * 
Bonds  5.60 5.05  5.75 2.02  5.68 3.52  
FX  4.01 -3.80  2.39 -2.43 *** 2.66 -2.74 *** 
Commodity  1.47 2.68  2.17 4.47  1.86 3.58  
Diversified  17.37 10.25  16.14 6.22 * 16.71 8.22 ** 
     
Panel B: GDP Data 
 
% Time  84.17 15.83  87.77 12.23  86.10 13.90  
Equity  5.54 2.37  5.67 3.00  5.61 2.67 * 
Bonds  5.51 5.57  5.99 -0.06 ** 5.77 2.91  
FX  3.67 -2.67  2.11 -0.86 * 2.37 -1.27 ** 
Commodity  1.48 2.57  2.32 3.59  1.95 3.05  
Diversified  17.10 11.93  16.08 5.67 * 16.55 8.97 ** 
           
 
In the following analyses, a month is defined as High (Low) if the value of the variable 
in that month is higher (lower) than the mean for the sample period.38 The results are 
displayed in Table 4.4. 
The diversified portfolio performs better in periods where the term spread is low, at 
business cycle peaks. It generates a return of 18.76% in the low term spread state 
compared to 11.95% in the high state over the full period, a statistically significant 
difference of 6.8%. It also performs better in the low state relative to the high state in 
                                                 
38 The definition of months as high (low) in a sub period is defined relative to the mean value for that sub-
period. This can lead to months being defined differently depending on the sample period mean.  
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both sub-periods. In general the sub-portfolios also outperform in the low term spread 
state over the full period and both sub-periods.39  
Table 4.4 
The Performance of Time Series Momentum in Short Term and Long Term 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions 
The table presents the average annualised excess return of the time series momentum strategies at 
different stages of the market cycle, based on interest rate spreads. In each case, a month is defined as 
high (low) if the value of the spread for that month is greater (less) than the average value for the sample 
period. The average return for high (low) periods is the annualized mean of the excess return in all high 
(low) spread periods. Panel A presents the results based on the term spread of interest rates (US 10Y T-
Bond Yield – 3M US T-Bill Yield). Panel B presents the results based on the default spread of interests 
rates (US BAA Corporate Bond Yield – US AAA Corporate Bond Yield). The first row of each panel 
(% Time) displays the proportion of the sample period that the spread was above (below) the average 
for the period. Results are presented for a diversified portfolio and four asset class sub-portfolios; equity 
indices, government bonds, FX and commodities. The results are presented from January 1950 to June 
2013 and over two sub-periods, January 1950 to December 1979 and January 1980 to September 2014. 
The FX and commodity time series begin in August 1972 and August 1951, respectively. All other 
series begin in January 1950. Excess returns are presented net of transaction costs and gross of fees. 
Statistically significant differences, calculated using a one tailed test, are indicated at confidence levels 
of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
 
 
  1950-1979 1980-2014 1950-2014 
  High Low  High Low  High Low  
 
Panel A: Term Spread 
 
% Time  47.78 52.22  53.00 47.00  48.01 51.99  
Equity  5.60 4.53  4.57 6.22  4.28 6.05 * 
Bonds  3.03 7.79 *** 4.82 5.72  4.27 6.39 * 
FX  2.22 3.07 0.27 3.41 *** 0.86 3.15 
Commodity  1.22 2.09  1.93 3.09  2.36 1.87  
Diversified  13.33 18.98  11.59 18.44 ** 11.95 18.76 *** 
           
Panel B: Default Spread 
 
% Time  34.17 65.83  42.69 57.31  45.56 54.44  
Equity  3.12 6.04 ** 4.53 5.95  4.30 5.96  
Bonds  1.36 7.67 *** 5.30 5.21  5.18 5.53  
FX  3.57 1.91  0.75 2.49  1.03 2.55  
Commodity  3.71 0.58 ** 2.26 2.64  2.46 1.82  
Diversified  9.59 19.76 *** 12.84 16.28  12.69 17.84 ** 
           
 
The pattern is repeated when looking at the default spread, where the time series 
momentum portfolios perform better in the low state, a proxy for expansions. Here the 
diversified portfolio generates a statistically significantly different return of 17.84% in 
the low spread state compared to 12.69% in the high state. Again, looking at the sub-
                                                 
39 There is one exception; in the 1950 to 1979 sub-sample period the equity portfolio marginally 
outperforms in the high term spread state. 
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portfolios and sub-periods, all typically perform better in the low default spread state 
compared to the high state.  
4.4.3 Comparison of State Definitions  
The previous analyses show that time series momentum underperforms when economies 
contract and interest rate spreads are high. These results are consistent over both the full 
period and each sub-period. This section compares the different state definitions, shown 
in Figure 4.2, and analyses the results from the previous two sections for consistency.  
Figure 4.2 
Indicators of Economic Conditions: January 1950 to September 2014 
The figure economic state indicators use in analysis the performance of time series momentum; NBER 
business cycles, GDP growth, the term spread and the default spread. The periods associated with times 
series momentum are highlighted in each case.  
 
 
There is significant overlap between the two measures of the economic cycle based on 
growth; the NBER recession definitions and change in GDP. The key differences are 
short periods of declining GDP, not sufficient to be defined as a recession and occasional 
months of GDP growth within recessions. It is reasonable to regard the GDP indictor as 
a timely, but noisy indicator of economic cycles defined by the NBER. There is little 
surprise in consistent results for the two definitions. The two interest rate spreads are 
also correlated with each other, having the same value 77% of the time between 1950 
and 2014, again indicating similar results are to be expected. 
Finally, it is necessary to compare the correlation of poor performance with periods of 
both high spreads and economic contraction. Work by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) 
1950
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and later by Estrella and Mishkin (1998) provides evidence that low term spreads 
precede recessions, demonstrated through a positive correlation between economic 
growth and lagged spread. This suggests that low term spread is associated with 
recession and consequently the results presented here are internally inconsistent.  
An extension of the analysis by Wheelock and Wohar (2009) resolves the conflict. The 
authors confirm the positive relationship between lagged term spread. The relationship 
is also demonstrated in both the German and British economies strengthening the 
evidence. Importantly for the analysis here, the research also demonstrates that the sign 
of the correlation reverses when co-incident or leading values of term spread are used, 
again this is a consistent finding across three major economies. This associates 
recessions with high spreads. This relationship is also seen the state definitions used in 
this research with 73% of recession periods (NBER) coinciding with a high term spread. 
Consequently, times series momentum should be expected to have similar relative 
performance in these periods, consistent with the results presented in Sections 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2.  
It is an interesting aside to note that if low term spread can predict recessions, it may also 
be able to predict the poor performance of time series momentum associated with them. 
4.5 Economic Factor Model Analysis 
The Bali et al. (2014) model has eight economic and financial factors which have been 
shown to be particularly important for hedge funds. The factors are commonly used in 
literature, examples of which can be found in the models of Chen et al. (1986), Fama 
and French (1989) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002).  
The term structure (TERM) and default spread (DEF) are included in all three of the 
models listed above. Fama and French (1989) show that the variables track the long term 
and short term business cycles, respectively. The dividend yield (DIV) is associated with 
mean reversion in the stock markets and can also be interpreted as a proxy for time 
variation in risk premia (Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)). The change in GDP and the 
level of unemployment (UNEMP) capture current economic conditions. Short term 
interest rates (RREL) capture both expectations about future economic activity (Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002)) and predict future equity market returns. Market returns (MKT) 
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reflect changes in expectations of future growth.40The definitions of the eight factors are 
given in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 
Macroeconomic Risk Model Factor Definitions 
The table presents the definitions of the eight economic factors that make up the economic model used 
in this study, based on the economic uncertainty model of Bali et al. (2014). The first column shows 
the factor name as used in Bali et al. (2014) and the second column defines the factor in terms of the 
underlying economic time series. 
 
Factor Definition 
  
DEF The default spread, the difference between BAA and AAA rated US corporate bonds
DIV The aggregate dividend yield on the S&P 500 
GDP The monthly change in US GDP per capita 
INF Monthly inflation based on US CPI
MKT The excess return on a value weight index of all US stocks (CRSP Universe) 
RREL The 3-month US T-Bill rate divided by its 12 month moving average 
TERM The term spread, the difference between 10 Year and 3 Month US Treasury rates 
UNEMP The total number unemployed divided by labour force. 
  
 
The ability of the economic model to explain time series momentum returns is tested 
using two different sets of assumptions. First, that the relationship between the factors 
and the methodologies is constant through time, a linear factor (unconditional) model 
and then allowing the relationship to vary through time (conditional model). 
4.5.1 Linear Factor Model 
The linear factor model specifies economic factors as explanatory variables in the 
regression model 
 
r௧୲୤ ൌ β଴ ൅෍β୬EF୲୬
୒
୬ୀଵ
൅ ε୲ 
 
(4.6)
Where EF୲୬ is the value of economic factor n at time t. N is the total number of 
explanatory variables (economic factors) and r௧୲୤ is the return of the time series 
momentum portfolio in time period t. The factor model is estimated for the full sample 
period and the two sub-periods. The ability of the factors to explain the returns of a time 
series momentum strategy is assessed based upon the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the respective regression co-efficient. A statistically significant 
                                                 
40 To correct for long term trends in our extended sample period, the dividend yield factor (DIV) is 
measured relative to the lagged five year moving average and the short term rate (RREL) is calculated as 
a quotient rather than a difference. 
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regression coefficient is evidence of a relationship between the returns of time series 
momentum and economic conditions.  
The results for the linear factor model are presented in Table 4.6. The table lists the 
factors and their corresponding t-statistics. Consistent with Moskowitz et al. (2012), the 
linear model provides little explanatory power for time series momentum at the portfolio 
or sub-portfolio level. Only four, of forty, coefficients are statistically significant. The 
market return factor (MKT) is significant for Equity and Bond portfolios and the short 
term rate (RREL) is significant for both the Equity and FX portfolios. At the diversified 
portfolio level, there is no statistically significant explanatory factor. The inability of a 
linear economic factor model to explain returns is reflected in the low values reported 
for the adjusted R2 measure, which range from 0.12% to 1.40%.  
4.5.2 Conditional Factor Model 
The explanatory power of a conditional model can vary considerably from the 
unconditional (linear) specification (Griffin et al. (2003)), consequently we define a 
conditional test based on the methodology used in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and 
Griffin et al. (2003). 
To allow for a time varying relationship between the time series momentum excess 
returns and the macroeconomic factors, at each month, we estimate, using the current 
month and prior 59 months, equation (7).41 
 
r௧୲୤ ൌ β଴ ൅෍β୬EF୲ିଵ୬
୒
୬ୀଵ
൅ ε୲ 
 
(4.7)
Where EF୲୬ is the value of economic factor n at time t. N is the total number of 
explanatory variables (economic factors) and r௧୲୤ is the return of the time series 
momentum portfolio in time period t. We utilize a minimum of 60 months of data for 
our regressions and the t-statistics are based on Newey-West serial correlation consistent 
standard errors, since the rolling regressions are subject to autocorrelation in the 
estimates. If the economic factors fail to fully explain the returns from time series 
momentum, the intercept of the regression model will be positive and significant. 
                                                 
41 We use a 60 month estimation period for the conditional model and portfolio study consistent with the 
cross-sectional momentum literature (Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)). In unreported analyses, we 
alternately use a 36 and 84 month estimation period. The results are very similar to those reported. 
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Table 4.6 
Linear Regression Factor Model 
The table presents the results of regressing the excess returns of five time series momentum portfolios; a diversified portfolio and four asset class sub-portfolios on 
the economic factor model. The table presents the regression coefficients and associated test statistics from the regression modelݎݐݐ݂ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚ1ܦܧܨݐ ൅ ߚ2ܦܫܸݐ ൅
ߚ3ܩܦܲݐ ൅ ߚ4ܫܰܨݐ ൅ ߚ5ܯܭܶݐ ൅ ߚ6ܴܴܧܮݐ ൅ ߚ7ܶܧܴܯݐ ൅ ߚ8ܷܰܧܯܲݐ ൅ ߝݐ. Regressions are estimated from January 1950 to September 2014 for the diversified portfolio and the equity and bond sub-portfolios. The FX and commodity regressions are from August 1972 to September 2014 and August 1951 to September 2014, 
respectively. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold. The adjusted R2 are presented for each regression. 
 
 INT DEF DIV GDP INF MKT RREL TERM UNEMP Adj. R2
           
Equity 0.0070 -0.0002 -0.0017 0.0009 -0.0017 0.0003 0.0047 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0140 
 3.12 -0.12 -0.50 0.47 -1.01 2.59 2.08 0.81 -0.99  
           
Bond 0.0052 -0.0037 0.0030 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0043 
 1.94 -1.64 0.75 -0.02 -0.91 -2.37 -0.37 -1.69 1.49  
           
FX 0.0048 0.0008 0.0013 0.0031 -0.0032 0.0000 0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0057 
 1.80 0.46 0.40 1.29 -1.89 0.00 1.96 -0.43 -0.81  
           
Commodity  0.0025 0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0049 
 1.41 0.54 -0.80 -1.33 2.70 -0.61 -0.28 0.73 -1.14  
           
Diversified 0.0218 -0.0031 0.0041 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0071 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0012 
 4.17 -0.71 0.52 0.40 -0.29 -0.01 1.35 -0.08 -0.75  
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In Table 4.7 we report the results of estimating a conditional model which allows for 
time variation - the average coefficients from the rolling five year lagged regressions and 
their statistical significance. Unlike the unconditional model, six of the eight 
macroeconomic factors have statistically significant coefficients for the full sample. This 
evidence highlights that the conditional implementation of the model has some 
explanatory power for time series momentum returns. However, it is also noteworthy 
that the intercept for the model is positive and statistically significant in all three of the 
periods, consistent with time series momentum returns not being fully explained by the 
economic model. Later we investigate what portion of returns is attributable to 
macroeconomic risk exposure. 
4.5.3 Time Series Momentum and Traditional Asset Classes 
To highlight the time varying nature of the risk exposure of the time series momentum 
portfolios we show the return series of time series momentum, the relationship (beta) 
between these series and equity and bond markets in Figure 4.3. The excess total return 
of the S&P 500 Index is used to represent the equity market; while the excess total return 
of the 10 Year US Treasury Bond at constant maturity is used as a proxy for the bond 
market. Each graph displays three data series; the mean monthly return of the market 
factor over the prior sixty months, the mean monthly return of the time series momentum 
portfolio over the same period, and the beta of the time series momentum portfolio 
estimated relative to the relevant financial market, again over the prior sixty months. 
Panel A shows the relationship between the diversified time series momentum portfolio 
and the equity market. Over the full period, the five year returns of the equity market are 
generally positive, and during this period the beta of the diversified portfolio is on 
average positive, reaching a maximum value of 0.75. The periods of negative beta, 
running approximately from 1970 to 1985 correspond to a poor period of performance 
for the equity market, where the return is lower than average and negative for a five year 
period around 1975. Two periods of negative beta occur after 2000 and coincide with 
falling equity markets in the periods following the collapse of the dotcom bubble and the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. Examining the relationship between the equity time series 
momentum portfolio and the equity market (Panel C) produces a very similar pattern; 
positive betas when equity markets are rising and negative betas when they are falling. 
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Table 4.7 
Time Varying Regression Model 
This table shows the average value of the time varying regression coefficients when the excess returns of a diversified time series momentum portfolio are regressed 
against the lagged economic model using ݎ௧௧௙ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦܧܨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܦܫ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߚଷܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚସܫܰܨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܯܭ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܴܧܮ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଻ܶܧܴܯ௧ିଵ ൅ߚ଼ܷܰܧܯ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ over a sixty month window. The reported coefficient t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation in the error term using the Newey-West autocorrelation consistent errors. Significant coefficients (5% level) are shown in bold. Results are presented from January 1955 to September 2014 and for two sub-
periods, January 1955 to December 1979 and January 1980 to September 2014. 
 
 INT DEF DIV GDP INF MKT RREL TERM UNEMP Adj. R2
           
1955 - 2014 0.0514 -0.0106 -0.0209 -0.0136 -0.0112 -0.0001 0.0067 0.0038 -0.0047 0.0669 
 8.86 -2.34 -2.50 -2.75 -2.75 -0.33 1.24 2.50 -3.55  
           
1955 - 1979 0.0406 -0.0319 -0.0395 -0.0083 -0.0067 0.0004 0.0206 0.0050 -0.0009 0.1221 
 3.45 -3.18 -2.32 -1.21 -0.91 0.84 1.71 1.29 -0.34  
           
1980 - 2014 0.0596 0.0053 -0.0068 -0.0176 -0.0146 -0.0005 -0.0037 0.0030 -0.0076 0.0186 
 7.76 0.94 -0.58 -2.14 -2.79 -1.28 -0.60 1.63 -4.82  
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Figure 4.3 
Rolling Beta of Time Series Momentum for Financial Markets 
Each panel presents the average five year monthly total excess return of a time series momentum 
portfolio, the average five year monthly total excess return of an asset and the beta between the two. 
Panel A presents the returns of the US equity market and the diversified time series momentum 
portfolio. Panel B presents the returns of US Treasury bonds and the diversified time series momentum 
portfolio. Panel C presents the returns of the US equity market and the equity index time series 
momentum portfolio. Panel D presents the returns of US Treasury bonds and the government bond time 
series momentum portfolio. Results are presented from January 1955 to September 2014. 
 
Panel A: Diversified Time Series Momentum & 
Equity Market 
Panel B: Diversified Time Series Momentum & 
Bond Market 
  
Panel C: Equity Time Series Momentum & 
Equity Market 
Panel D: Bond Time Series Momentum & Bond 
Market 
 
A similar analysis for the bond market is reported in Panel B and D. The excess return 
of the bond market can be divided into two distinct periods split by the peak of the great 
inflation in 1982. In the first period, bonds have a flat to small negative excess total 
return. Since then the excess returns of bonds have been consistently positive. Strikingly, 
the returns of the time series momentum portfolios are positive across all bond market 
conditions. In the early period, both the global and bond time series momentum 
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portfolios have a significant negative relationship (beta) with the bond market excess 
return. In the later sub-period when bond returns are positive the portfolio beta is also 
positive. This provides evidence that time series momentum is profitable in rising and 
falling interest rate environments. 
4.6 Momentum and Asset-Specific Returns 
Returns to the cross-sectional momentum strategy have been shown to be primarily due 
to the component of individual equity returns explained by macroeconomic factors 
(Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)). This is important as it shows that the returns to cross-
sectional momentum are in large part due to exposure to macroeconomic risk. In order 
to examine if this is also the case for time series momentum, we create two alternative 
time series momentum portfolios based on the decomposition of asset returns into a 
macroeconomic factor-related component (factor-related returns) and an idiosyncratic 
component specific to the individual asset (asset-specific returns). 
This decomposition produces two return series, factor-related and asset-specific, for each 
instrument. Each series is used as the basis for the creation of a set of time series 
momentum portfolios using the methodology described above. 
The factor-related time series momentum strategy generates a trading signal for each 
futures contract from its factor-related return, whereas the asset-specific time series 
momentum portfolio is built using a signal generated from the component of each futures 
contract return not explained by the factor model. 
The first step in this process is to decompose the returns of each futures contract into 
factor-related and asset-specific components. We define the regression model to explain 
the factor-related price movement following Grundy and Martin (2001) and Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002). The model is estimated for each futures contract for each month, 
using the current month and prior 59 months’ returns. Estimating the model using a 
rolling regression allows us to identify the time varying factor-related return. 
 
r୲୧ ൌ β଴,୲ ൅෍β୬,୲∆F୲୬
୒
୬ୀଵ
൅ ε୲ 
 
(4.8)
Where r୲୧ is the excess return of futures contract i in time period t, ∆F୲୬ is the change in 
factor n in time period t and ε୲ is the error term. The model has N factors. The regression 
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coefficients β଴,୲ and β୬,୲ are the coefficients for the model estimated over the period t-
59 to t, where β଴,୲ is the regression intercept and β୬,୲ is the regression coefficient for 
factor n. 
The factor-related return of each instrument at time t is then estimated as 
 
݂ݎݎ௧௜ ൌ β଴,୲ ൅෍ߚ௡,௧∆ܨ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
 
 
(4.9)
Where ݂ ݎݎ௧௜ is the factor-related return of instrument i, at time t. The corresponding asset-
specific return, ܽݏݎ௧௜, is then calculated as the difference between the excess return and 
factor-related return at time t. 
 ܽݏݎ௧௜ ൌ ݎ௧௜ െ ݂ݎݎ௧௜ (4.10)
We then form two alternative time series momentum portfolios using, alternately, factor-
related returns and asset-specific returns (rather than raw excess returns) to generate the 
trading signal.  
Under this construction, if time series momentum returns are entirely due to exposure to 
macroeconomic risk then only the portfolios formed on factor-related returns should 
yield positive payoffs. The cumulative returns are reported in Figure 4.4 and the 
summary statistics of the different portfolios are displayed in Table 4.8.42 
Looking first at the diversified portfolio, it can be seen that statistically significant excess 
returns are generated by both sets of portfolios, factor-related (Panel B) and asset-
specific (Panel C) futures returns over the full sample period and both sub-periods.43 
Over the full period, the portfolio formed on asset-specific returns generates an annual 
excess return of 9.92% compared to 5.74% for the portfolio formed on factor-related 
returns. Looking at the results over the two sub-periods, the portfolio formed on 
macroeconomic factor-related returns is consistent, with payoffs of 5.18% and 6.13% 
respectively. The asset-specific return portfolio shows a different pattern, with an excess 
return of 14.14% in the earlier period and 7.09% since 1980. For individual markets, all 
the sub-portfolios have positive returns for the asset-specific return portfolios and in all 
                                                 
42 Results are reported from January 1956 as we use a 60 month period to decompose futures returns and 
a further 12 month formation period for the initial time series momentum signals. 
43 The signal generating process of the portfolios is quite different reflected in a full sample correlation 
coefficient of -0.06 for the diversified portfolios formed on factor and idiosyncratic returns. 
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but two cases these are statistically significant. The factor-related portfolio returns are 
quite different. While the equity and bond portfolios produce statistically positive returns 
over the full period, the FX return is only marginally positive and the commodity return 
is close to zero. Results are more mixed over the sub-periods where, while the majority 
of the returns are positive, only two are statistically significant. 
Figure 4.4 
Portfolio Formed on Explained and Unexplained Returns 
The figure shows the natural logarithm of the cumulative excess return series of two global diversified 
time series momentum portfolio from January 1956 to September 2014. Portfolio Formed on Explained 
Returns is a time series momentum portfolio formed from signals based on the return of the underlying 
instruments explained by the macroeconomic model. Portfolio Formed on Unexplained Returns is a 
time series momentum portfolio formed from signals based on the unexplained (futures specific) return 
of the underlying instruments.  
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Table 4.8 
Decomposition of Time Series Momentum Returns 
In each panel the average annualised excess returns and t-statistics are presented across five portfolios 
and three time periods. The five portfolios consist of a diversified portfolio and four asset class sub-
portfolios; equity indices, government bonds, FX and commodities. The results are presented for the 
period from January 1956 to September 2014 and two sub-periods; January 1956 to December 1979 
and January 1980 to September 2014. The FX time series begins in August 19776 and the commodity 
in August 1956, all others begin in January 1956. Panel A presents the results of the standard time series 
momentum model, where trading signals are generated from raw excess returns. Panel B shows the 
return statistics of time series momentum portfolios formed from signals based on the return of the 
underlying instruments explained by the macroeconomic model. Panel C presents the results of time 
series momentum portfolios formed from signals based on the asset-specific return of the underlying 
instruments. Excess returns significant at the 5% level are shown in bold. 
 
 Equity Bonds FX Commodity Diversified 
    
Panel A: Portfolios Formed on Raw Returns    
      
1956-2014 4.42 5.42 1.93 2.23 14.52 
 6.41 6.53 2.97 4.41 9.04 
1956-1979 3.16 5.82 4.18 1.90 13.79 
 3.37 4.49 1.68 2.05 5.49 
1980-2014 5.30 5.15 1.67 2.45 15.03 
 5.46 4.76 2.52 4.37 7.19 
      
Panel B: Portfolios Formed on Economic Factor-Related Returns   
      
1956-2014 3.02 2.14 0.40 -0.03 5.74 
 4.19 2.68 0.72 0.10 3.90 
1956-1979 0.34 5.42 -5.48 -0.53 5.18 
 0.44 3.99 -1.64 -0.41 2.17 
1980-2014 4.92 -0.08 1.10 0.32 6.13 
 4.93 0.13 1.78 0.68 3.30 
      
Panel C: Portfolios Formed on Asset-Specific Returns   
      
1956-2014 2.41 3.73 1.05 1.89 9.92 
 4.60 4.70 1.67 3.53 6.77 
1956-1979 4.09 3.36 6.23 2.65 14.14 
 4.25 2.89 2.09 2.49 5.40 
1980-2014 1.27 3.98 0.47 1.37 7.09 
 2.18 3.70 0.81 2.59 4.19 
      
Note: The FX sub-portfolio begins in 1977, and so results for 1956-1979 are based on a three year sample. 
 
4.7 Economic Uncertainty 
Recent evidence on time series momentum has highlighted that the performance of the 
strategy tends to be below average for an extended period following financial crises 
(Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014)). Separately Bali et al. (2014) present evidence that 
economic uncertainty plays a role in explaining the cross-sectional deviation in the 
performance of hedge funds. In order to identify if macroeconomic uncertainty is the 
transmission mechanism linking macroeconomic factors and the results of Hutchinson 
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and O'Brien (2014) we specify a model of economic uncertainty, based on Bali et al. 
(2014), where the time varying conditional volatility of a set of eight economic variables 
is used as a proxy for economic uncertainty. 
Bali et al. (2014) define economic uncertainty as being a function of the time varying 
conditional volatility of the eight risk factors. The time varying conditional volatility is 
estimated using a vector auto regressive process to model the economic variables and a 
GARCH model to capture the asymmetric response of volatility to change in the 
economy.  
The auto regressive model is given as: 
 ሾܼ௧ሿ ൌ ሾߚ଴ሿ ൅ ሾߚ௡ሿሾܼ௧ିଵሿ ൅ ሾߝ௧ሿ (4.11)
Where ሾܼ௧ሿ is an 8x1 matrix of the values of the eight variables at time t. ሾߚ଴ሿ is an 8x1 
matrix of regression constants and ሾߚ௡ሿ is an 8x8 matrix of regression coefficients. ሾߝ௧ሿ 
is the matrix of regression errors at time t. After regressing the model over the time 
period January 1950 to September 2014, the expected volatility of each factor is 
estimated using a multivariate asymmetric GARCH model, specifically the Threshold-
GARCH (TGARCH) model of Glosten et al. (1993). The asymmetry allows different 
responses to positive and negative shocks to be modelled. The TGARCH model is: 
 ܧൣߝ௜,௧ଶ ൧ ≡ ߪ௜,௧ଶ ൌ ߛ଴௜ ൅ ߛଵ௜ߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛଶ௜ߪ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛଷ௜ߝ௧ିଵଶ ܦ௜,௧ିଵ (4.12)
 ܦଵ,௧ ൌ 1 ݂݋ݎ ߝ௜,௧ ൏ 0, 0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  
Where ܧൣߝ௜,௧ଶ ൧ is the expected value of the square of the error term of variable i, at time 
t. This is the conditional volatility, ߪ௜,௧ଶ , of the instrument. ߛ௡௜  is the coefficient n of 
variable i. ܦ௜,௧ is a dummy variable set to one for ߝ௜,௧ ൏ 0 or zero otherwise. A positive 
value for ߛଷ௜  indicates negative shocks cause higher volatility than positive shocks. 
The final stage of the process combines the volatilities of the eight factors to generate an 
index of economic uncertainty. The volatilities of the factors are both persistent and cross 
correlated, allowing the use of principle component analysis. Following Bali et al. (2014) 
we use the first principle component to generate a linear function of the eight individual 
time series.  
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Our methodology differs from Bali et al. (2014) in two ways. Bali et al. (2014) use a 
recursive estimation procedure, whereas we use a single estimation for the full time 
period, which induces a look-ahead bias. The advantage of our approach is that it allows 
us to begin our analysis in 1950, maximizing the sample of available economic data.44 
While Bali et al. (2014) estimate all parameters simultaneously, we estimate the 
economic model separately from the T-GARCH volatility model. 
The economic uncertainty index based on Bali et al. (2014) is reported in Figure 4.5. 
The measure varies through time, but peak economic uncertainty measured by the model 
closely corresponds to the financial crises identified in Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014). 
Figure 4.5 
Economic Uncertainty Index 
The figure presents the measure of economic uncertainty used in this paper. The measure is based on 
the methodology defined in Bali et al. (2014). The major peaks, associated with the periods of highest 
uncertainty, are identified. The labels correspond to the financial crises identified Hutchinson and 
O’Brien (2014). The times series runs from January 1950 to September 2014. 
 
 
To see the impact of economic uncertainty on the performance of time series momentum, 
we compare the performance in periods of high and low uncertainty over the full period 
and each of the sub-periods. The markets are defined as high or low uncertainty by 
                                                 
44 The recursive estimation approach requires an extended window of data, prior to the sample period (Bali 
et al. (2014) use 23 years). As our economic data set begins in 1950, incorporating a similar formation 
period eliminates much of the first sub-sample period.  
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comparing the level of economic uncertainty with its mean for the period.45 46 The results 
are shown in Table 4.9.  
The diversified portfolio exhibits better performance in periods of below average 
uncertainty for both the full sample period (18.39% against 9.84%) and both sub-periods, 
(17.48% compared with 14.34% in the earlier period and 17.33% compared with 9.92% 
in the later period). This pattern is evident in the equity and currency markets, over both 
the full period and both sub-periods; although it should be noted the sample size for 
currencies is small in the earlier period, running from 1972 to 1979. 
Table 4.9 
Time Series Momentum Performance and Economic Uncertainty 
The table reports the average annualised excess return for five time series momentum portfolios in 
periods of high and low risk. The portfolios consist of a diversified portfolio and four asset class sub-
portfolios; equity indices, government bonds, FX and commodities. Uncertainty is measured using the 
economic uncertainty index set out in this paper based on Bali et al. (2014). A month is defined as high 
(low) risk if the value of the risk measure for that month is greater (less) than the average value for the 
sample period. The average return for high (low) risk periods is the mean of the excess return in all high 
(low) risk periods. The results are presented from January 1950 to September 2014 and over two sub-
periods, January 1950 to December 1979 and January 1980 to September 2014. The FX time series 
begins in August 1972 and the commodity in August 1951; all others begin in January 1950. Excess 
returns are presented net of transaction costs and gross of fees. Statistically significant differences, 
calculated using a one tailed test, are indicated at confidence levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
 
  1950-1979 1980 – 2014 1950-2014 
  High Low  High Low  High Low  
 
% Time  38.06 61.94  34.05 65.95  33.85 66.15  
Equity  3.66 5.89  1.46 7.35 *** 2.36 6.66 *** 
Bonds  4.64 6.06  6.27 4.72  5.25 5.43  
FX  3.06 2.37  0.64 2.32  -0.08 2.92 ** 
Commodity  3.20 0.72 * 1.56 2.95  2.05 2.14  
Diversified  14.34 17.48  9.92 17.33 * 9.84 18.39 *** 
           
 
          
The results for government bonds and commodities are less consistent. The performance 
of the bond portfolio over the full period is marginally better when economic uncertainty 
is reduced, while it performs better in low uncertainty conditions in the earlier period 
and high uncertainty conditions in the later sub-period. The commodity portfolio again 
shows a different pattern, with similar performance under high and low uncertainty over 
the full periods and performing better in high uncertainty conditions in the first sub-
period. 
                                                 
45 As the mean uncertainty is a function of the sub-period, individual months can be assigned to different 
states depending on the mean of the period under investigation. 
46 Results are very similar when the analysis is based on the median of the series. 
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In order to further investigate the relationship between the returns and economic 
uncertainty a series of regressions were carried out based on the model 
 ݎ௧௧௙ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௧ܷି௟ ൅ ߝ௧ (4.13)
Where ݎ௧௧௙is the return of the diversified time series momentum portfolio at time t, and 
௧ܷି௟ is the value of the economic uncertainty index at time t - l. The variable l is the 
measure of the lag or lead of the uncertainty index relative to the return series. The test 
statistics of the regression coefficients for a range of values of l (-18 to 18) is displayed 
in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.6 
Time Series Momentum Returns and Economic Uncertainty 
The excess returns of the diversified time series momentum portfolio was regressed against the 
Economic Uncertainty Index at a variety of lags/leads using the regression model ݎ௧௧௙ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௧ܷି௟ ൅ߝ௧, where ௧ܷ is the value of the economic uncertainty index at time t and l is the lag (lead), ranging from -18 to +18 months. The figure displays the test statistics of the regression coefficientߚଵ. The results of the lagged index appear to the left, and the lead index to the right. The times series run from January 
1950 to September 2014. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the returns to 
time series momentum and the uncertainty index in the contemporaneous month and for 
lags of up to six months. Following periods when economic uncertainty is low (high) the 
returns of the time series momentum strategy are higher (lower) than average. Given the 
association of economic uncertainty and periods following financial crises, this helps 
explain previous findings that time series momentum returns are below average in the 
period after financial crises (Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014)). 
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4.8 Conclusions 
This article was motivated by two observations. First, CTAs have received large inflows 
of capital following the 2008 financial crisis. Second, investors’ motivation for 
allocating to CTAs is often due to an expectation of performance in equity bear markets, 
without a consideration of performance in other market states, or the drivers of 
performance. We have shown that the returns to time series momentum are connected to 
the business cycle. Time series momentum earns positive returns in both expansions and 
recessions but the returns are especially strong in expansions. Whether we measure the 
business cycle using NBER data, GDP data or use interest rate spreads as proxies for 
short and long term fluctuations, our results are consistent. Returns are statistically 
significantly higher by between 5% and 8% in expansions. These findings dispel the 
notion that high returns to time series momentum are specific to equity market states. 
Taken together our results provide a degree of clarity on the return drivers of time series 
momentum. Complementing Moskowitz et al. (2012) who document a behavioural 
driver, we find that there is a role for rational price theories to explain a portion of time 
series momentum profitability. We find that the returns are related to a set of 
macroeconomic factors that have been shown in the literature to be important in 
explaining the returns of traditional asset classes and hedge funds. Our results indicate 
that about 40 percent of the returns of time series momentum are due to time varying 
exposure to these macroeconomic variables, which are related to the business cycle. 
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
for cross-sectional momentum, that a portion of the profitability of momentum strategies 
represents compensation for bearing time varying risk, consistent with rational asset 
pricing theories. 
Finally, we note the interesting finding that the performance of time series momentum 
improves when economic uncertainty is diminished. This result provides a link between 
the finding of Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014), that time series momentum tends to 
perform less well than average following periods of financial crisis, and changes in the 
business cycle. Using a new methodology, we document that uncertainty is the 
transmission mechanism linking changes in the macroeconomic variables and changes 
in the performance of time series momentum following financial crisis 
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4.A Appendix: Data Sources 
4.A.1 Equity Indices 
The universe of equity indices has twenty components. Fourteen of these consist of data 
from developed markets, with future prices available from Datastream starting at various 
dates from January 1980 and derived forward prices generated from data provided by 
Global Financial Data prior to that. In each case Global Financial Data provides a total 
return index, which allows the yield to be calculated. This group consists of Australia 
(SPI200), Canada (TSX 60), Netherlands (AEX), France (CAC 40), Germany (DAX), 
Hong Kong (Hang Seng), Korea (KOSPI 200), Japan (Nikkei 225), United States (S&P 
500), United Kingdom (FTSE 100), Spain (IBES 35), Italy (MIB), Sweden (OMX 30) 
and Switzerland (SMI). 
The six additional indices are the three mid cap indices (Germany, Switzerland and 
United States) and three alternative indices for the US (Dow Jones, Russell 2000 and 
NASDAQ 100). We only include exchange traded future contract data for these indices. 
4.A.2 Bond Indices 
A total of thirteen government bond indices from six countries are used. Australia (10 
and 3 year), Canada (10 year), United States (2, 5, 10 and 30 year), Germany (2 ,5, 10 
and 30 year), Japan (10 year) and United Kingdom (10 year). Exchange data for these is 
from Datastream, starting on a variety of dates from January 1980. Data for eight of these 
is extended backwards using total return indices and short term yields from Global 
Financial Data. 
4.A.3 Currencies 
The universe of currency forwards consists of ten currencies. Forwards are created for 
all currency pairs from spot data and short term interest rates. The spot rates are sources 
from Datastream/MSCI from 1980 and, prior to that, from Global Financial Data. 
Although data is available back to 1920, currencies are only considered for inclusion and 
statistics provided from the end of the Bretton-Woods fixed rate system in 1971. The 
Euro and German Mark are spliced into one time series. The currencies included are 
Australia, Canada, Euro (Germany), Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States. 
111 
 
4.A.4 Commodities 
Twenty one commodities are included; Copper, Gold and Silver (COMEX), Light Crude 
Oil, Natural Gas, NY Heating Oil, Palladium, Platinum and RBOB Gasoline (NYMEX), 
Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton, Gas Oil and Sugar (ICE), Corn, Soya Bean Oil, Soya Bean Meal, 
Soya Beans and Wheat (CME) and Lean Hogs and Live Cattle (CBOT). The commodity 
data is entirely based on prices of exchange traded futures. As cost of carry data is 
unavailable it is not possible to accurately estimate forward prices prior to the availability 
of exchange traded futures. The commodity data from 1980 was sourced from 
DataStream while the earlier data was sourced from Commodity Systems Inc. (CSI). The 
Copper contract consists of a combination of the medium grade copper contract traded 
until l988 and the high grade copper contract traded since then, sourced from CSI and 
DataStream respectively. 
4.A.5 Risk Free Rates 
Short term interest rates are sourced from Global Financial Data due to more extensive 
coverage. The one month interbank rate (LIBOR or equivalent) is the preferred rate. 
When this is not available, the closest available interbank rate was used, and finally the 
central bank base rate. 
4.A.6 Economic Factor Model 
Table 4.10 shows the data sources used for the primary data used to define the economic 
factor model. All data is available from January 1950, with the exception of the yield of 
the 10 Year US Treasury Bond (constant maturity), which becomes available from 1952. 
The first two years of this time series were back filled using the US 10 Year Treasury 
Bond Yield from the same source. 
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Table 4.10 
Macroeconomic Risk Model: Data Sources 
This table lists the sources for the data items used in the economic analyses. It includes the primary data 
used to derive the factors of the economic uncertainty model and the items used to define the economic 
cycle. All data items listed in this section are available for download from the named website. 
 
Data Item Source 
 
BAA and AAA rated US Corporate Bond Yields 
3-Month US T-Bill Rate 
10 Year Constant Maturity US Treasury Bond
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
  
The Aggregate Dividend Yield on the S&P 500 
US CPI 
www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
  
US GDP 
US GDP per capita 
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
  
Excess Return on US stocks mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu 
/pages/faculty/ken_french/data_library.html 
  
Unemployment Rate www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm 
  
NBER Economic Cycles www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html  
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Chapter Five 
Just a One Trick Pony? An Analysis of CTA Risk 
and Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract47 
 
 
Recently a range of alternative risk premia products have been developed promising 
investors hedge fund / CTA like returns with higher liquidity, transparency and relatively 
low fees. The attractiveness of these products rests on the assumption that they can 
deliver similar returns. Using a novel reporting bias free sample of 3,419 CTA funds as 
a testing ground, our results suggest this assumption is questionable. We find that CTAs 
are not a homogenous group. We identify eight different CTA sub-strategies, each with 
very different sources of return and low correlation between sub-strategies. To illustrate 
the difficulty of modelling the strategies we specify recently identified alternative risk 
premia from the academic literature as factors to examine the sources of return of CTAs. 
We find that these premia fail to explain between 56% and 86% of returns. Our results 
suggest that, given the heterogeneity of CTAs, while these new products may deliver on 
liquidity, transparency and fees, investors expecting hedge fund / CTA - like returns may 
be disappointed. 
                                                 
47 This paper has been accepted for publication in The Journal of Alternative Investments, expected issue, 
Vol. 20 No. 2.. The research reported in this paper has been presented at the FMA Europe conference, 
Lisbon, 2017. Lead author, John O’Brien, co-authors; Jason Foran, Mark Hutchinson and David 
McCarthy. 
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5. Just a One Trick Pony? An Analysis of CTA Risk and 
Return 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the fastest growing segments of the alternative asset management industry is 
alternative risk premia products. These offerings promise hedge fund like returns with 
higher liquidity, transparency and relatively low fees.48 49 The attractiveness of these 
products depends upon the assumption that it is possible to deliver similar returns to 
hedge funds. In this paper we test this assumption for one particular hedge fund 
classification by addressing two questions. First, does this particular classification of 
hedge fund actually follow a homogenous, easily modelled strategy? Second, are the 
returns of the hedge funds within this single classification easily modelled using 
alternative risk premia?  
We address these questions using a novel dataset of Commodity Trading Advisors 
(CTAs) as our sample hedge fund classification. We specify CTAs as they are one of the 
longest established hedge fund classifications, with an extensive academic literature 
providing guidance on their sources of return. Recently this academic literature has been 
accompanied by advances in alternative risk premia products which seek to capture their 
characteristics. We are also fortunate in having a comprehensive dataset of funds going 
back to 1987 which has been carefully cleaned of reporting biases. 
Our first finding is that CTAs represent more than a single homogeneous style. We utilise 
statistical clustering techniques to identify different types of CTA and classify them into 
eight sub-strategies. The different sub-strategies generally have low correlation between 
clusters, generating their returns from very different sources. Our second key finding, 
using alternative risk premia from the academic literature, is that it is difficult to model 
their returns. These alternative risk premia do not explain a large proportion of CTA 
returns, with the proportion of CTA portfolio returns explained by the premia ranging 
                                                 
48 While there is no standard definition we use the term “alternative risk premia” to describe the portion 
of hedge fund / CTA returns explained by non-traditional systematic factors. We are aware that this 
definition is also associated by practitioners with the terms “alternative beta”, “strategic beta”, “smart 
beta” and “factor investing”. 
49 It is difficult to gather data on alternative risk premia assets under management (AUM). Data from 
Morningstar for Smart Beta exchange traded products (which are predominantly equity related) gives an 
indication of the likely growth rates. AUM has jumped from $100bn to over $500bn between 2008 and 
2015. 
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from 14% to 44%.50 When we divide CTA returns into alternative risk premia exposure 
and alpha, we find that three of our eight CTA clusters generate alpha. 
From a practitioner’s perspective these results suggest attempts to capture the returns of 
CTAs face certain challenges. Since CTAs are a heterogeneous group it is difficult to 
reproduce their returns. Even sophisticated products which seek to track aggregate CTA 
performance are likely to have high tracking error due to the lack of a single identifiable 
style. Further, as noted, we find eight sub-strategies within our CTA universe. Given 
alternative risk premia from the academic literature represent a small proportion of the 
source of returns for each of these sub-strategies (ranging from 14% to 44%), it is 
difficult to make the case (at least for the specifications in this paper) that these 
alternative risk premia represent a close substitute for investing directly in CTAs. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section we review the 
literature and discuss how our results link to and extend the literature. In section 5.3 we 
describe our CTA dataset and the results of our clustering analysis. Next, in section 5.4, 
we describe the dataset and methodology we use to create our alternative risk premia. 
This is followed in section 5.5 by results on the alternative risk premia exposure of 
CTAs, using self-classification and statistical clustering. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of our key findings in section 5.6. 
5.2 Literature Review 
The literature on mutual funds and hedge funds has demonstrated that clustering is 
generally superior to self-classified styles for predicting cross-sectional past and future 
performance (Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Brown and Goetzmann (2003)). The 
difficulty with self-classification is that it provides latitude for funds operating in the 
same classification to conduct divergent behaviour and evidence for mutual funds finds 
that many funds within the same self-classification have quite different return generating 
processes (Brown and Goetzmann (1997)). Our paper compliments Kazemi and Li 
(2009) who divide CTAs into systematic and discretionary sub-classifications, showing 
the very different characteristics of these groups. In this paper we use clustering 
                                                 
50 In comparison for actively managed equity mutual funds risk premia fail to explain between 3% and 
22% of portfolio returns (Carhart (1997)). 
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techniques to put CTAs into classes based upon differences in how the funds generate 
their returns. 
In doing so we add to a prior literature on the performance of CTAs, which is generally 
positive (e.g. Schneeweis et al. (1991), Schneeweis et al. (1997), Edwards (1998), Liang 
(2003), Gregoriou et al. (2005), Kazemi and Li (2009), Gregoriou et al. (2010), Arnold 
(2012) and Schneeweis et al. (2013)), with the exception of two early studies (Elton et 
al. (1987) and Elton et al. (1990)) and a recent paper ((Bhardwaj et al. 2014)). There is 
also related literature which highlights the diversification benefits of CTAs as part of a 
broader institutional portfolio (for example Fung and Hsieh (2000), Edwards and 
Caglayan (2001), Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Mulvey (2012)), highlighting the strong 
performance in equity and bond bear markets.  
Advances in the alternative risk premia literature have focused on identifying risk premia 
jointly across all asset classes, that are constructed by forming portfolios of futures and 
options (in a manner consistent with CTAs) using signals generated from a range of 
variables. These global risk premia can be broadly classified as time series momentum, 
carry, value and options based. Research on the performance and risks of global time 
series momentum (typically known as trend following in the investment industry) is 
emerging in the literature (see, Baltas and Kosowski (2013), Hutchinson and O’Brien 
(2014) and Hutchinson and O'Brien (2015)). Despite carry historically being associated 
with foreign exchange (see (Menkhoff et al. 2012a) for a recent example) research has 
emerged focusing on basis (a measure of commodity futures carry) in commodities (Erb 
and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006)) and fixed income (Duarte et 
al. (2007)). Research on equity markets has traditionally found predictive power for the 
dividend yield (a measure of equity carry) though it has varied over time (see Ball (1978) 
for an early study and (Dangl & Halling 2012) for recent evidence of time varying 
predictability). Unifying research on carry in different asset classes, (Koijen et al. 2013) 
present evidence documenting the prevalence of carry as an alternative risk premia effect 
across all four asset classes. Likewise, while traditionally value is associated with equity 
markets, Asness et al. (2013)document the power of relative value across a wide range 
of asset classes. Finally, perhaps the first researchers to utilise options based factors for 
a CTA trading strategy were Fung and Hsieh (2001). They document the power of their 
options based factors in explaining the performance of a wide range of hedge fund 
trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh (2004)). We build upon this literature by specifying 
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these alternative risk premia to identify the proportion of CTA returns which is coming 
from non-traditional systematic sources. 
5.3 Data and Sample 
5.3.1 CTA Returns Data  
We use the BarclayHedge CTA database as our source of CTA returns data due to its 
depth of coverage. The BarclayHedge database includes both live funds and a graveyard 
file containing the returns of funds which have ceased reporting to BarclayHedge, 
eliminating survivorship bias.  
Table 5.1 
Database Cleaning and Sample Size 
The table shows the number of funds remaining in the sample after each successive stage of data 
filtering. 
 
 Funds  
Removed 
Funds 
Remaining 
    
BarclayHedge Live and Dead CTA Databases: Full Sample   5199 
Remove Fund of Funds and Indices 228  4971 
Remove non-USD denominated funds 504  4467 
Remove highly correlated (>0.99) funds 314  4153
Remove backfilled funds and pre-2002 non index funds 692  3461 
Remove funds without AUM: Sample for performance analysis 42  3419 
    
Remove funds with less than twelve return months: Sample for cluster 
analysis 
950  2469 
    
 
A number of filters are applied to the data to ensure it is representative of investors’ 
experience of investing in CTAs. First, funds of funds are removed as are any indices, 
leaving 4,971 funds. As is standard, we remove all non-US dollar denominated funds, 
focusing on CTAs which are denominated in US dollars. Funds which do not report net 
of fees, or report at quarterly intervals are also excluded. 
Our next step is to identify and remove duplicate shares. Following Jorion and Schwarz 
(2014) we use a return based filter to avoid duplicate share classes. If two programs with 
the same management company have a correlation of 0.99 or higher, then the program 
with the earliest start date is retained. 
Finally we need to address backfill bias. Recent academic attention has focused on how 
to address this bias without introducing further bias to the study. For example, Bhardwaj 
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et al. (2014) and Getmansky et al. (2015) remove any observations prior to the “date 
added” field in the TASS database. However, subsequent evidence by (Jorion & Schwarz 
2014) Jorion and Schwarz (2014) indicates that this approach is likely to overstate 
backfill bias, as many funds in TASS in fact report to HFR at an earlier date. Using 
TASS is further complicated by the merger of TASS with Tremont in the late 1990s. The 
“date added” field in the TASS database for the Tremont funds is not the date the funds 
were added to Tremont but the date they were merged with TASS, which is much later 
(Fung and Hsieh (2009)). Whereas for HFR the earliest add date is May 1996, which is 
most likely to represent the date HFR started to collate this variable (Jorion and Schwarz 
(2014)). 
 
In our study we take a novel approach to backfill bias. Since 2002, BarclayHedge have 
collated a “date added” variable for each fund, indicating when the fund was added to 
the database. This allows us to easily remove all backfilled returns for these funds, prior 
to the date they were added to the database. For pre-2002 data BarclayHedge provided 
us with the constituents of the BarclayHedge CTA Index. The BarclayHedge CTA Index 
is equal weighted and rebalanced at the beginning of each year. To qualify for inclusion 
in the index an advisor must have four years of prior performance history and must be 
reporting to BarclayHedge at the beginning of the year. Additional programs introduced 
by qualified advisors are not added to the Index until after their second year.  
As constituents are added at the beginning of each year, in order to qualify for inclusion 
in the index, a fund would have to be already reporting to BarclayHedge. Hence, pre-
2002 we only include a fund’s returns in our sample, if they have, or have in the past, 
been constituents of the BarclayHedge CTA Index.51 This leaves us with a sample of 
3,461 funds. As we need AUM data for creating AUM weighted portfolios of CTAs, 
removing funds which do not report this information leaves us with 3,419 funds.52 
Finally, in the paper we conduct statistical clustering to identify common styles of CTA. 
This technique requires a minimum of twelve months of returns. Interestingly, removing 
                                                 
51 There are 19 funds that are listed in the BarclayHedge CTA Index constituent list which are not in the 
database. BarclayHedge clarified that there are a number of funds who provide them with data solely for 
index calculation purposes, with whom they have an agreement not to re redistribute their data. A number 
of funds cease reporting to the database for a period before resuming reporting, leaving a gap in their 
return history. In this instance we remove all returns prior to the fund resuming reporting. 
52 There is evidence in the literature that the reported AUMs in hedge fund databases are not reliable. 
Funds tend not to update them and smaller funds may also have an incentive to inflate them. For robustness 
we report all results for equal weighted as well as AUM weighted portfolios. 
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funds with fewer than twelve months eliminates a further 950 funds. The quite 
considerable drop off in sample size for this step demonstrates the high attrition rate of 
CTAs who newly report to the database.53 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of funds within our CTA sample from January 1987 to July 
2015. There is a notable increase in funds from 2003 onward when BarclayHedge 
introduce their “date added” variable. While we recognise that our pre-2002 utilisation 
of constituent lists will introduce a downward bias to our performance results, as it 
excludes non-backfilled fund returns which are not in the index, our preference is to be 
conservative in providing performance estimates. 
Figure 5.1 
CTA Data Universe: January 1987 to July 2015 
The figure shows the size of the CTA dataset of clean returns over the analysis period. 
  
 
The descriptive statistics of the CTA dataset are reported in Table 5.2. For the full 
sample, from January 1987 to July 2015, an equal weighted portfolio of all CTAs earned 
annualised mean returns of 7.85% per annum, whereas an AUM weighed portfolio 
(rebalanced monthly using prior month reported AUM) of all CTAs earned 9.00% per 
annum. Post January 1994 returns are 5.40% per annum for the equal weighted portfolio 
and 7.70% per annum for the AUM weighted portfolio of CTAs. It is also notable that 
the volatility for the later sample is considerably lower, and Sharpe ratios are comparable 
                                                 
53 Removing funds with fewer than twelve months of returns upward biases the average returns of the 
sample used in the clustering results by 0.035% per month. These short return history funds earn an 
average monthly return of -0.49%. 
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in both periods at 0.38 (0.49) and 0.37 (0.56) for the equal weighted (AUM weighted) 
portfolios. 
Table 5.2 
CTA Performance: January 1987 to July 2015 
The table shows the summary performance figures for funds in the BarclayHedge CTA database. 
Summary performance measures are presented for both equal (Panel A) and AUM (Panel B) weighted 
portfolios. Annual return is the annualised average monthly return. Volatility is the annualised monthly 
standard deviation. Sharpe ratio is the annualised monthly return in excess of the risk free rate, divided 
by the volatility. 
 
 1987 – 2015 1994-2015 
 
Panel A: Equal Weighted 
  
    
 Annual Return (%) 7.85 5.40  
 Volatility (%) 11.35  7.26  
 
 
Sharpe Ratio 0.38  0.37 
 
 
Panel B: AUM Weighted 
 
  
   
 Annual Return (%) 9.00 7.70  
 Volatility (%) 11.20  8.80  
 Sharpe Ratio 0.59  0.56  
    
 Annual Risk Free Rate (%) 3.36 
 
 2.61 
 
 
 
We also report cumulative returns in Figure 5.2. Interestingly, the equal weighted 
portfolio outperforms up to 2001, whereas from 2002 onward the AUM weighted 
portfolio outperforms. 
5.3.2 Clustering Results 
We next move on to examine portfolios formed using robust statistical clustering. The 
literature on mutual funds and hedge funds has demonstrated that clustering is generally 
superior to self-classified styles for predicting cross-sectional past and future 
performance (Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and (Brown & Goetzmann 2003)). Self-
classification provides great latitude for funds to conduct widely divergent behaviour for 
funds operating in the same classification and evidence for mutual funds (which are 
subject to much stricter regulation than hedge funds) indicates that many funds are 
misclassified (Brown and Goetzmann (1997)). The advantage of clustering is that it 
objectively puts funds into classes based upon styles characterized by how the funds 
generate their returns. 
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Figure 5.2 
CTA Cumulative Returns: January 1987 to July 2015 
The figure shows the cumulative average return of the hedge funds in the Barclay Hedge CTA database. 
Cumulative returns are created for portfolios of CTAs which are equal weighted (Equal Weighted) and 
weighted by assets under management (AUM Weighted). 
 
 
As noted earlier, in order to be included in our clustering approach funds must have a 
minimum of 12 observations. Our sample is divided into eight clusters following Brown 
and Goetzmann (1997).54 We carry out clustering as an iterative process. First the 
exposures (correlations) of each fund to the risk premia are estimated. The clusters are 
initialised by assigning funds with common risk premia correlation into the same cluster. 
Next we calculate the time series of the average cross-sectional returns of each cluster. 
The next step is to estimate the correlation between each fund’s return and each cluster’s 
return. Using these correlations we reassign funds to the cluster with which they have 
the highest correlation. The process is repeated until no funds change cluster. 
Table 5.3 reports the reallocation of CTAs from their self-reported classification to the 
eight clusters. For most of the clusters naming is straightforward as they are closely 
aligned to a well-known industry style. However for several of the fund clusters there is 
                                                 
54 Choosing the number of clusters is a non-trivial issue. Choosing more clusters allows for more granular 
analysis of CTA sub-strategies, but risks introducing noise. While we follow Brown and Goetzmann 
(1997) who choose eight to analyse equity mutual funds (a far more homogenous group of funds than 
CTAs) we also repeated all of our analysis with as few as two clusters. These results, which are available 
from the authors on request, demonstrate the robustness of our key findings (low risk premia explanatory 
power and low cluster cross correlation) to the choice of the number of clusters. 
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no obvious match to a commonly accepted industry style. Hence, we name the clusters 
of funds based upon a combination of (1) their correlation with the average returns of 
the self-classified series, (2) the original self-classification of the majority of funds in 
the cluster, and (3) the fund clusters alternative risk premia exposures (reported in Table 
5.3). 
Table 5.3 
The Relationship between Self-classification and Clusters 
The table shows the re-allocation of CTAs from the initial self-allocated style to the eight clusters 
defined in this paper. For each self-classified category, the number of CTAs allocated to each cluster is 
given. Self-classifications with fewer than ten funds are not reported. 
 
 
Number of CTAs 
Diversified Trend 
Longer Term Trend 
Shorter Term Trend 
Fundamental Value 
Fundamental Diversified 
Fundamental Carry 
Discretionary 
Option Strategies: Short 
          
Undefined 40 4 6 5 4 3 4 5 9 
Arbitrage 48 3 3 3 12 6 4 6 11 
Discretionary 46 7 11 3 2 4 6 6 7 
Fundamental - Agricultural 83 14 7 7 7 13 17 6 12 
Fundamental - Currency 89 10 13 13 10 15 8 14 6 
Fundamental - Diversified 137 31 14 13 14 28 11 16 10 
Fundamental - Energy 28 4 3 5 5 2 4 2 3 
Fundamental - Financial/Metals 91 11 5 12 17 11 7 18 10 
Option Strategies 208 9 10 7 19 24 7 5 127 
Stock Index 196 12 17 23 43 27 24 12 38 
Systematic 61 12 6 11 3 9 10 5 5 
Technical - Agricultural 18 1 2 1 1 7 0 4 2 
Technical - Currency 263 17 27 53 44 23 27 50 22 
Technical - Diversified 866 379 124 90 46 50 33 112 32 
Technical - Energy 19 2 1 3 3 5 3 1 1 
Technical - Financial/Metals 250 49 34 37 26 23 29 30 22 
Technical - Interest Rates 20 2 1 5 1 2 3 2 4 
          
Number of CTAs  568 286 294 258 256 199 296 323 
          
 
The largest category, by number of funds, is Diversified Trend which is comprised 
mainly of the BarclayHedge “Technical-Diversified” category, while the smallest 
grouping is Fundamental Carry, which includes funds from a broad range of 
BarclayHedge categories and is positively correlated to the carry alternative risk 
premium. The Longer Term Trend category is comprised principally of funds listed in 
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BarclayHedge’s “Technical-Diversified” category and is correlated with the time series 
momentum alternative risk premium, itself a relatively longer duration signal. The 
Shorter Term Trend category is correlated with the option risk premium which appears 
to capture shorter term trend following effects. The Fundamental Value category is 
correlated with the value risk premium and has a negative relationship with the carry risk 
premium. The Fundamental Diversified category is comprised principally of 
BarclayHedge “Fundamental - Diversified” category funds and is related to the value, 
carry and option risk premia. Option Strategies: Short is made up predominantly of 
BarclayHedge “Option Strategies” funds and is negatively related to the options risk 
premium. Finally, Discretionary funds are comprised of a mixture of technical and 
fundamental funds, with no obvious match to the BarclayHedge categories or the 
alternative risk premia. 
The descriptive statistics of our eight clusters (both equal and AUM weighted) are 
reported in Table 5.4. The highest returns are generated by Diversified Trend and 
Fundamental Carry in the full sample from January 1987 to July 2015, while Diversified 
Trend and Longer Term Trend generate the highest returns from January 1994 to July 
2015. Fundamental Value and Option Strategies earn the lowest returns in both sample 
periods. The largest AUM is in the Diversified Trend, Longer Term Trend and 
Fundamental Diversified clusters.55 The median correlation between the return of each 
fund in a cluster and the average return for that cluster ranges from 0.40 for Fundamental 
Carry to 0.68 for Diversified Trend. Looking next at portfolios weighted by AUM, in 
Panel B, we can see that performance is higher for Diversified Trend, Shorter Term 
Trend and Fundamental Diversified, whereas for the remaining clusters performance is 
lower than their equal weighted counterparts. 
  
                                                 
55 AUM data is skewed by several relatively large funds. As at July 2015 greater than 60% of total AUM 
is invested in the ten largest CTAs. 
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Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics of CTA Clusters 
The table reports the summary statistics of the CTA clusters. The average annual return (Ret), 
annualized volatility (Vol) and Sharpe ratio (SR) is shown for each cluster. Results are reported for the 
full period, January 1987 to July 2015 and the period January 1994 to July 2015. Panel A shows the 
statistics for an equal weighted portfolio of CTAs and Panel B for an AUM weighted portfolio. The 
total number of funds (sample size) in the cluster and the AUM (USD billion as at July, 2015) are 
reported in Panels A and B respectively. In addition, Panel A reports the median correlation between 
the returns of each fund in a cluster and the average return for that cluster. 
  
 Median 
Corr. 
No. of 
funds 
Ret 
(%) 
Vol. 
(%) 
SR  Ret. 
(%) 
Vol. 
(%) 
SR 
          
   1987 - 2015  1994 - 2015 
 
Panel A: Equally Weighted Performance Statistics 
 
Diversified Trend 0.68 566 11.13 17.61 0.45  8.27 13.42 0.42 
Longer Term Trend 0.59 281 8.35 14.87 0.34  7.48 13.25 0.37 
Shorter Term Trend 0.54 293 7.10 15.07 0.25  6.40 11.37 0.34 
Fundamental Value 0.40 258 2.94 13.04 -0.03  3.13 11.35 0.05 
Fundamental Diversified 0.45 254 8.57 16.84 0.31  3.30 8.60 0.08 
Fundamental Carry  0.40 199 8.81 13.58 0.41  5.21 8.23 0.32 
Discretionary 0.47 295 6.12 7.92 0.36  4.64 6.76 0.31 
Option Strategies: Short 0.49 323 4.20 12.74 0.07  1.33 10.97 -0.11 
 
Panel B: AUM Weighted Performance Statistics 
 
  AUM 
($bn) 
Ret 
(%) 
Vol. 
(%) 
SR  Ret. 
(%) 
Vol. 
(%) 
SR 
          
Diversified Trend  65.5 11.28 16.57 0.48  9.79 14.37 0.50 
Longer Term Trend  164.1 6.25 11.12 0.26  4.84 8.80 0.26 
Shorter Term Trend  3.0 10.59 13.55 0.54  8.50 8.26 0.73 
Fundamental Value  1.6 2.36 9.00 -0.10  2.10 7.88 -0.06 
Fundamental Diversified  90.6 7.58 14.35 0.30  3.71 9.38 0.12 
Fundamental Carry   3.5 3.18 15.28 -0.01  3.97 9.78 0.14 
Discretionary  12.1 5.43 6.88 0.31  3.77 5.49 0.22 
Option Strategies: Short  2.9 4.40 13.36 0.08  0.66 9.06 -0.21 
          
 
The correlations between the different clusters are reported in Table 5.5. Unsurprisingly, 
Diversified Trend, Longer Term Trend and Shorter Term Trend are all quite highly 
correlated, with coefficients ranging from 0.35 to 0.64. Shorter Term Trend is also 
reasonably highly correlated with Fundamental Carry and Discretionary, highlighting 
that even those funds classified as non-trend, appear to share characteristics with shorter 
term trend followers. 
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Table 5.5 
Correlation of Cluster Returns 
The table shows the correlation between the returns of the eight CTA clusters over the period January 
1994 to July 2015. The results are shown for equal weighted (Panel A) and AUM weighted (Panel B) 
cluster performance. 
         
 
Diversified Trend 
Longer Term Trend 
Shorter Term Trend 
Fundamental Value 
Fundamental Diversified 
Fundamental Carry 
Discretionary 
Option Strategies: Short 
 
Panel A: Equal Weighted Performance 
         
Diversified Trend 1.00 0.53 0.64 -0.01 -0.07 0.36 0.44 -0.13 
Longer Term Trend  1.00 0.35 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.00 
Shorter Term Trend 1.00 0.04 -0.10 0.30 0.40 -0.19
Fundamental Value    1.00 -0.26 0.10 0.00 -0.04 
Fundamental Diversified     1.00 -0.08 -0.16 0.10 
Fundamental Carry       1.00 0.18 0.01 
Discretionary       1.00 -0.23 
Option Strategies: Short        1.00 
         
Panel B: AUM Weighted Performance 
 
Diversified Trend 1.00 0.40 0.60 -0.03 0.00 0.31 0.26 -0.06 
Longer Term Trend  1.00 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.00 
Shorter Term Trend   1.00 0.11 -0.03 0.27 0.23 -0.10 
Fundamental Value    1.00 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
Fundamental Diversified     1.00 -0.02 -0.05 0.19 
Fundamental Carry       1.00 -0.01 0.03 
Discretionary       1.00 -0.05 
Option Strategies: Short        1.00 
         
  
The clustering of CTAs has revealed a deeper and differentiated analysis of CTA returns. 
The results of these analyses have two major implications for practitioners. First, we find 
that the correlation between different clusters is low. This heterogeneity introduces 
major challenges to any attempt to model their returns, as there is no single identifiable 
strategy. Second, historically the performance of these clusters has been very different. 
Generally the returns of funds in the trend categories have been higher, accompanied by 
higher volatility, whereas the non-trend strategies typically have lower volatility and 
returns. Due to the higher historical returns, trend funds have also attracted the largest 
AUM. One needs to be aware of these characteristics when analysing CTA returns. 
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In the next section, to illustrate the difficulty in modelling the returns of the CTA 
clusters, we use three recently published futures based alternative risk premia (carry, 
value and time series momentum) and an options based risk premium, which has 
historically been shown to be correlated with the returns of CTAs. The result of the 
analyses will demonstrate the practical challenge of implementing futures and options 
based portfolios to replicate CTA returns. 
5.4 Alternative Risk Premia  
5.4.1 Futures Data 
In this paper we use four alternative risk premia, recently specified in academic 
literature, to capture the sources of CTA returns. To minimize potential data snooping 
bias we use the risk premia as published in the academic finance literature.56 
Three of the alternative risk premia are constructed based on the specifications provided 
in the literature and the fourth is downloaded from David A. Hsieh’s data library. In each 
case, the alternative risk premium is defined as the returns of a portfolio of underlying 
futures instruments, constructed from signals defined in the source literature. The 
portfolios are built from a combination of exchange traded futures and forward prices 
derived from spot data. We use a consistent data universe across all three alternative risk 
premia and follow the most common usage in the underlying literature when deciding 
on details. The data is from Thomson Reuters unless otherwise stated.  
The number of equities indices typically used in the literature range from nine 
(Moskowitz et al. (2012)) to eighteen (Asness et al. (2013)). We use universe of twelve, 
limiting the sample to one index from each country and to those with exchange traded 
data available over the majority of our sample period. The alternative risk premia 
portfolios for government bonds are exclusively created from synthetic futures, 
following both Asness et al. (2013) and Koijen et al. (2013). The data set consists of 
eight 10-year government bond futures. All commodity prices are based on exchange 
traded futures. The universe consists of twenty-two futures pairs, consisting of all 
instruments used in one or more of the original papers, with the exception of sugar, where 
we are unable to source data. For commodities the Thompsons/Reuters data is 
                                                 
56 Data snooping refers to the risk of yielding misleading inferences when statistical tests are performed 
after analysing the data. The risk being that while historical model fit is high the patterns in the data are 
spurious. 
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augmented with CSI data for some earlier periods. Finally, we specify synthetic futures 
for all currency prices. We use a universe of ten currencies and exclude the pre-Euro 
legacy currencies following both Moskowitz et al. (2012) andAsness et al. (2013). 
As noted above, portfolios and alternative risk premia are created from continuous 
cumulative excess return series for each of the instruments. Two methods are used to 
create these series. The first takes the price series for individual futures contracts trading 
on an exchange and combines these to produce a continuous excess return series. The 
second approach creates a synthetic return series by combining the underlying spot price, 
yield and risk free rate.  
The continuous return series created from futures is derived from the monthly price 
series. For each month, the return for that month is the return of the nearest to deliver 
contract, which trades for the full month. In effect, this means we are rolling contracts 
on the last day of the month prior to the delivery month.  
In the case of synthetic forwards, the excess return is defined as a function of spot price, 
yield and risk free rate. The excess return from buying a forward contract at the start of 
a month and holding it to month end, ݁ݎଵ, is given by: 
 
݁ݎଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎଵሻ ቆ1 ൅ ݍ1 ൅ ݎ௙ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (5.1)
where ݎଵ is the (spot) price return for the month, ݎ௙ is the one month risk free rate, and ݍ 
is the annualized yield. 
Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics of the futures data used in the study. In total we 
specify twenty-two commodity futures, twelve equity index futures, eight 10-Year bond 
futures and nine currency pairs. However, data is not available for all equity indices and 
commodities pre-January 1994, so for the earlier time period we have a reduced sample 
of nine equity index futures and thirteen commodity futures, in addition to the bond and 
currency data. 
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Table 5.6 
Futures Data 
The table lists the futures contracts included in the portfolios used to generate the risk alternative risk 
premia used in this study. Each future is listed with its average annual excess return, volatility and the 
date first included in the portfolio. The futures are divided into four classes; Commodities, Government 
Bonds, Equity Indices and currencies. All data series end in July 2015.  
 
 Start 
 Date 
Annual 
Excess 
Return 
Annual 
Vol. 
 Start 
Date 
Annual 
Excess 
Return 
Annual 
Vol. 
        
Commodity Futures  Equity Index Futures 
COCOA Jan. 87 -2.86 29.51 SPI 200-Australia Jan. 94 3.82 12.84 
COFFEE Jan. 87 -6.54 37.84 S&P TSX60-Canada Jan. 94 5.68 15.29 
CORN Jan. 87 -6.05 27.37 SMI – Switzerland Jan. 87 6.25 16.74 
COTTON Jan. 87 -3.20 27.45 DAX-Germany Jan. 87 3.74 21.38 
LIVE CATTLE Jan. 87 7.78 14.30 IBEX 35-Spain Jan. 87 3.82 21.51 
LEAN HOGS Jan. 87 -1.96 26.03 CAC 40-France Jan. 94 4.30 18.76 
SOYABEANS Jan. 87 4.02 24.13 FTSE 100-UK Jan. 87 3.26 15.38 
WHEAT Jan. 87 -0.44 26.86 HANG SENG-Hong Kong Jan. 87 8.50 26.57
BRENT CRUDE Jan. 94 8.81 31.48 MIB-Italy Jan. 94 1.94 22.25 
GAS OIL Jan. 94 7.60 31.80 NIKKIE 225-Japan Jan. 87 -0.14 19.51 
NY HEATING OIL Jan. 87 9.67 35.90 AEX-Netherlands Jan. 87 5.24 19.60 
LIGHT CRUDE Jan. 87 4.63 32.13 S&P 500–US Jan. 87 6.25 15.05 
NATURAL GAS Jan. 94 -18.84 50.66     
ALUMINIUM Jan. 94 -3.82 19.68     
SILVER Jan. 87 -0.02 28.18     
GOLD Jan. 87 0.13 15.53 Currency Forwards    
COPPER Jan. 94 6.26 26.03 AUD/USD Jan. 87 -2.91 11.57 
NICKEL Jan. 94 3.18 34.82 CAD/USD Jan. 87 -0.84 7.56
LEAD Jan. 94 3.21 28.69 CHF/USD Jan. 87 -0.46 11.38 
PLATINUM Jan. 87 4.22 22.21 EUR/USD*  Jan. 87 -0.12 10.67 
TIN Jan. 94 5.63 24.06 GBP/USD Jan. 87 -1.84 9.83 
ZINC Jan. 94 -2.64 25.71 JPY/USD Jan. 87 1.37 11.08 
  NOK/USD Jan. 87 -1.56 10.89
Government Bonds    NZD/USD Jan. 87 -3.89 11.88 
Australia-10Y Jan. 87 3.99 9.97 SEK/USD Jan. 87 -0.47 11.39 
Canada-10Y Jan. 87 3.65 9.24     
Switzerland-10Y Jan. 87 2.29 6.28     
Denmark-10Y Jan. 87 4.42 9.27     
Germany-10Y Jan. 87 2.92 7.01     
UK-10Y Jan. 87 3.24 8.93     
Japan-10Y Jan. 87 2.64 8.56     
US-10Y Jan. 87 3.08 9.14     
        
* DEM/USD prior to the introduction of the Euro in Jan 1999
5.4.2 Methodology 
In selecting the methodology to create the alternative risk premia, our goal is to use a 
uniform approach where possible, minimizing potential data snooping biases. In 
consequence where details differ in the literature, we take the simplest formulation. We 
initially create alternative risk premia at the asset class level, where each asset is equal 
dollar weighted, before combining asset class alternative risk premia into a final 
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alternative risk premium, where the asset classes risk premia are aggregated using an 
equal volatility weighting.57 
There are typically some variations in the literature in portfolio construction. We select 
a consistent methodology based on the simplest formulations. In consequence, following 
Asness et al. (2013) and Koijen et al. (2013), we do not adjust for volatility in individual 
assets (though we do at the asset class level) and look at the sign of the signal (long or 
short), not at its magnitude (following Moskowitz et al. (2012)). In effect the dollar value 
of each asset held in an asset class portfolio at a given time is the same. The market 
neutral portfolios are scaled so that at any time; 
 ෍ݓ௜௟௢௡௚ ൌ െ෍ݓ௜௦௛௢௥௧ ൌ 1 ܽ݊݀ |ݓ௜| ൌ
2
௖ܰ
 (5.2)
ݓ௜௟௢௡௚ is the weight of instrument i if a long position is held in that instrument, ݓ௜௦௛௢௥௧ is 
the weight of instrument i if a short position is held in that instrument and ௖ܰ is the 
number of instruments in the asset class. The time series momentum portfolios are scaled 
so that for any month, if long positions were held in all assets the sum of the weights 
would equal one, that is  
 ෍|ݓ௜| ൌ 1 ܽ݊݀ |ݓ௜| ൌ 1௖ܰ (5.3)
where ݓ௜ is the weight of instrument i and ௖ܰ is the number of instruments in the asset 
class. 
5.4.2.1 Value  
There is no single measure of value that can be used consistently across different asset 
classes and consequently we use a variety of formulations to generate the value 
alternative risk premia across the four asset classes. However, in each case, we closely 
follow the methodology used in Asness et al. (2013). For equity indices, we use the 
previous month’s market-to-book ratio for the MSCI index of the country as our measure 
of value. Equity indices with the highest (lowest) market-to-book ratio are considered to 
be relatively over (under) valued. For bonds, we use the 5-year change in the yields of 
10-year bonds as our value measure. Bonds with the highest (lowest) change in yields 
                                                 
57 By volatility weighting at the asset class level we ensure that there is an equal risk allocation to asset 
classes with very different volatilities (for example equities and bonds). 
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are considered to be most under (over) valued. For commodities we use the five year 
change in spot price, where commodities with the highest (lowest) five year return are 
considered to be relatively over (under) valued. Finally for FX we use the five year 
change in purchasing power parity as our measure of relative valuation.58 
Having identified our measure of value for each asset class we then form market neutral 
long/short portfolios at the asset class level which are long (short) relatively low (high) 
value assets.  
5.4.2.2 Carry  
The carry alternative risk premium is constructed following Koijen et al. (2013) and is 
similar to other methods found in the literature, such as those used by Bhardwaj et al. 
(2014) and Gorton et al. (2013). Koijen et al. (2013) find that carry predicts returns both 
in the cross-section and time series for a variety of different asset classes including global 
equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities. Accordingly, it is an appropriate candidate 
as an alternative risk premium to explain CTA performance. Koijen et al. (2013) define 
the basic measure of carry as  
 ܥ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ െ ܨ௧ܨ௧  (5.4)
where ܥ௧, ܵ௧ and ܨ௧ are the carry, spot price and future price respectively of an asset at 
time t. As the time to delivery can vary between assets, including those within the same 
class, the raw measure is annualized to allow consistent comparisons across assets. While 
the spot rate for financial assets is well known, the spot rate for commodities is less 
certain. Therefore, following Koijen et al. (2013), we use the two nearest futures as the 
basis for calculating commodity carry. We are able to apply a consistent approach for all 
asset classes to create the carry risk premium.  
Each month we sort assets within an asset class based upon their annualized roll yield. 
We then form market neutral long/short portfolios which are long (short) relatively high 
(low) carry securities. Finally, to create our carry alternative risk premium we combine 
                                                 
58 In the case of commodities and FX we use the average value for the previous 4½ to 5½ years to match 
the methodology of Asness et al. (2013). 
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the four asset class portfolios into one alternative risk premium, using equal volatility 
weighting. 
5.4.2.3 Time Series Momentum  
Although a long/short portfolio, the time series momentum portfolio differs from carry 
and value, in that it is not market neutral. The portfolio holds long positions in assets 
with positive momentum and short positions in assets with negative momentum. The 
portfolio is formed following Moskowitz et al. (2012) using a twelve month formation 
(look-back) period and a one calendar month return period. These are the most common 
definitions used in the literature (see, for example, Hurst et al. (2012) and Moskowitz et 
al. (2012)). The momentum signal is defined as  
 
ܯ௧௜ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ሺ෍ logሺ1 ൅
ଵଶ
௞ୀଵ
ݎ௧ି௞௜ ሻሻ (5.5)
where, ܯ௧௜ is the momentum of instrument i at time t and ݎ௧ି௞௜  is the excess return of 
instrument i at time t-k. 
A momentum portfolio is created for each asset class initially. Each instrument is given 
an equal dollar weighting within the asset class, before asset classes are combined using 
equal volatility weighting into one time series momentum alternative risk premium.59 
5.4.2.4 Options Strategies 
Our final alternative risk premium is the Fung and Hsieh (2001) options based trend 
following factor. We include this as an alternative risk premium for two reasons. First, it 
has consistently been shown to have high explanatory power out of sample for CTAs, in 
addition to other hedge fund strategies (Fung and Hsieh (2004)). Second, given a 
significant number of CTAs in our sample list “option strategies” as their primary 
category it seems plausible that the Fung and Hsieh (2001) alternative risk premia may 
also have high explanatory power for this group of CTAs. We expect a negative 
coefficient on the options premium for this group of CTAs as they tend to be short 
volatility. Fung and Hsieh (2004) model for diversified portfolios of hedge funds 
specifies three trend-following alternative risk premia, including Bond (PTFSBD), 
Currency (PTFSFX) and Commodity (PTFSCOM). To be consistent with our approach 
                                                 
59 We equal dollar weight at the asset level to be consistent with our other alternative risk premia. Using 
equal risk weighting has no effect on our results. 
132 
 
for value, momentum and carry we also include an Equity Index trend-following 
alternative risk premia (PTFSEQ) in our analysis.  
5.4.3 Alternative Risk Premia Performance 
The value, carry and time series momentum alternative risk premia generate returns 
(Table 5.7, Panel A) of between 2.5% and 4.5% per annum, with Sharpe ratios ranging 
from 0.45 to 0.76. In contrast, the option alternative risk premium generates returns of -
4.5% per annum, with a negative Sharpe ratio of -0.68. Though we use gross alternative 
risk premia returns for all of our analysis, for illustration Table 5.7, Panel B reports the 
returns for the alternative risk premia net of transaction costs, which have a small 
negative effect on performance, with Sharpe ratios now ranging from 0.41 to 0.74.60  
Table 5.7 
Alternative Risk Premia Summary Statistics: January 1994 to July 2015 
The table presents summary statistics of the four alternative risk premia used in the analysis; value 
(VAL), carry (CAR), time series momentum (TSM) and options (OPT). Panel A presents their key 
performance statistics excluding trading costs; annual return, volatility and Sharpe ratio. Panel B shows 
the same analysis net of trading costs, with the exception of OPT where trading cost estimates are 
unavailable. In both Panels the annual excess return is the return in excess of the risk free rate. Panel C 
shows the cross correlations of the four alternative risk premia. 
 
  VAL CAR TSM OPT 
 
Panel A: Alternative Risk Premia Returns 
          
 Annual Excess Return (%) 2.60  4.14  4.59  -4.35  
 Volatility (%) 5.52  5.33  6.50  6.53  
 Sharpe Ratio 0.47  0.78  0.71  -0.67  
          
Panel B: Alternative Risk Premia Returns, Net of Trading Costs 
          
 Annual Excess Return (%) 2.37  4.02  4.39  -4.35  
 Volatility (%) 5.51  5.32  6.49  6.53  
 Sharpe Ratio 0.43  0.76  0.68  -0.67  
          
Panel C: Alternative Risk Premia Correlations      
          
 VAL 1.00  -0.27  -0.34  -0.03  
 CAR   1.00  0.00  -0.24  
 TSM     1.00  0.23  
 OPT       1.00  
          
 
Cross correlations reported in Table 5.7, Panel C highlight the very different return 
characteristics of the alternative risk premia. Value has a negative relationship with the 
                                                 
60 Futures transaction cost estimates are taken from Hutchinson and O’Brien (2014). We do not have data 
on transaction costs for the options data. 
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remaining three alternative risk premia, whereas only time series momentum and options 
are positively correlated, unsurprising given the existing literature documents how the 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) alternative risk premia capture the return characteristics of trend 
followers, who pursue strategies related to time series momentum. 
5.5 CTA Alternative Risk Premia Analysis 
Next we combine our futures and options based alternative risk premia with our dataset 
of CTAs. We first examine the premia exposures and performance of the aggregate 
portfolios of funds before using our cluster styles, which are based upon how funds 
generate returns. Finally, we report results using self-classifications. 
The general equation we estimate to compute a CTA portfolio’s exposure to the 
alternative risk premia is: 
 
ݎ௜,௧ ൌ ߙො௜ ൅෍ߚመ௞௜ܣܴ ௞ܲ,௧
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜̂,௧ (5.6)
where r୧,୲ is the net-of-fees excess return on CTA portfolio i at time t,	αෝ୧ is the estimated 
alpha of the CTA portfolio, ߚመ௞௜ 	is the estimated alternative risk premia exposure of CTA 
portfolio i on alternative risk premia k, 	ARP୩,୲ is the return of alternative risk premium 
k in month t, and  ߝ௜̂,௧is the estimated residual.  
Table 5.8  
CTA Alternative Risk Premia Exposure: January 1994 to July 2015 
The table reports the results from a regression of the excess returns of CTA portfolios (both Equal 
Weighted and AUM Weighted) against four alternative risk premia; value (VAL), carry (CAR), time 
series momentum (TSM) and option (OPT). The regression coefficients along with their test statistics 
(in brackets) are shown. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.  
 
 ALPHA VAL CAR TSM OPT Adj. R2 
       
Equal Weighted Index 0.17  0.0699  0.0903  0.2043  0.2368  0.34  
 (1.45)  (1.91)  (2.45)  (6.69)  (8.03)    
             
AUM Weighted Index 0.32  0.0296  0.1064  0.2611  0.2382  0.31  
 (2.25)  (0.65)  (2.33)  (6.87)  (6.49)    
             
 
Our baseline results are reported in Table 5.8, where we report results for portfolios using 
all CTAs in our sample, formed using equal weighting and AUM weighting. For both 
portfolios three of the four alternative risk premia have a statistically significant positive 
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relationship with CTA returns. In aggregate CTAs are positively related to carry, time 
series momentum and the options alternative risk premia. The explanatory power of the 
model is relatively low at 34% (equal weighted) and 31% (AUM weighted), leaving 66% 
and 69%, respectively, of returns unexplained by the alternative risk premia. While both 
portfolios generate positive alpha ranging from 17 to 32 basis points per month, the 
AUM weighted portfolio alpha is significant at statistically acceptable levels. 
Having established that there is some statistically significant alpha earned by CTAs, 
albeit concentrated amongst the larger funds (AUM weighted portfolio), next we 
examine how that performance evolves over time. Figure 5.3 reports the results from 
estimating the alternative risk premia model using a rolling 60 month estimation period. 
Panel A (Panel B) presents the rolling alpha (t-statistic of alpha). The results indicate 
that there has been no deterioration in performance (alpha) over time and the t-statistic 
is in fact higher in recent periods, reflecting a lower standard error of the performance 
measure. Finally in Panel C we report the rolling adjusted R2 which shows that there is 
considerable time series variation in the explanatory power of our four alternative risk 
premia models, ranging from 20% to 60%. 
Figure 5.3 
Time Varying Alpha: January 1994 to July 2015 
The figures show the results of regressing the excess return of an equal weighted index of CTA 
performance against the four alternative risk premia over a rolling 60 month window. The figures show 
the monthly risk adjusted return (Panel A), the test statistic of the risk adjusted return (Panel B) and the 
adjusted R2 of the regression (Panel C). 
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Figure 5.3 - Continued 
Time Varying Alpha: January 1994 to July 2015 
The figures show the results of regressing the excess return of an equal weighted index of CTA 
performance against the four alternative risk premia over a rolling 60 month window. The figures show 
the monthly risk adjusted return (Panel A), the test statistic of the risk adjusted return (Panel B) and the 
adjusted R2 of the regression (Panel C). 
 
Panel B: Test statistic of the Alpha 
 
Panel C: Adjusted R2 
5.5.1 CTAs and Alternative Risk Premia: Cluster Analysis 
Next in Table 5.9 we present an analysis dividing the returns of CTA clusters into 
alternative risk premia exposure and alpha. Looking first at the equal weighted clusters 
(Panel A), the explanatory power of the models is modest with adjusted R2 range from 
14% to 44%. All of the clusters have a statistically significant relationship with at least 
one of the alternative risk premia. Longer Term Trend, Fundamental Value, 
Fundamental Carry and Option Strategies all have positive value exposure, while only 
Fundamental Diversified is negatively related to value. Fundamental Diversified, 
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and Option Strategies. Perhaps unsurprising, given their well-documented explanatory 
power in the literature, the Fung and Hsieh (2001) options based alternative risk premium 
is related to all clusters, except Longer Term Trend and Fundamental Value. Coefficients 
are generally positive, with the exception of Option Strategies and Fundamental 
Diversified.61 By creating these more homogenous clusters, we find that the explanatory 
power of the alternative risk premia is higher (relative to the full sample results) for the 
trend clusters, whereas it is relatively lower for the fundamental clusters. However, in 
absolute terms the explanatory power remains low.  
Table 5.9
Alpha and Alternative Risk Premia Exposure of CTA Clusters: Jan. 1994 to July 2015
The table shows the results of regressing the average return of each of the eight clusters on four 
alternative risk premia; value (VAL), carry (CAR), time series momentum (TSM) and options (OPT). 
The table reports the monthly Alpha, the exposure to the alternative risk premia and the exclamatory 
power of the regression (adjusted R2). Panel A reports the results for equally weighted returns and panel 
B for AUM weighted returns. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold. 
 
 ALPHA VAL CAR TSM OPT Adj. R2
       
Panel A: Equally Weighted Mean Cluster Returns 
   
Diversified Trend 0.41 0.1299 0.1686 0.8521 0.9520 0.44 
 (2.05) (1.04) (1.34) (8.15) (9.43)  
Longer Term Trend -0.02 0.2533 0.1066 1.0690 0.2016 0.27
 (-0.09) (1.80) (0.75) (9.07) (1.77)  
Shorter Term Trend 0.56 -0.0063 0.1516 0.1167 0.9255 0.28 
 (2.93) (-0.05) (1.25) (1.16) (9.52) 
Fundamental Value 0.18 0.6278 -0.6035 -0.1327 0.0400 0.23 
 (0.93) (5.04) (-4.82) (-1.28) (0.40)  
Fundamental Diversified  -0.05 -0.2766 0.3958 -0.1319 -0.2356 0.16
 (-0.33) (-2.81) (3.99) (-1.60) (-2.96)  
Fundamental Carry 0.17 0.3294 0.4161 -0.0278 0.4165 0.14 
 (1.10) (3.45) (4.33) (-0.35) (5.41) 
Discretionary 0.36 -0.0939 0.0206 0.0175 0.5128 0.25 
 (3.20) (-1.30) (0.28) (0.29) (8.82)  
Option Strategies: Short -0.60 0.2619 0.2386 0.2654 -0.7052 0.19
 (-3.07) (2.12) (1.92) (2.57) (-7.07)  
       
 
Perhaps of more interest initially for an investor in CTAs is the alpha. While we urge 
caution in interpreting these results as outperformance, given the low explanatory power 
of the alternative risk premia, alpha is statistically significant and positive for three of 
the clusters, Diversified Trend, Shorter Term Trend and Discretionary, ranging from 36 
                                                 
61 Given CTAs have different track record lengths it is possible that the characteristics of clusters vary 
through time. To investigate this we estimate clusters exposures in sub-sample periods. These results 
(available from the authors on request) are remarkably consistent. When we split the sample into two sub-
periods we find that only five of the thirty two risk premia coefficients change sign between the periods. 
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to 56 basis points per month. Unsurprisingly, given the low raw returns of 1.33% per 
annum, the Option Strategies have a statistically significant negative risk adjusted return 
(60 basis points per month).62 
Table 5.9 - Continued
Alpha and Alternative Risk Premia Exposure of CTA Clusters: Jan. 1994 to July 2015
The table shows the results of regressing the average return of each of the eight clusters on four 
alternative risk premia; value (VAL), carry (CAR), time series momentum (TSM) and options (OPT). 
The table reports the monthly Alpha, the exposure to the alternative risk premia and the exclamatory 
power of the regression (adjusted R2). Panel A reports the results for equally weighted returns and panel 
B for AUM weighted returns. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold. 
 
 ALPHA VAL CAR TSM OPT Adj. R2
       
Panel B: AUM Weighted Mean Cluster Returns  
       
Diversified Trend 0.42 0.2166 0.2945 0.9047 0.8660 0.36 
 (1.85) (1.51) (2.04) (7.55) (7.48)  
Longer Term Trend 0.14 0.0026 -0.1001 0.3876 0.1710 0.11
 (0.82) (0.02) (-0.95) (4.41) (2.02)  
Shorter Term Trend 0.59 -0.0150 0.0684 0.1388 0.4842 0.17 
 (4.06) (-0.16) (0.73) (1.79) (6.47) 
Fundamental Value 0.16 0.1932 -0.4173 -0.2277 0.0419 0.16 
 (1.15) (2.13) (-4.57) (-3.00) (0.57)  
Fundamental Diversified  -0.03 -0.2673 0.2487 -0.0471 -0.3182 0.10
 (-0.17) (-2.39) (2.21) (-0.50) (-3.53)  
Fundamental Carry 0.06 0.2910 0.4257 0.0087 0.4378 0.10 
 (0.33) (2.51) (3.66) (0.09) (4.69) 
Discretionary 0.23 -0.1475 -0.0603 0.0191 0.2313 0.10 
 (2.24) (-2.28) (-0.93) (0.35) (4.44)  
Option Strategies: Short -0.44 0.2169 0.1784 0.0857 -0.3954 0.09
 (-2.59) (1.99) (1.63) (0.94) (-4.50)  
       
 
5.5.2 CTAs and Alternative Risk Premia: Self-classifications 
As noted in the data section our clustering technique requires a minimum of twelve 
months of returns. As removing funds with fewer than twelve months of data eliminates 
950 funds and upward biases the average returns of the sample used in the clustering 
results by 0.035% per month, to ensure the robustness of our findings we report results 
based upon self-classifications in Figure 5.4. 
  
                                                 
62 Though the explanatory power of the models tends to be lower, alternative risk premia exposures and 
alphas in Panel B are broadly similar for the portfolios weighted by AUM. 
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Figure 5.4 
The Alpha of Self-classified Clusters 
The figure reports the alpha of an equal weighted index of each of the twenty self-allocated classes 
(Panel A) and the power of the alternative risk premia to explain the return of each CTA classification 
(Panel B), defined as the adjusted R2 of the regression. 
 
Panel A: Cluster Alpha 
 
Panel B: The Adjusted R2 of the alternative risk premia 
 
In terms of the relative performance of the different self-classifications of CTAs, in 
Figure 5.4 we report the alpha for each classification accompanied by the adjusted R2 
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showing the explanatory power of the model. The best performing classifications are 
Fundamental-Agricultural, Technical-Diversified and Technical-Financials/Metals, 
whereas the worst performers are funds classified as Technical Agricultural and 
Technical Energy. In terms of explanatory power both Technical-Diversified and 
Technical-Financials/Metals are the highest at 44% and 32% respectively. CTAs do in 
some cases generate positive alpha, but it is notable that there is considerable cross 
sectional variation in model explanatory power, with the alternative risk premia 
explaining very little for some self-classifications. 
Taken together the results presented in Section 5.5 suggest that the alternative risk 
premia factors specified in this paper are at best adequate in explaining the risk exposures 
of CTAs. With average explanatory power ranging from 14% to 44%, that leaves 86% 
and 56% respectively of CTA returns which are not coming from exposure to these 
alternative risk premia. This result demonstrates the challenge of specifying alternative 
risk premia to provide returns similar to CTAs. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This article was motivated by the observation that the future success of alternative risk 
premia products is dependent upon the assumption that they are able to adequately 
capture the returns of hedge fund strategies. While these products may offer advantages 
in terms of liquidity, transparency and fees, investors expect that they will produce hedge 
fund like performance. 
Unfortunately, for a comprehensive sample of CTAs we find evidence to suggest the 
likelihood of these expectations being met is not high, primarily due to the heterogeneity 
in the sample. There are significant differences in the return characteristics of these 
funds. Using statistical clustering we find that three of our eight clusters (Diversified 
Trend, Shorter Term Trend and Longer Term Trend) have some correlation though they 
differ in exposures to alternative risk premia. There is also a clear category of funds 
which can be classified as Option strategies, due to their negative relationship with the 
option based factors. The remaining four categories which we class as Fundamental 
Value, Fundamental Carry, Fundamental Diversified and Discretionary have varying 
exposures (both in statistical significance and sign) to each of our alternative risk premia 
factors. To avoid introducing data snooping bias we limit our analysis to tradable 
alternative risk premia which have been published in the academic finance literature. 
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These simple alternative risk premia illustrate the difficult of modelling CTSA strategies. 
The low explanatory power of these alternative risk premia is striking. Between 56% and 
86% of a cluster’s returns are not explained by the alternative risk premia. Hence, 
developing products based upon these types of constructs with low tracking error to 
CTAs will be challenging.63 
Looking at the portion of returns unexplained by the alternative risk premia, we find that 
on average CTAs historically generate positive alpha, though at marginal significance 
levels. Repeating the analysis focusing on within strategy self-classifications we find 
that Systematic-Diversified have historically offered the highest returns and 
performance. For portfolios of CTAs formed using statistical clustering our results 
demonstrate a lack of homogeneity amongst CTAs and reinforce our earlier finding that 
the category of funds with a high trend exposure (Diversified Trend) historically 
generated the highest performance. 
Finally we note that, consistent with the literature, our analysis of the long term 
performance of CTAs, using the largest backfill and survivorship bias free dataset in the 
literature from January 1987 to July 2015, indicates that CTAs have generated 
consistently high performance through time. Sharpe ratios for the period January 1994 
to July 2015 range from 0.37 (equal weighted) to 0.56 (AUM weighted). 
The implications for investors are significant. Attempts to capture the returns of CTAs 
using alternative risk premia face challenges. CTAs are not a homogenous group 
therefore their returns are not easily characterised. Given the lack of a single identifiable 
style, developing products which seeks to track aggregate CTA performance using 
alternative risk premia will be difficult to implement. To illustrate this, we find recently 
published alternative risk premia represent a small proportion of the source of returns for 
the eight sub-strategies we identify within our CTA universe. Hence it is difficult to see 
these alternative risk premia being a close substitute for investing directly in CTAs. 
  
                                                 
63 Our finding of low model explanatory power for CTAs is consistent with the empirical literature. For 
example, Kazemi and Li (2009) using a combination of sophisticated market, volatility timing and option 
based factors report maximum adjusted R2 for discretionary (systematic) CTAs of 18% (53%). 
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6 Robustness Tests 
This chapter expands on discussions of methodology presented in the previous chapters. 
In particular, it tests the validity of three assumptions used in previous analysis. 
Synthetic Futures: The methods used to create synthetic futures are discussed in detail. 
The validity of basing conclusions on analysis of synthetic rather than market price data 
is tested.  
Transaction Cost Model: This chapter surveys the literature to provide evidence on 
level transaction costs to test the cost model used in creating the time series momentum 
portfolios. 
CTA Fee Structure: The core purpose of this section is to test the assumption that CTAs 
generally charge a management fee of 2% and incentive (performance) fee of 20%. In 
addition, the trends over time in the structure of fees is presented.  
6.1 Synthetic Futures 
The use of synthetic future returns is common in studies of future trading across equity 
indices, government bonds and foreign currencies. They are used to increase the number 
of instruments in a study (Asness et al. (2013) and Koijen et al. (2013)) or extend the 
time frame (Moskowitz et al. (2012) and Hurst et al. (2012)). 
6.1.1 Methodology 
6.1.1.1 Synthetic Price Returns 
The general methodology used to create a return series is described in previous 
chapters64. This focuses on calculating the excess return of an instrument in a given 
month. The excess return on a future contract is the sum of capital gain and income less 
the cost of funding the investment. Assuming the income and risk free rates are known 
and continuous at the start of a month, the formula is 
 ݁ݎ௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ൬1 ൅ ݍ1 ൅ ݎ௧൰
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (6.1)
where ݎ௧ is the return on the underlying spot instrument for the month, ݎ௙ is the one 
month risk free rate and ݍ is the annualized yield. While this method can be applied in 
                                                 
64 See Sections 3.1.2.1, 4.3.1.2 and 5.4.1 
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theory across all asset classes, the nature of the different asset classes and available data 
results in idiosyncrasies in the methodology across asset classes, these are discussed 
individually below. 
6.1.1.2 Test Methodology 
The tests in this section are based on comparison of the returns of two sets of portfolios 
generated from the same instruments and over the same time period and using the same 
trading rules. For each asset class, two sets of time series momentum portfolios are 
created, one based on exchange traded data and the other based on corresponding 
synthetic data. The performance of these is compared to verify that synthetic price data 
provides a good proxy for market prices. The momentum portfolios are created using the 
standard methodology for this work. The signal is defined using a twelve month 
formation period, so 
 
ܯ௧௜ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ൭෍ log൫1 ൅ ݎ௧ି௞௜ ൯
ଵଶ
௞ୀଵ
൱ (6.2)
where ܯ௧௜ is the time series momentum signal for instrument i for period t. The analyses 
focus on two key features of the return series; cumulative return and monthly correlation.  
6.1.2 Equity Index Futures 
In equity index markets, synthetic future prices are generated from total return indices. 
As this combines both price return and income, Equation 6.1 can be rewritten as  
 
݁ݎ௧ ൌ ቆܫ௧்
ோ
ܫ௧ିଵ்ோ ቇቆ
1
1 ൅ ݎ௙ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (6.3)
where ܫ௧் ோ is the value of the total return index at time t. The risk free rate is defined as 
the one month inter-bank offer rate in the corresponding currency. Calculating the return 
series ex-post includes the implicit, but reasonable, assumption that the dividends paid 
during a month are known at the start of the month.  
The portfolios are created on the basis of twelve national stock exchange indices. These 
are the set of indices which have an exchange traded future over the sample period, from 
2000 to 2015 and sufficient data to calculate synthetic future prices. 
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The results are presented in Figure 6.1. There is no noticeable difference between the 
cumulative return series of the two portfolios (Panel A) and a high degree of correlation 
in the monthly returns (Panel B), with a correlation coefficient in excess of 99.9%.  
Figure 6.1 
Synthetic and Exchange Traded Futures Equity Index Portfolios: 2001-2015 
The figures below compare the performance of two sets of portfolios generated from a time series 
momentum trading rule from January 2001 to September 2015. The first set is generated from the 
historic price data of twelve exchange traded future (ETF) contracts. The second is generated from 
synthetic future contracts for the corresponding instruments. The synthetic returns are created from total 
return indices and local risk free rates. Panel A shows the cumulative return of the two series and Panel 
B compares the monthly returns.  
 
Panel A: Cumulative Performance 
 
Panel B: Monthly Performance Correlation 
6.1.3 Government Bonds 
As with equity indices, synthetic return series for government bonds are created from 
total return indices. However unlike equity indices, there is no equivalent underlying 
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basket comprises of US government bonds with maturities of six to ten years while the 
UK basket specifies nine to thirteen year maturities. The Australian government bond 
future is based on the 10 year interest rate and is cash settled65. The universe of futures 
is more limited than equities and the analysis is based on government bonds from six 
countries.  
The synthetic return series are calculated from the total return index of a 10-year constant 
maturity government bond provided by DataStream, so that, as with equity indices, the 
excess return is defined as: 
 
݁ݎ௧ ൌ ቆܫ௧்
ோ
ܫ௧ିଵ்ோ ቇቆ
1
1 ൅ ݎ௙ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (6.4)
where ܫ௧் ோ is the value of the total return index of the constant maturity bond at time t. 
The risk free rate is defined as the one month inter-bank offer rate in the corresponding 
currency. 
The performances of the two portfolios are compared in Figure 6.2. Examining the 
cumulative return of the two portfolios (Panel A) shows differences between the two 
series, unsurprising given the mismatch between the instruments underlying the future 
contracts and those used to create the corresponding synthetic contracts. However, the 
general pattern is similar. The two series are correlated (Panel B) with a correlation 
coefficient of 96%. The volatility of the synthetic portfolio is higher than that of the 
exchange traded portfolio, consequently results based on this portfolio understate the 
Sharpe ratio relative to exchange traded futures. 
6.1.4 Currency Futures 
Synthetic currency futures were created for six currencies against the USD, based on the 
contracts available on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) from January 1999 to 
September 2015. The continuous return series was created by combining MSCI spot 
rates with the one month interbank offer rate for the USD and appropriate currency.  
 
݁ݎ௧ ൌ ൬ ܵ௧ܵ௧ିଵ൰ ቆ
1 ൅ ݎ௧ିଵ௙
1 ൅ ݎ௧ିଵ௎ௌ஽ቇ
ሺଵ/ଵଶሻ
െ 1 (6.5)
                                                 
65 The contract specifications were sourced from the websites of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(www.cme.com), the Intercontinental Exchange (www.ice.com) and the Australian Stock Exchange 
(www.asx.com.au). 
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ܵ௧ is the spot price at time t, ݎ௧ିଵ௎ௌ஽is the one month USD interbank offer rate and ݎ௧ିଵ௙ is 
the one month interbank offer rate for the foreign (from the US point of view) currency. 
The formula respects the CME standard of quoting currency future prices as USD per 
foreign currency unit.  
Figure 6.2 
Synthetic and Exchange Traded Futures Government Bond Portfolios: 1993-2015 
The figures below compare the performance of two sets of portfolios generated from a time series 
momentum trading rule from January 1993 to September 2015. The first set is generated from the 
historic price data of six exchange traded future (ETF) contracts. The second is generated from synthetic 
future contracts for the corresponding instruments. The synthetic returns are created from total return 
indices of 10-year constant maturity bonds and local risk free rates. Panel A shows the cumulative return 
of the two series and Panel B compares the monthly returns.  
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Panel B: Monthly Performance Correlation 
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As in the case of equity indices, the spot price of the asset underlying the futures contract 
was available. Consequently the correlation between the return of each exchange traded 
future and its corresponding synthetic instrument is above 99.2% in all cases. The results 
of the two portfolios formed are shown in Figure 6.3. The cumulative return series (Panel 
A) of the portfolios are closely matched, however a minor drift in performance can be 
seen since 2008. The monthly return series have a correlation coefficient of 99.50%  
Figure 6.3 
Synthetic and Exchange Traded Futures Currency Portfolios: 2000-2015 
The figures below compare the performance of two sets of portfolios generated from a time series 
momentum trading rule from January 2000 to September 2015. The first set is generated from the 
historic price data of six exchange traded future (ETF) contracts. The second is generated from synthetic 
future contracts for the corresponding instruments. The synthetic returns are created from the underlying 
spot price and risk free rates associated with each currency. Panel A shows the cumulative return of the 
two series and Panel B compares the monthly returns.  
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6.1.5 Conclusions 
The three analyses above compare, in three separate asset classes, the returns of time 
series momentum portfolios based on synthetic and exchange traded future data. In the 
case of both equity indices and currencies the returns of the portfolios are highly 
correlated. There is more variation between the bond portfolios due to the mismatch 
between the underlying instruments of futures contracts and the prices used to create the 
synthetic returns. However, the general pattern is similar and monthly correlations high 
over a twenty-three year period. The synthetic portfolio has a higher volatility and 
performance of this portfolio (based on Sharpe ratio) understates performance relative 
to the exchange traded portfolio. Taken together, the results give no reason to invalidate 
the assumption that inferences based synthetic products will replicate those based on 
exchange traded data.  
6.2 Transaction Cost Model 
The proper incorporation of transaction costs is essential to robust conclusions based on 
simulated trading strategies. Understating the magnitude of transaction costs can cause 
significant problems in both industry and academic settings. In industry, it can lead to 
overestimation of the profitability (or risk premium) of trading strategies and consequent 
overtrading, while in academic research, it can suggest anomalies to the efficient market 
hypothesis where none exist, Lesmond et al. (2004) assign the excess return of cross-
sectional momentum to underestimated costs.  
A transaction cost model, described by Hurst et al. (2012) and presented in Table 6.1, is 
used throughout this work to maintain the robustness of conclusions. This model defines 
transaction costs for a one way trade as a proportion of the nominal value traded and is 
a function of asset class and time. As a consequence, transaction costs for instruments 
within the same class are equal at any point in time. The model splits the time sample 
into three periods where costs are constant; up to 1992, from 1993 to 2002 and from 
2003 on. The long period of constant costs in the first sub-period is based on analysis of 
transaction costs on the New York Stock Exchange presented in Jones (2002). This 
showed transaction costs remaining constant from 1930 to 1980, followed by a slow drift 
down from 1980 to 1990 and a significant reduction from 1990 to 1992. Hurst et al. 
(2012) calibrate the model by reference to one used by a large investment management 
firm.  
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Table 6.1 
Transaction Cost Model 
The table shows the transaction cost model used in creating simulated time series momentum portfolios. 
Costs are defined as a percentage of the notional amount traded for a one way trade.  
 
 1900-1992 1993-2002 2003-2013 
    
Equities  0.36% 0.12% 0.06% 
Bonds  0.06% 0.02% 0.01% 
Commodities  0.60% 0.20% 0.10% 
Currencies  0.18% 0.06% 0.03% 
    
Adapted from Hurst et al. (2012) 
 
Table 6.2 demonstrates the effect of applying this cost model to simulated time series 
momentum portfolios with a twelve month formation period, showing the returns gross 
and net of transaction costs. Over the full period, transaction costs reduce the return from 
19.18% to 15.81%, with a greater effect in earlier periods. Since 1992, transaction costs 
have fallen considerably and amount to less than 5% of gross profit. The magnitude of 
the costs relative to the gross return suggests that if the estimate used is reasonable it is 
sufficient to form the basis for reliable analysis and a detailed instrument specific set of 
models is not required. 
The rest of this section focuses on verifying that the transaction cost model is reasonable. 
Before discussion of the evidence the general methods used to estimate transaction costs 
is discussed. The bid-offer spread is a key measure of transaction cost used in the 
literature. An investor can buy an asset at the offer price and sell at the bid price to 
complete a round trip trade. The long period of constant trading costs implied by the 
model is largely based on the finding that spreads remained constant over this period 
(Jones (2002)). Commission may (see, for example, Szakmary et al. (2010)) or may not 
(see, for example, Burnside et al. (2006)) be included. Following the literature, 
transaction costs can be estimated as:  
 ܶܥ ൌ ஼௏ ൅
ଵ
ଶ .
ሺ௉೚೑೑೐ೝି௉್೔೏ሻ
௉೚೑೑೐ೝ   (6.6)
TC is the transaction cost, expressed as a fraction of the nominal value, consistent with 
the cost model used. ௕ܲ௜ௗ	ܽ݊݀	 ௢ܲ௙௙௘௥ are the bid and offer prices respectively, C is the 
commission charged and V is the nominal value of the trade. Tick size, the smallest 
allowed price movement, is often used as a proxy for spread on commodity exchanges 
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(Szakmary et al. (2010)). Locke and Venkatesh (1997) note that transactions can occur 
within the spread, indicating spread based models can overstate costs.  
Table 6.2 
The Effect of Transaction Costs on Simulated Portfolio Performance 
The table reports the average annual return of a twelve month time series momentum portfolio gross 
and net of costs. The results are reported for the full period and broken into three sub-periods, consistent 
with the three price levels in the transaction cost model. Results are expressed as an average annual 
percentage return. 
 
   Diversified Equity Bond Currency Commodity 
         
1950-  Gross Annual Ret. 19.18  5.87  5.80  2.32  3.11  
2014  Net Annual Ret. 15.81  5.18  5.31  1.83  2.06  
  Trading Cost 3.37  0.69  0.50  0.49  1.04  
             
1950-  Gross Annual Ret. 20.64  5.91  6.21  2.72  3.13  
1992  Net Annual Ret. 15.91  4.95  5.52  1.88  1.68  
  Trading Cost 4.72  0.97  0.69  0.84  1.45  
             
1993-  Gross Annual Ret. 22.68  5.81  6.86  4.13  4.55  
2002  Net Annual Ret. 21.63  5.59  6.74  3.91  4.19  
  Trading Cost 1.05  0.22  0.12  0.22  0.36  
             
2003-  Gross Annual Ret. 11.24  5.79  3.43  0.13  1.80  
2014  Net Annual Ret. 10.71  5.70  3.33  0.01  1.62  
  Trading Cost 0.53  0.09  0.10  0.12  0.18  
         
 
The evidence for changes in the relative level of trading costs through time is first 
discussed to verify key turning points in the cost function. Barclay et al. (1999) show 
that spreads fell by 30% when the NASDAQ was forced by the SEC to move from a 
quote based system to an auction system. Aitken et al. (2004) investigate the effect of 
the introduction of electronic trading on three specific exchanges in the late nineties and 
find that electronic trading results in a reduced bid-ask spread and consequently reduced 
trading costs. The general fall in transaction costs reflected in the model can be seen 
across a number of other asset classes. Subrahmanyam (2007) shows that spreads on 
individual equities in US stock markets and REITS both fall by over 80% from 1988 to 
2002, while Marcato and Ward (2007) show the spread on US REITS drops by 75% 
from 1993 to 1995, remaining constant after that (to 2005).  
Finally, evidence for the level of transaction costs from the literature is presented and 
compared with the levels indicated by our transaction cost model66. Burnside et al. 
                                                 
66 Evidence on transaction costs is prevented in a variety of ways, and may be either explicit or implicit. 
Where necessary, the data from the literature is converted to a measure compatible with our cost model. 
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(2006) examine trading strategies in currency futures and includes data on spreads for 
the period 1976 to 2005 and the sub-period 1999 to 2005. The average of the bid-ask 
spreads of four currencies against GBP (one month forward) is 21 basis points, 
equivalent to 10.5 basis points transaction cost per one-way transaction. The time 
weighted average of our model is 12.5 basis points over the same period. The average 
implied transaction cost for the period 1999 to 2005 is 3.3 basis points, compared with 
the model value of 4.5 basis points. Finally, the average spread falls by 65% between 
these two periods, consistent with the model estimate of 67%. While these figures are 
consistent with the transaction cost model used in this work, it should be noted that 
evidence also demonstrates significant heterogeneity across the different currency pairs 
which is not reflected in the model used in this work and the relationship between trade 
size and spread is ignored. 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) implement a trading strategy on Corn and Soybean futures 
from 1957 to 1968, their results implying a trading cost in the range of 25 to 35 basis 
points. Lukac et al. (1988a) use a standard cost of 100 USD per contract in their analysis 
of technical trading systems, indicating transaction costs in the same 25 to 35 basis point 
range for commodities and 2.7 to 4.0 basis points for currency futures. Over the same 
period the cost model estimates 60 basis point for commodities and 18 basis points for 
currencies Smidt (1965) uses a lower figure of 18 USD per contract for the period 1952 
to 1961, this represents a significantly lower estimate of transaction costs than recorded 
elsewhere in the literature or suggested by our cost model. Sweeney (1986) estimates 
transaction costs of 6 basis points for trading in foreign currency forwards between 1975 
and 1980. Szakmary et al. (2010) estimate transaction costs as 10 USD commission plus 
the minimum spread for a series of commodity futures. Converting this to a measure 
consistent with our model suggests transaction costs in the range of 3 to 6 basis points, 
about half the level of the model used here.  
In general, the transaction costs reported explicitly or implicitly in the survey of papers 
investigating trading strategies are close to or below the levels suggested by the cost 
model. In addition, the key turning points and different relative levels of costs indicated 
by the model are consistent with those reported in the literature. Taken together, the 
evidence suggests the model provides a reasonable, possibly slightly conservative, 
estimate of transaction costs.  
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6.3 CTA Fee Structure 
CTAs typically charge both a management fee, a proportion of assets under management, 
and an incentive (performance) fee based on investment returns, typically assumed to be 
2% and 20% respectively (see, for example, Hurst et al. (2012)).  
The estimates of CTAs’ fee structure in has significant impact on two important types of 
analysis. A fee structure must be assumed to convert the gross return of simulated trading 
strategies into net returns seen by investors and to estimate gross returns generated by 
CTAs trading strategies from results presented net of fees. The purpose of this section is 
to test the validity of assuming the 2% and 20% fee structure for these analyses. For 
convenience, this fee structure will be referred to as the standard structure.  
The analyses presented here are based on the cleaned BarclayHedge CTA database used 
in Chapter 5 and described in Section 5.3.1. This database is further processed to remove 
funds that do not charge any fees and a small number of funds where there are clear 
errors in recording the fees67.  
The method used to record the fees in the database has a significant limitation that should 
be borne in mind when reviewing the analysis below. The fee data is stored as a static 
item rather than a time series; that is only one value is stored for each fund. As a 
consequence, there is no indication whether these fees are associated with the entry of 
the fund into the database, are continuously updated or represent the fees associated with 
the final entry into the database. In the absence of other information, the analyses below 
assume that fee levels are constant over the life of a fund.  
6.3.1 Average Fees 
The first set of analyses, presented in Table 6.3, looks at the simple averages across all 
funds. The mean management fee is 1.82% and the mean incentive fee is 20.24%. While 
the incentive fee is very close to its standard value, the average management fee appears 
a little lower. The total fees of each CTA is then compared to the standard fees. While 
half of the funds charged the standard fees, 14% had higher fees and 23% had lower. It 
is not possible to estimate the relative levels of the remaining 14% of funds as these are 
a function of gross performance. Finally, there are a small but significant proportions of 
                                                 
67 These errors consist of the management fee and incentive fee being reversed. 
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funds that either don’t charge a management fee (11%) or don’t charge an incentive fee 
(2.4%).  
Table 6.3 
Summary of CTA Fee Levels 1987-2015 
The table summarises the fee structures reported to BarclayHedge by CTAs in the period January 1987 
to July 2015. Standard fees refers to a structure of 2% management fee and 20% incentive fee. Average 
management and incentive fees are first reported along with frequency of higher and lower overall fee 
structures. Finally, the proportion of funds charging specific levels of fees are reported. Results are not 
adjusted for assets under management or lifetime of the fund. 
 
 
Average Fee (%)  Fee Structure (%) 
 Management 1.82   2% Management Fee 55.06  
 Incentive 20.23 20% Incentive Fee 71.58
Relative Fees Levels (%)   No Management Fee 10.54  
 Standard 48.92   No Incentive Fee 2.40  
 Higher 14.03      
 Lower 23.93      
        
 
The most common fee structures are shown in Table 6.4. The standard model dominates, 
with half of CTAs using this structure. The next most common structure is 1% and 20%, 
with 7.79% of funds. The proportion of funds using other structures falls away quickly. 
The table highlights two general groups of fee structures which deviate from the standard 
structure. One group charges only an incentive fee, while the other charge the standard 
rate (20%) incentive fee and a lower, but non-zero, management fee. 
Table 6.4 
Common Fee Structures of Commodity Trading Advisors 
The table shows the eight most common fee structures reported by CTAs as recorded in the Barclay 
CTA database. The total sample size is 3,378 funds.  
 
Management 
Fee (%) 
Incentive 
Fee (%) 
Number of  
CTAs 
Proportion of 
CTAs (%) 
        
2.0  20  1,652  48.92  
1.0  20 262 7.76 
0.0  25  125  3.70  
1.5  20  125  3.70  
2.0  25 118 3.49 
0.0  20  102  3.02  
3.0  20  88  2.61  
0.0  30 80 2.37 
        
6.3.2 Fees and Volatility 
This section investigates the characteristics of funds that have atypical fee structures. 
The analysis focuses on the two most common groups identified above; CTAs that 
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charge the standard incentive fee but have a low management fee and funds that charge 
incentive fee only. The characteristics of these CTAs are compared to the corresponding 
values for CTAs with the standard fee structure. The analysis focuses on data from 1994 
as prior to this there an insufficient number of CTAs in the database to provide a reliable 
sample size. Cross-sectional volatility is used as a proxy for the risk of each class of 
CTA. For each month, the cross-sectional standard deviation of each class of funds is 
normalised by dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation of the standard fee 
funds. The relative volatility is defined as the average value of this measure. The results 
are presented in Table 6.5.  
Table 6.5 
Characteristics of Non-Standard Fee Structures 
The table compares characteristics of CTAs with an atypical fee structure to those using the standard 
structure. Results are presented relative to those of the standard fee structure. All reported values are 
statistically different from those of standard fee CTAs at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Fee Structure   Value (%) Relative Value Std. Error 
         
Incentive Fee Only Average Incentive Fee  25.57  1.28  0.02  
Incentive Fee Only Relative Volatility    1.38  0.03  
Low Management Fee Relative Volatility    0.78  0.02  
         
 
Looking first at the incentive fee only CTAs, these funds charge a significantly higher 
average incentive fee, 25.57% and have 28% higher volatility. In contrast to this, funds 
that charge a lower management fee have an average volatility level statistically 
significantly below standard funds. 
In the case of funds charging incentive fee only, the results are consistent with those 
funds compensating for the lack of a management fee by charging a higher incentive fee 
and running riskier portfolios. While in the case of CTAs that charge lower management 
fee, this fee level is consistent with a model where investors are compensated with lower 
management fees by funds running at lower risk levels.  
6.3.3 Trends in Fees  
The final analysis in this section focuses on the trends in fees over time. The mean fee 
(management and incentive) is calculated for each month as the mean fee of all funds 
reporting returns in that month. The results are shown in Figure 6.6 with management 
and incentive fees reported in Panels A and B respectively.  
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Figure 6.6 
Trends in CTA Fees 
The figures show the trend over time of the average management fee (Panel A) and average incentive 
fee (Panel B) reported by CTAs to BarclayHedge from January 1987 to July 2015. The average value 
of the management (incentive) fee in a given month is the unweighted average of the management 
(incentive) fee of all CTAs reporting a return in that month.  
 
Panel A: Average Management Fee 
 
Panel B: Average Incentive Fee 
 
The management fee (Panel A) has shown a downward trend over time, falling from 
3.2% to 1.6% over the sample period. The bulk of this fall was in the first half of the 
period from 1987 to 2002, since then the decline has been slower. The pattern is 
consistent with Peltz (1997) who reports average management fees of 2.5% and Irwin et 
al. (1993) who quote 2.5% for institutional investors and 5% for private investors. Both 
sources suggest an average level of incentive fees close to 20% 
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In contrast, the incentive fee (Panel B) has remain constant over the entire period, staying 
within a narrow band between 20 and 21% over most of the sample. It has fallen to 19% 
since 2014, but it is too early to place any significance on this. 
The last analysis, Figure 6.7, investigates the trends in fee structure over time. Panel A 
divides CTAs into three categories depending on relative fee structure, standard, higher 
and lower and shows the proportion of CTAs in each category over time. CTAs where 
the fee level relative to the standard rate depends on the gross return are included in the 
calculations but not shown. Panels B and C show the trends in the proportion of CTAs 
reporting different levels of management and incentive fees respectively. 
A long-term downward trend in totals fees is apparent in Panel A. Excluding funds with 
indeterminate fee structures, the industry has moved from a situation where 95% of 
CTAs charged the standard rate or higher in 1987 to one where 95% of CTAs charge the 
standard rate or lower in 2015. In effect, the standard rate has gone from being a lower 
bound to being an upper bound on fee levels. 
The standard fee of 2% is the most common, with over 50% of the CTAs implementing 
this level of management fee since 1999 (Panel B). In the first quarter of the sample 
period higher management fees dominate, with over 60% of fund charging above 2% 
(the highest level was 6%, reported by 34 CTAs). Since then the proportion charging 
relatively high fees has consistently fallen to its current level of 3%. The proportion of 
funds with management fees below 2% has followed the opposite trajectory rising 
steadily from 4% to 35% throughout the period.  
The 20% fee is the dominant level of the incentive fee, the majority of funds report a 
20% management fee since 1994, and it has remained in a range between 70 and 80% 
since 1999 (Panel C). Unlike management fees, there is a consistent reduction in the 
proportion of funds that charge either higher or lower levels of incentive fee. It is finally 
worth highlighting a small but growing proportion of funds appearing over the last five 
years that do not charge an incentive fee. 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
Over the full period the average fee levels were measured at 1.82% (management) and 
20.2% (incentive) close to and not significantly different from the standard level. In 
addition, 50% of CTAs apply the standard fee structure and it is the most common 
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structure by a considerable margin. These results justify the assumption of 2% 
management fee and 20% incentive fee and indicate that analysis incorporating results 
based on this structure are reasonable.  
Figure 6.7 
Evolution of CTA Fee Structures 
The figure shows the trend over time in the proportion of CTAs using different fee structures in the 
BarclayHedge CTA database from January 1987 to July 2015. The CTAs are classified as equal to, 
higher or lower than the standard structure. The results are displayed for total fee levels (Panel A), 
management fee (Panel B) and incentive fee (Panel C). 
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Funds with atypical management fee structures also have atypical performance profiles. 
The results are consistent with CTAs charging lower management fee as compensation 
to investors for running lower risk and running higher risk to compensate absence of 
management fees.  
Looking at the two fees individually, the mean incentive fee has remained flat over the 
entire period, and continues to be close to 20%, while the mean management fee has a 
distinct downward trend over the period, researchers may wish to allow for this time 
variation in some studies. The growing number of funds that do not charge an incentive 
fee appearing in recent years may reflect the recent fashion for alternative beta funds. 
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusions 
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7. Conclusions  
This chapter draws together the key findings generated by the research presented in this 
thesis. The evidence on the effectiveness of time series momentum as a trading strategy 
is first assessed. This includes a discussion of both the conclusions on long-term 
performance and the robustness of those conclusions in the light of the methodologies 
used.  
The following two sections deal with the relationship between the performance of time 
series momentum and the macroeconomy. The first is a narrow discussion of the 
relationship between its performance profile and financial crises. This is followed by a 
more general examination of the links established between time series momentum and 
general macroeconomic factors, including business cycle, economic variables and 
economic uncertainty.  
The key findings on the CTA industry, based on detailed analysis of the BarclayHedge 
database, are then presented. This includes discussion of long-term aggregate 
performance, trading strategies, and exposure to risk premia including time series 
momentum.  
The chapter concludes by highlighting areas where the research indicates further work 
is required.  
7.1 Performance 
Analysis of the long-term return profile of time series momentum is a constant theme 
throughout the research. Overall the three papers generated return series running from 
January 1925 to July 201568. In extending the performance record back to 1925, the 
analysis covers a longer time period than any peer reviewed work.  
The performance time series are obtained by measuring the returns of simulated 
portfolios generated from a mechanical time series momentum trading rule. The 
portfolios are constructed from futures contracts across four major global asset classes; 
equity indices, government bonds (both from 1925), currencies (from 1973) and 
                                                 
68 The sample periods are January, 1925 to June 2013, January 1950 to September, 2014 and January, 
1987 to July, 2015 respectively for the three papers. The years from 1940 to1949 are excluded from the 
analysis due to concerns about quality of data and operation of the markets around world war two. 
161 
 
commodities (from 1951). The returns are measured for a diversified portfolio, holding 
assets from the four classes and four sub-portfolios, each holding assets from a single 
class.  
The diversified portfolio produces a consistent stream of returns in excess of the risk free 
rate, with few extended periods of poor returns. These periods of poor performance are 
generally characterised by flat rather than significant negative returns. Over the period 
1925 to 2013, it generated a Sharpe ratio of 1.5. Splitting the sample into sub-periods 
highlights the consistency in returns, with Sharpe ratios of 1.3 and 1.2 for the periods 
1950 to 1979 and 1980 to 2014 respectively.  
The effect is replicated in the four major asset classes individually. A positive excess 
return is observed in each of the asset class specific portfolios. In the period up to 2014, 
the Sharpe ratios for the four sub-classes are measured at 0.96 (equity indices, from 
1950), 0.83 (government bonds, from 1950), 0.41 (foreign currencies, from 1972) and 
0.49 (commodities, from 1951). 
The robustness of this conclusion is a function of the methodology used to generate the 
return series. Three significant concerns with the methodology are identified and 
analysed; the use of synthetic rather than real price data, the proper incorporation of 
trading costs and the validity of using synthetic rather than exchange traded futures’ data. 
Failure to properly include transaction costs in simulated portfolios can make 
conclusions based on simulated returns unreliable, in particular under-estimating costs 
can lead to erroneous conclusions of excess return. Consequently, results presented in 
this research are net of transaction costs. The model used to estimate costs is verified 
through comparison with others in the literature and found to assume similar but slightly 
higher costs than typical, indicating the conclusions are robust to transaction costs. The 
use of a twelve month formation period limits the turnover of the portfolio and 
consequently reduces the stress on the cost model. 
While exchange traded data is optimum, it is not possible to extend the track record back 
to 1925 based on this type of data alone. It is necessary to create synthetic future data; 
that is replicate future return series from the underlying spot and risk free rates. In 
consequence, the simulated portfolios are a combination of exchange traded and 
synthetic instruments.  
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Although this technique is widespread in academic literature, its validity is explicitly 
tested here. The tests focus on comparing the performance of two portfolios, one created 
from synthetic data and the other from corresponding exchange traded future data. High 
correlation between the portfolios indicates that synthetic data can be used as the basis 
for valid conclusion. 
In a less formal approach to the same problem, a number of the analyses focus 
exclusively on the period after 1980, where portfolios were dominated by exchange 
traded futures. Time series momentum is found to produce a statistically significant 
excess return over this period.  
Finally, analysis of CTA returns reported to the BarclayHedge database, discussed in 
greater detail below, confirms the excess returns observed in simulated portfolios have 
also been obtained in financial markets by CTAs running time series momentum 
strategies.  
Taken together, these studies confirm that the primary conclusion of this section that 
time series return produces a consistent excess return is reliable.  
The presence of returns to time series momentum is tested indirectly by detailed analysis 
of a key feature of financial markets linked to time series momentum, auto-correlation 
of asset prices (Moskowitz et al. (2012)). The evidence for its presence is extended, 
showing it to be a feature of financial markets back to 1925 and across all four asset 
classes individually. It is linked more conclusively with time series momentum by 
demonstrating a positive relationship between the presence of the correlation and strong 
performance of time series momentum. The presence of this auto-correlation at lags of 
up to twelve months justifies the use of a twelve-month formation period for the trading 
rules used to generate portfolios. 
7.2 Financial Crises 
The research establishes a link between the performance of time series momentum and 
financial crises. Six major global financial crises spanning the period from 1925 to 2013 
are identified and, based on these, the sample period is split into crisis and non-crises 
periods.  
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The mean return to time series momentum in non-crisis periods exceed the performance 
in crisis periods by 11.5% per annum over the period 1925 to 2013. Using the shorter 
sample period 1980 to 2013, the difference ranges from 3.9% to 6.0% per annum 
depending on the definition of crises period. However, it can be noted that there is a 
lower average return in this periods. The same effect is seen in three of the four asset 
classes. Extended periods where no excess return is generated are identified in the 
aftermath of each crisis.  
Two approaches are used to support the conclusion of a link between time series 
momentum and financial crises. A sample of eight regional crises from 1977 to 2000 are 
used as an out of sample test. Although the individual crises differ significantly with 
volatile return series due to the limited portfolio, the data set was limited to relevant 
equity indices, government bonds and currencies, in aggregate a pattern of poor 
performance followed by reversion to long-term norms is observed following financial 
crises. This replicates the return profile of the global crises.  
Secondly, a change in the structure of markets in the period after financial crises is 
observed. Serial auto-correlation, associated with time series momentum, is observed at 
time horizons of up to twelve months. However, when markets are divided between 
crises and non-crisis periods, the relationship breaks down in the crisis periods. This 
effect is consistent across all four asset classes, emphasising the extent to which time 
series momentum is a feature of all markets. 
These two tests strengthen the conclusion that there is a relationship between time series 
momentum and financial crises. 
7.3 The Economy 
Time series momentum produces excess returns in a variety of economic conditions; 
across the business cycle and in both rising (1950 to 1980) and falling (1981 to 2015) 
interest rate environments. However, a number of links were identified between the 
magnitude of this performance and macroeconomic conditions. 
While the strategy has positive returns in both expansions and recessions, the returns 
vary with the business cycle. The average returns are statistically significantly higher in 
expansions relative to recessions. This result is robust to the definition of the business 
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cycle; NBER, GDP data or interest rate spread, with differences of between 5% and 8% 
per annum, depending on the definition. 
The link between time series momentum and the economy is investigated through the 
relationship between its return series and a set of economic variables previously shown 
to be important in explaining investment returns. While no relationships are found using 
linear models, some evidence of a conditional relationship is observed using the 
methodology of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
A further insight to the relationship between time series momentum and economic 
variables is obtained by decomposing the return series of individual assets into 
systematic and idiosyncratic components following the methodology of Grundy and 
Martin (2001). The systematic component of an asset’s return is defined as that part of 
the return explained by its exposure to economic variables. Portfolios, and subsequently, 
return series were generated from a time series momentum rule based on each set of 
returns. In both cases, a diversified time series momentum portfolio generates a return 
statistically significantly above the risk free rate.  
The return due to time varying exposure to these macroeconomic variables is about 40% 
of the total. This is consistent with part of the profitability of time series momentum 
being compatible with rational pricing models. A portion of the return can be explained 
as compensation for bearing time varying exposure to economic risk.  
The same pattern is seen when the data is split into two sub-periods around the year 
1980, with statistically significant excess returns generated by both portfolios in each of 
the sub-periods. It is noticeable that while the return of the systematic portfolio remains 
constant, there is a drop in the return to the idiosyncratic portfolio in the second period. 
While the significance of this should not be overstated, it may be a reflection of increased 
global correlation and represent a permanent fall in the efficacy of time series 
momentum.  
A link between economic uncertainty (also referred to as macroeconomic risk) and time 
series momentum is demonstrated. The novel methodology developed by Bali et al. 
(2014) is used as the basis for a measure of economic uncertainty. This uncertainty index 
is extended back to 1950, co-incident with the earliest availability of monthly economic 
data series from the US. The analysis highlights an inverse relationship between the 
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returns of time series momentum and economic uncertainty. The performance of time 
series momentum improves when economic uncertainty drops. Further this relationship 
remains statistically significant at lags of up to six months. 
This supports the previous conclusion that time series momentum tends to perform 
below average following periods of financial crisis and changes in the business cycle. In 
addition, peaks in the value of the uncertainty index are coincident with the crises 
identified in the study of the links between time series momentum and financial crises, 
justifying their selection. The relationship between economic uncertainty and the 
performance of time series momentum provides a transmission mechanism linking 
changes in macroeconomic variables to changes in the performance profile of time series 
momentum following financial crises. 
7.4 Commodity Trading Advisors 
The performance characteristics of the CTA industry are explored through extensive 
analysis of the BarclayHedge CTA database. The database contains performance and 
other data on five thousand funds, subsequently reduced to a data set of three and a half 
thousand following a cleaning process to remove duplicated and backfilled data.  
Backfill bias has been identified as a significant problem in assessing performance data 
from before 1994 (Fung and Hsieh (2000)). A new methodology, using records of index 
components, is developed to eliminate this bias. Applying this methodology to clean the 
BarclayHedge database extends the record of aggregate CTA returns back to 1987. This 
shows that over the period 1987 to 2015, the average aggregate excess return of CTAs 
is positive, with a Sharpe ratio of 0.38, net of fees. Further these returns are generated 
consistently throughout the period. Focusing specifically on the newly extended period, 
1987 to 1993, both the aggregate returns and the volatility were higher than in subsequent 
periods. It should also be noted that allowing for fees, the gross return generated by the 
underlying strategies are significantly above those delivered by CTAs to investors and 
subsequently reported to the database.  
In both industry and academic research, there is an assumption of a standard fee structure 
of 2% (management fee) and 20% (incentive fee). Analysis of the database shows that 
while this assumption is reasonable, there are some noticeable deviations, including 
significant cross section variation of fees. The average incentive fee remained constant 
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around 2% over the period. There is a downward trend in the average management fee, 
which falls from 3.2% to 1.6% between 1987 and 2015. A general fall in fee levels is 
reflected in the fact that the standard structure has gone from being a floor on fee levels 
to a ceiling. The research also highlights that some of the variation in fee levels is 
explained by funds having atypical risk profiles. 
Variations in performance profiles between different CTAs was investigated using 
statistical clustering. This allows eight distinct clusters to be identified objectively, each 
with a different return profile. Low correlation between the clusters emphasises the 
heterogeneity of the industry. In addition, comparison between the self-assigned 
classifications recorded in the database and the statistically derived clusters, shows that, 
as in the case of mutual funds (Brown and Goetzmann (1997)), self-classification is not 
a reliable guide to performance strategy for CTAs.  
Four risk premia are used to identified the return strategies of CTAs; time series 
momentum, value, carry and options. The first three of these have been recently 
formalised and are shown to have generated significant risk premia over the period 1987 
to 2015. The option factor is the widely used risk factor developed by Fung and Hsieh 
(2001). Each of the factors has explanatory power for the aggregate CTA performance 
index. In addition, when applied to the aggregate return series of the clusters, each of the 
factors has a statistically significant explanatory power for at least three of these. 
Only three of the eight clusters (representing half of the funds) are exposed to time series 
momentum. CTAs cannot be dismissed as a homogenous collection of trend-followers. 
The clusters characterised as following time series momentum strategies generated the 
highest Sharpe ratios, further emphasising the extent to which excess return to the 
strategy observed in simulations has been realised in financial markets. 
The portion of the returns explained by these risk premia is below 50% in all cases and 
falls as low as 14%. Clusters associated with trend following have the highest portion of 
their returns explained. This has significant implications for CTA investors. If CTAs are 
deliberately tracking these factors, apart from time series momentum, they are failing to 
capture a significant portion of available returns. In addition, the return drivers of the 
CTA industry are highly diverse and low cost replication of CTA performance through 
alternative risk premia funds is likely to have a high tracking error and unlikely to 
produce a reliable return stream.  
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7.5 Future Work 
This study presents strong evidence for consistent long-term returns in excess of the risk 
free rate for trading strategies based on time series momentum. Despite some success in 
linking a portion of those returns to risk premia based on economic factors, the research 
does not focus on a theoretical explanation for the returns. In particular, it leaves open 
the question of whether the returns can be fully explained through other risk factors in 
the efficient market hypothesis – arbitrage pricing theory framework, are an anomaly in 
need of explanation or should be regarded as a potential risk factor.  
This research has developed risk based explanations for part of the return of time series 
momentum through exposure to risk factors associated with the macroeconomy, both 
through time varying exposure to economic variables and through economic uncertainty. 
This indicates that some of the returns can be explained under the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Others have shown that a portion of the returns can be explained by 
alternative investment premia. However, in all cases, statistically significant returns 
above those associated with risk premia remain, explaining this potential anomaly to the 
efficient markets hypothesis provides motivation to further investigation of the 
phenomenon in the context of efficient markets, in particular whether it can be explained 
through additional risk factors or remains an anomaly. 
Time series momentum is also under-represented in the literature on behavioural finance. 
The explanation of return continuations is a major theme in the literature but discussion 
focuses almost exclusively on cross-sectional momentum in equity markets. There has 
been little effort to apply behavioural theories to the observed time series momentum 
effect despite, prima facia, the compatibility of time series momentum and behavioural 
phenomena. There is a need for greater analysis of time series momentum under a 
behavioural framework.  
In the absence of an explanation of the excess return through risk factors, consideration 
should be given to classifying the return as a risk premium. The return series to time 
series momentum is generated through the application of mechanical trading rules. This 
replicates the general methodology used to generate risk premia associated with 
recognised risk factors.  
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Variations of time series momentum has been long used in industry and investigated by 
academics, however the recent formal definition (Moskowitz et al. (2012)) has facilitated 
its study by creating a standard definition. A number of the findings in this research 
further assist this. Evidence for time series momentum, including both its performance 
and relationships between performance and other factors, is demonstrated consistently 
for all asset classes, indicating investigations should focus on global rather than market 
or asset specific answers to research questions. The evidence of links between time series 
momentum and auto-correlation in asset markets is further strengthened. While this in 
itself is not an explanation of time series momentum, it does provide alternative 
approaches to both investigating the effect and testing theories developed in the 
investigation.  
The study of economic links is based on US economic variables and conditions due to 
the limited availability of international data. This is despite the fact that the assets 
forming the basis of time series momentum portfolios are global. As more data becomes 
available in the future, global data can replace US data in the economic models. In 
particular, it is necessary to test whether use of the global data, in theory a better fit for 
the portfolio, can explain a greater proportion of returns to time series momentum in a 
rational pricing framework.  
The categorisation of all CTAs as trend-followers is an over-simplification. The 
investment class is heterogeneous, with about half of CTAs following some form of time 
series momentum based strategy. Links between four alternative risk premia and the 
returns of CTAs are established but the bulk of the returns remain unexplained. Further 
investigation is necessary to understand fully the return strategies used by this diverse 
collection of funds. The study highlights the low explanatory power of a number of risk 
premia, including value and carry, while also highlighting the significant risk premia 
associated with those factors. Taken together, these findings suggests that CTAs are 
either not directly targeting these risk premia or, if targeting them, failing to capture a 
large part of the available returns. Resolving this question can provide significant 
insights into the investment strategies of CTAs and their value to a diversified portfolio.  
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